Europeans about Europe: young intellectuals of six countries express their attitudes about the unification of Europe by Cornelis, P.
EUROPEANS ABOUT EUROPE 

EUROPEANS ABOUT EUROPE. 
PROMOTOR: PROFESSOR DR. F. J. TH. RUTTEN. 
© 1970 P. A. Coraelis and Swets & Zeltlinger n.v. 
EUROPEANS ABOUT EUROPE 
YOUNG INTELLECTUALS OF SIX COUNTRIES EXPRESS THEIR 
ATTITUDES ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE. 
A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
TER VERKRIJGING 
VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR 
IN DE FACULTEIT DER SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN 
AAN DE KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT TE NIJMEGEN, 
OP GEZAG VAN 
DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS DR. G. BRENNINKMEYER, 
HOOGLERAAR IN DE FACULTEIT DER SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN, 
VOLGENS BESLUIT VAN DE SENAAT 
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN 
OP 19 JUNI, TE 1 4 . 0 0 UUR 
DOOR 
PETRUS-ARSÈNE CORNELIS 
GEBOREN TE IJZENDIJKE 
1970 
SWETS Λ ZEITLINGER 
AMSTERDAM 
To my wife 
and our parents. 

Professors, assistants and students of the following institutions of higher 
education rendered their assistance. In the pretests: 
The College of Europe at Bruges 
The Europe Institute of the Municipal University at Amsterdam 
The Free University at Brussels (International Summer Course) 
In the actual enquiry: 
The Universities of Brussels and Louvain (Belgium) 
The Universities of London and Sheffield (England) 
The Universities of Paris and Nice (France) 
The Universities of Munich and Bochum (Germany) 
The Universities of Rome and Genoa (Italy) 
The Universities of Amsterdam and Tilburg (Netherlands) 
The Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.) at the 
Hague awarded a subsidy for the writing of this thesis. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation at Brussels granted a fellowship together with a fee for the English trans-
lation. The European Communities at Brussels granted an allowance for the cost of the 
enquiry and the publication of this book. 
CONTENTS 
Chapter I INTRODUCTION 
1. History prior to formation of European Community 
2. Opinions on Unification of Europe 
3. Need for further investigation 
Chapter Π PROCEDURE OF ENQUIRY 
1. Reconnaissance 
2. Purpose of the Enquiry 
3. The Construction of a Measuring Instrument 
3.1 What is an Attitude? 
3.2 Measuring of Attitude toward Unification of Europe 
3.3 Definition of the Image of Europe 
3.4 The Measuring of Knowledge of European Unification 
3.5 Collection of Personal Antecedents 
3.6 Motivational Distortion Scale 
3.7 Measuring Personality by means of a Questionnaire 
3.8 Compilation of the Definitive Questionnaire 
4. The Group of Student Test Persons 
4.1 Which Students? 
4.2 The Actual Enquiry 
4.3 Participants per Country 
Chapter III ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS TOWARD UNIFICATION 
OF EUROPE 
1. Europe Attitude Scale 
2. Scores on the Europe Scale 
3. Reliability 
4. Validity 
5. Attitude Scores by Various Sub-Groups 
6. Conclusion 
Chapter IV IS THE EUROPE ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS BASED ON 
KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS? 
1. The Knowledge Test 
2. Scores on the Knowledge Test 
page 
11 
11 
14 
20 
22 
22 
26 
27 
27 
28 
33 
34 
34 
35 
36 
38 
41 
41 
42 
44 
46 
46 
48 
50 
51 
53 
53 
55 
55 
57 
3. Knowledge Scores of the Various Sub-Groups 58 
4. Correct and Faulty Answers in the Knowledge Test 58 
5. Conclusion 60 
Chapter V CONCEPTION AND IMAGE OF A UNITED EUROPE 61 
1. The 27 European Countries in the Order of Preference 61 
2. Special Preference for Certain Countries 63 
3. Picture of Situation and Objectives of the Europe of the future 64 
3.1 General Situation 65 
3.2 Internal Objectives 66 
3.3 Vision and Expectations of a United Europe 67 
3.4 Critical Comments 67 
4. Image and Picture of Europe among Real Advocates of a United 
Europe compared with Non-Advocates of Unification 68 
4.1 General Situation 70 
4.2 Internal Objectives 74 
4.3 Vision and Expectations of a United Europe 77 
4.4 Critical Comments 80 
5. Conclusion 82 
Chapter VI PERSONALITY AND EUROPE ATTITUDE 84 
1. The Social Attitude Inventory 84 
2. The Meaning of the Factors R and Τ 85 
2.1 Conservatism (R-) versus Radicalism (R+) 85 
2.2 Tough-mindedness (T+) versus Tender-mindedness (T-) 85 
3. Factor Analysis of the Answers Received 87 
4. Scoring Method 90 
5. Reliability 90 
6. Validity 90 
7. Scores on the Attitude Inventory 95 
7.1 Positions of the Various Sub-Groups 95 
7.2 Position of Pro's and Non-Pro's on the Inventory 96 
8. Difference in Personality 96 
8.1 Position of Europe A ttitude with respect to Social A ttitude 96 
8.2 Answers to Specific Items of the Inventory 97 
8.3 The Picture of the Future Europe 99 
9. The Social Attitude of Students compared to Non-Students 100 
9.1 Conformity in the Distribution of Social Attitudes 100 
9.2 The Social Attitude of the Student Test Group 101 
Chapter VII WHY PRO OR NOT PRO A UNITED EUROPE? 103 
1. Important Criteria in a Europe Attitude 103 
2. Correlation between the Scores on the Europe Scale, the Knowledge 
Test and the Attitude Inventory 104 
2.1 Europe Scale and Knowledge Test 104 
2.2 Europe Scale and Social Attitude Inventory 105 
2.3 The Relationship between Europe Attitude, Knowledge and 
Social Attitude 106 
3. The Remaining Criteria 107 
3.1 Political Interest 107 
3.2 Political Party 108 
3.3 Nationality 110 
3.4 Travelling 111 
3.5 Knowledge of Languages 112 
4. Conclusion 114 
Chapter VIII LITERATURE REFERENCE 116 
1. Connection with Recent Investigations 116 
1.1 The Attitude in respect of a United Europe 117 
1.2 Governments and Countries in a Future Europe 119 
1.3 Knowledge of European Matters 119 
1.4 Differences in Social Attitude or Personality 120 
2. The Actual Significance of a Pro-Europe Attitude 121 
2.1 Suppositions 121 
2.2 Y a-t-il des Européens? (Salvador de Madariaga) 123 
Chapter IX SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS 124 
1. Theorem and Results 124 
2. Recommendations for Further Research 131 
3. On to a United Europe 133 
LIST OF TABLES 137 
LIST OF FIGURES 138 
LIST OF ENCLOSURES 138 
SAMENVATTING 163 
RÉSUMÉ 166 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 168 
RIASSUNTO 170 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 172 
EPILOGUE 175 

CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. HISTORY PRIOR TO FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The unification of Europe is a subject on which opinions differ widely. Partic-
ularly after World War II, when on the ruins of a shattered Europe, there were 
growing hopes that a strong combination of efforts of countries and peoples 
would offer a solution to the problems Europe was facing. Would it be 
possible for the old continent to recover in a combined effort? Would it be 
possible to put an end to the international conflicts which, within a period 
of 25 years, caused two conflagrations which affected the whole world? 
In 1946 in Zurich Winston Churchill expressed the thoughts of many 
Europeans when he said: 'We will have to build a kind of United States of 
Europe'. The time was ripe for joint activities. The Marshall Plan in 1947 
led to the estabhshment of the O.E.E.C. (Organisation for European Econom-
ic Cooperation) to ensure efficient distribution of the Marshall Aid and to 
stimulate the European economy by the creation of customs unions and the 
improvement of monetary relations between the countries. 
At the Congress in the Hague in 1948 the European leaders proposed a 
European Parliament to promote political and economic unification. A 
result of this was the foundation of the 'Council of Europe' in Strasbourg 
(1949). An organisation with vast authority, which had no power. In fact 
projects and major initiatives were strangled by the formal regulation of the 
'Comité des Ministres'. The right of veto reduced the Council of Europe to 
a periodic diplomatic conference. 
In May 1950 in the large 'Salon de l'horloge' Robert Schuman, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in France, read a declaration - in which Jean Monnet had 
played a very active role - and proposed to combine the coal resources of 
France and the defeated Germany in one organisation that would be open 
to all European countries. Real power would be delegated to one common 
organisation with restricted authority. 
11 
In April 1951 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg signed the Treaty which was to bring the European Coal and 
Steel Community into being. This first step was also aimed at bringing about 
integration on a much wider scale. Also aimed at laying the basis for a Body 
of Authority to pave the way for a common future target. England found it 
impossible to accept an authority with sovereign rights and stood aloof. Six 
countries had given birth to the first European organisation of a federal 
nature. The participating countries delegated part of their sovereign rights to 
the 'High Authority', whose members worked strictly for the benefit of the 
Community. The High Authority was subject to the democratic supervision 
of the 'Assembly' of parliamentarians elected from the six national parlia-
ments, and the juridical supervision of a 'Court of Justice'. The seat of this 
High Authority was established at Luxemburg. The common market for 
coal and steel, surpassing national boundaries, had become a reality. The 
results were soon felt. Within a year a striking expansion in the coal and 
steel trade in the six countries had been realised. After the achievement of 
these results efforts aimed at a next target: A form of integration resulting in 
a European Defence Community. 
On August 31, 1954 the new Europe received a painful blow. The French 
'Assemblée Nationale' rejected the European Defence Community and with 
it any provisional form of political integration. All strength was directed 
toward the expansion of the existing Economic Community. 
In 1955 the 'Six' declared that they would continue to give to Europe the 
place in the world and the influence it is entitled to, and to steadily raise the 
standard of living of its population. Following this, Paul Henri Spaak c.s. 
gave instructions to draw up a report on the possibilities of coming to a 
general economic union and to a community in the field of nuclear energy. 
In March 1957 the Treaty of the Common Market and Euratom is signed 
by the six in the Capitole at Rome. The goal of forming a common market 
for 180 million inhabitants is thus not only economic but also political. If 
Europe is to become a major factor in the world economy, it will - if it is to 
hold this place - be necessary to join more closely in order to eventually be-
come a 'United States of Europe'. In the first place a customs union was 
necessary to open the way for the free interchange of goods, persons, enter-
prises, services and capital in the six countries. Along with this went a 
common tariff to control imports from other countries. Firm agreements were 
made to ensure that these measures were taken before 1970. Secondly, 
a common economic policy should be adopted to replace the various national 
regulations by: cooperation in the agricultural field, mutual competition, 
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transport, relations with other countries etc. In order to realise all those 
aims an effective Body of Authority was indispensable. An independant 
European Commission was established on the pattern of the Coal and Steel 
Community, together with a 'Council of Ministers' which would represent the 
governments and make important decisions on the suggestions of the 'Commis-
sion'. This was all to be done under the supervision of the 'European 
Parliament'. The 'Court of Justice' was to maintain observance of rights. 
In 1958 the seat of the Common Market and Euratom was established 
at Brussels; the Commission was presided over by Walter Hallstein. On 
January 1, 1959 the first reduction in the mutual customs duties by 10% 
was introduced and the first commercial successes were registered in the 
course of the same year. The six decided to accelerate the completion of the 
Common Market; at the end of 1960 the customs duties were lowered by 
30% instead of 20%. The common economic policy appeared to be the 
big stumbling block, especially in the field of agriculture. 
In 1963 France objected to a link-up with England, which sought an 
appropriate form of cooperation. Contrasts among the six were becoming 
more manifest now. In June 1965 a crisis arose about a proposal from the 
Commission to abolish all customs duties and to establish an agricultural 
market to go into effect on July 1, 1967. Also the proposal for structural 
and financial reforms within the community was rejected. A shadow is cast 
over the European stage, which causes chilliness and prevents important 
decisions from being made. However, activities were continued behind the 
scenes. 
Mid 1966 fresh progress was made with regard to financing the agri-
cultural policy and July 1, 1968 was fixed as the date for a customs union for 
industrial products to go into effect. A year and a half prior to the date fixed 
in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The free trade of most agricultural products 
was also laid down on that date. 
1967 made a hopeful start. In April the first programme (till 1970) for a 
common economic policy was passed and a decision was made to standar-
dize taxes in order to come to a common system of tax on added value for 
1970 (V.A.T.). On June 30 the 'Kennedy Round' in Geneva in which about 
70 countries took part was terminated. The Community, which had in the 
meantime developed to the first commercial power of the world, defended 
a common point of view by means of its market commission. After three 
years of negotiation the largest post-war trade conference was finished. 
Tariff reductions on a world-wide scale, corn agreements and anti-dumping 
agreements had been laid down. 
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On July 1967 the treaty of 1965 for the combination of the Common Market, 
the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom became a fact. Mr. Jean Rey 
presided over this one European Commission. In that year the Council of 
Ministers acknowledged the necessity for taking measures to fill the techno-
logical gap between Europe and the U.S.A. and drew up a programme of 
action of six points. The first important step had been taken toward a joint 
scientific and technological policy. 
In May 1967 England applied again for membership in the Community 
of the six, followed by Ireland, Denmark and Norway on the basis of a 
detailed report. The Commission proposed to start negotiations with the 
countries concerned about a possible extension of the six. The Council of 
Ministers did not reach an agreement. France did not agree to the proposal 
of the Commission. The second European tragedy had become a fact; the 
differences among the six countries were coming to a head. 
In 1968, twenty years after the Congress at which the Council of Europe 
was bom, a new Conference is held in the 'Knights Hall' in the Hague. It is 
attended by 500 parliamentarians and has been organised by the European 
Movement. The French Government is not represented, although the leaders 
of the Anti-De Gaulle opposition are present. Students demonstrate and call for 
less talk and more action. Press, radio and T.V. bring the differences among 
the countries, particularly the E.E.C, partners, to the fore. There is little re-
sponse on the part of the general public. Has the wish for unification weakened 
or must we conclude that the Europeans have never been familiar with the 
conception of a United Europe? This question will be subject of our discussion 
in the next section. 
2. OPINIONS ON UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
Most enquiries on this matter refer to the opinions of people in the E.E.C. 
countries and England. Enquiries were largely held in the period between 
1950 and 1963 at the initiative of the United States Information Agency 
(U.S.I.A. 1957), the Unesco Institute for Social Sciences (1957), Readers 
Digest (1963), and the Information Service of the European Communities. 
The latter was carried out by Gallup International (1962) and we are paying 
particular attention to this one. In his excellent Survey 'l'Opinion publique et 
l'Europe, essai d'inventaire des connaissances et des lacunes', Rabier (1966) 
gjves a detailed representation of the enquiries held after 1950. Rabier provides 
a survey of the results of opinions collected in the same way and at the same 
time in various countries in the period from 1950 to 1962 as stated in the 
table below. 
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TABLE 1 
Survey of opinions on the Unification of Western Europe between 19S0 and 1963. 
The numbers in the various columns indicate (he percentages of the pro's. 
Period 
March 
September 
October 
February 
December 
April 
November 
May 
1956 and 
Jan./Febr. 
1950 
1951 
1954 
1955 
1955 
1956 
1956 
1957 
1957 
1962 
Netherl. 
57 
74 
— 
— 
— 
72 
— 
— 
79 
87 
Germany 
55 
70 
82 
73 
69 
79 
82 
79 
72 
81 
France 
56 
60 
63 
49 
45 
53 
67 
55 
74 
72 
Belgium 
57 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
80 
— 
66 
65 
Italy 
52 
57 
63 
55 
55 
66 
— 
59 
— 
60 
Gr. Britain 
51 
58 
78 
67 
66 
65 
70 
64 
— 
— 
Source 
Eric Stem 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
U.S.I.A. 
UNESCO 
Institute 
Gallup 
Internat. 
From this table it appears that in March 1950 five to six out of ten persons 
interviewed were in favour of Unification of Western Europe. In September 
1952, after the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community and the 
preliminaries for a European Defence Community, the percentages rose in all 
countries, particularly in the Netherlands and Western Germany. From 1952 
to 1958 the percentages are running up steadily, except some considerable fall 
back in February 1955, (this may be as a result of the rejection of the European 
Defence Community) to reach a peak in November 1956, coinciding with 
the acceptance of the Spaak report as a basis for the establishment of a 
Common Market. In May 1957 enthusiasm seems to have diminished, particu-
larly in France, although the Unesco Institute shows considerably more 
favourable percentages for the country in 1957. In 1962 we find that the 
tendency to rise has been maintained. The group of voters against a United 
Europe is exceptionally small. 
Gallup (1962) found an average of 5% opponents in the six countries with 
a maximum of 8% in France. The persons who declared themselves contra 
rather than pro or strongly against in answer to the question: 'To what 
extent are you pro or contra the efforts for the Unification of Europe?' were 
considered to belong to the opponents. The number of people having no 
opinion or those who did not wish to voice their opinions proved to be con-
siderably larger. According to Gallup the percentages of this category in the 
various countries are: 36% in Italy, 30% in Belgium, 20% in France, 15% 
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in Germany and 10% in the Netherlands. The makers of the Gallup report 
state that the most remarkable feature in the collection of the opinions of 
the general public in the six countries is: 'l'adhésion très large de ce public 
à l'idée de l'unification européenne.' 
After 1962 enquiries are made on a restricted scale only. Rabier also makes 
mention of an enquiry in France, by the 'Institut français d'opinion publique' in 
1966 on the question whether a European Community is materially possible; 
83% of the answer appeared to be positive. In Germany, where the 'Institut 
für Demoskopie' holds enquiries at regular intervals, it appeared that in 
December 1965 the public considered the integration of Western Europe in 
the form of a United States of Europe less possible or realisable than in 1961. 
In 1961 36% of the public thought this possible and 30% not possible. In 
1965 the figures were: 29% possible and 42% not possible. It must be ob-
served that in this poll the question was not if they were pro or contra a United 
Europe, or whether one thought that the Unification of Europe would ever 
be realised or not. 
Also in England it appears in 1966 that the population is more in favour of 
joining the Common Market than before. Social Survey (Gallup Poll) states 
that two thirds of the British are for joining the Common Market countries, 
provided that the Government deems this desirable. In 1961 and 1962, 
during the first negotiations on England joining the Euromarket, this 
number seldom amounted to more than 50%, says Rabier. Of course not all 
categories of the population are equally strongly pro Europe and it must be 
expected that beside the differences per country, there will be divergencies on 
the basis of age or environment, education or sex. In this respect it is interest-
ing to know the attitude of youth. Juveniles bom after the second world war 
have from their childhood been more or less familiar with the integration of 
Europe idea, they are more mobile than before and know the possibilities of 
crossing the boundaries of their own country and travel abroad. Young people 
are not burdened with ideas and prejudices of the past, less tied to established 
relations. 
The number of polls with respect to youth is plentiful although only few of 
them deal with their opinions about Europe. Rabier makes mention of some 
enquiries in Belgium and France in 1961/1962 by the Sociological Institute 
of the University at Brussels and by Walter Jaide in Germany between 1958 
and 1962. In Eastern Europe, namely in Poland, an enquiry was held in 1965. 
The results are different from expectations. First of all it appears that juve-
niles there show only a small amount of interest in politics. It is true that 10 
to 15% are involved and 30% interested, but 50% are indifferent or take no 
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interest at all; 5 to 10% are against politics or deny any form of a political 
community. These figures hardly deviate from those of the political interest of 
adults in the E.E.C, as stated by Gallup who mentions: 10% highly interested, 
32% interested and 58% little interest, or no interest at all. Also from 
direct questions about the Unification of Europe it appears that juveniles in 
general do differ little from older people. 
In Gallup's report the reporters observe that in no country youth shows 
more interest than the general public; nor does it express an opinion which is 
more in favour. By youth they include the age group from 20 to 34 years. 
There is a certain group among juveniles that feels probably more interested 
in politics and feels involved in the Unification of Europe. Enquiries held in 
Italy (Alfassio, Bertoni '64) and France (Lapierre, Noizet '62) point to a 
greater amount of preparedness for Europe among school-going juveniles, 
particularly those who study at a university, than the general picture would 
lead us to believe. Rabier supposes that it is to be attributed to the older ones if 
youth is not yet conscious of what a United Europe of the future may mean to 
them. The older ones know too little of the spheres of interest of the juveniles 
and do not speak their language well enough and do not listen to their ques-
tions. 
With Gallup no large differences are found between youths adults; 
nor is any significant distinction found between the various age groups. 
Sex does play a part according to Gallup. Men appear to be better informed 
and more Europe-minded than women, whose minds are less bent towards the 
future and who are hesitant in taking sides. 
With respect to the Unification of Europe it has also appeared that there is 
a great difference between people who are interested in politics and those who 
take no interest. This conclusion may be obvious and is at any rate confirmed 
by the outcome of various investigations. Table 2, which has been derived from 
Gallup, shows the percentages of ardent advocates for Europe among people 
who are politically interested and those who are not. 
TABLE 2 
Relation between political interest and opinion with respect to a United Europe 
The figures show the percentages of ardent Europe advocates 
Political interest France Belgium Netherlands 
Highly interested: 53 56 85 
Moderately interested: 35 51 68 
Little interested: 24 29 57 
Not interested: 16 17 40 
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Those who are highly politically interested prove to have twice to three times 
as many ardent advocates in their ranks as the non-politically interested 
category. Moderately interested persons are more pro Europe than those who 
take little or no interest. It appears that there are also differences among adher-
ents to various political parties in the E.E.C, countries, although, according to 
Rabier, it is difficult to determine which party holds most of the Europe advo-
cates and exactly where the strongest resistance is to be found. The parties 
in the various countries all have 60 to 80% advocates in their ranks, be it that 
extremely left groupings count about 60% pro Europeans, and the Socialists 
about 80%. 
There appear to be big differences among the various social categories and 
professional groups, particularly if they are classed according to income and 
educational level. The Gallup report states that industrialists, people in leading 
positions and those who practise a free profession are best informed and the 
strongest advocates of the Unification of Europe. In this they are essentially 
distinct. 
Shopkeepers and hand-workers are also for the greater part pro, but seem 
to be less well-informed. Working people are rather neutral and indifferent, 
though not inclined against the Unification of Europe. Dutch and German 
labourers deviate fabourably in that they are rather pro, whereas a smaller 
number have no opinion. Agricultural workers prove to be most reluctant 
with respect to Europe without openly voting against unification. 
On considering the results of the various enquiries and taking note of the un-
ambiguous opinions of the public, one might be amazed that the Unification of 
Europe has not long been realized. However, a more profound analysis of 
the data shows that objections can be raised to such an optimistic starting 
point. Even if there are many people for a United Europe, it appears from all 
enquiries, Gallup included, that information and knowledge with respect to 
this unification is scanty, even among the real advocates. In general, little is to 
be seen of personal action, any degree of sacrifice or even constant thought or 
attention to unification. 
The idea may appeal to the average citizen, providing he is politically inter-
ested, but it is too remote from his personal horizon for him to realize that his 
personal effort might contribute towards the realisation of integration. In ad-
dition, it must be said that he has never been approached personally or asked 
to pronounce an opinion in direct relation to elections for a European Parlia-
ment. Neither are the programmes of national and international political 
parties geared to entice their members to take action and make a direct con-
tribution towards Unification of Europe. Regional interests and national priori-
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ties spoil the view and prevent the eyes from travelling across the borders. The 
motives to deem unification desirable vary widely. Assurance of peace and 
improvement of personal welfare are listed higher than general economic pro-
gress and alliance with the European peoples (Gallup 1962). 
Europe seems to be more a function in the fulfílment of a pattern of con-
stantly changing needs than a thing that emerges from a rational ambition, to 
be more connected with one's own skin than to emanate from a sense of human 
solidarity. We have already seen that the number of Europe advocates among 
the various categories of the population is unequally distributed and that short-
sighted motives play an important role in the Europe idea. As personal or 
group interests are at stake the more resistance against unification appears to 
increase. In this connection Rabier makes mention of an enquiry in 1952 
(U.S.I.A. Public Opinion in Western Europe). In this enquiry immediately 
after the question about Unification of Europe, advocates were asked if their 
opinion would change if a European Government would take measures for the 
benefit of the general interest, that might be harmful to their own country. The 
results of this enquiry are shown in table 3. 
TABLE 3 
The percentage of advocates per country, in spite of possible harm to national interests 
Italy France Germany Netherlands Great Britain Average 
Pro unification 
of Western Europe 57 60 70 74 58 64 
Pro in spite of 
possible harm to 38 43 63 62 41 49 
national interests: 
Difference 19 17 7 12 17 15 
The percentage of advocates decreases by an average of 15% of the total pop-
ulation, the countries with the greatest number of pro's showing the slightest 
decrease. The average number of Europe advocates has decreased to less than 
50% ; of the original number of pro's an average of 15 % have been eliminated. 
The idea of a United Europe with only advantages for all parties involved 
seems to be popular. Also the absence of a strong, if small, opposition to 
unification in a period during which no thesis or idea remains unstirred, is a 
reason for reflection; not because advancing unification would give little 
cause to take sides, but because this progress is perhaps taking place out of 
the field of observation of the average European citizen. 
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3. NEED FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
Relatively little research has been done as to what is imagined when one 
thinks of Unification of Europe. In other words what are the expectations and 
what picture is conjured up? To many people, the Europe of the six is still a 
beginning which must be continued, though one wonders in what direction. 
Will it involve all Western European countries, as well as some Eastern 
European countries, or is it to be a Gaullistic Europe stretching from the 
Atlantic to the Ural? Does one think of a federation or of a Europe of separate 
countries (l'Europe des patries)? Many people feel for direct elections of a 
European Parliament; also for the establishment of a European Government. 
But what is meant then? A democracy, a people's democratic or a more or 
less authoritative Government? Does one think of a self-supporting Europe 
independent of other world powers or just allied with them? If so, with what 
countries? 
What are the main objectives of a joint Europe? How is this related to 
mutual integration of home and foreign affairs, languages, development aid 
and the armed forces? In this field it clearly appears that our knowledge of 
what the European of to-day really wants is very limited. One may doubt if it 
is necessary to know all this, but one may not dispute the fact that it is 
desirable to know more of the attitude and ideas of people, even if this may 
be at the expense of the glitter of a European adventure, if one wants to create 
real unity. It will prove increasingly necessary in the world of to-day and to-
morrow to take into account the wishes and needs of many - often opposing -
groups. 
The field of investigation seems to unconditionally oppose the possibility 
of taking a step forward within a reasonable period. One may wonder what 
the differences in principle are, where the basis lies of the various view points 
with respect to the Unification of Europe. Already from the first and most 
elementary talks between people it appears that even between advocates of a 
United Europe there are differences of opinion about partners in that 
community, form of government, objectives and the policy to be adopted. 
It is thought here that differences of opinion are to be interpreted on the 
ground of nationality or people, differences of opinion caused by ideology 
and philosophy perhaps on the ground of character or personality structure. 
Another question possibly equally important to the first one is what the 
ideas of the opposition are about a United Europe and what structure will be 
most acceptable to them if unification materialises. Of course one is desirous 
of tracing more closely the real meaning of being pro-Europe. What picture 
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the opposition has formed about this Europe and why they feel for it. 
In brief one has become curious and starts wondering if common traits can be 
distinguished among the advocates. Maybe the genuine European is already 
in existence as a type, and recognisable by his antecedents. 
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CHAPTER II. 
PROCEDURE OF ENQUIRY 
1. RECONNAISSANCE 
As a start it seemed desirable to have a number of interviews in order to gain 
an impression of the prevailing opinions on European Unification. An oppor-
tunity presented itself during a stay in Spain, where a number of persons 
from various countries proved to be willing to exchange views. The majority 
of the persons expressed a wish for a United Europe, a minority appeared to 
be moderately interested and there was only one person opposed. On the 
basis of these discussions a questionnaire was drawn up. Of the 50 questions, 
one third referred to European integration. The purpose of the other questions 
was to check opinions on some 6 European countries and their inhabitants. 
— The questions on Europe enquired about: General impression, such 
as do you feel for a United Europe, do you think it a real issue, do you ever 
think of it, will it ever materialise? 
— Preparedness to undertake something in its favour: would you be willing 
to serve in a European army, work one hour for the benefit of a United 
Europe, pay 2% Europe tax, settle outside your own country? 
— Whether one had ever done anything in this field: reading a European 
magazine, membership of a European Movement, or political party. If when 
voting one had ever thought of a United Europe. 
— The picture of this Europe: as a large country, as a Federation or 
Federated States. The purpose of a United Europe, whether one had objec-
tions, if so what? 
The questions referring to the opinions on certain European countries 
were meant to check which of the E.E.C, countries and England was the 
most important in the minds of the persons interrogated (except their own 
country). 
— In power and prestige in general and from the point of view of politics, 
economics and militarism, the trust or distrust of this power. 
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— In social respect: democratic government, education and social con-
ditions. 
— In culture and language and practice of science. 
In addition, sympathy and antipathy were checked in questions about pref-
erence for settling in a country outside one's own, for certain foreigners 
in one's own country and if one had to choose a room-mate. Further questions 
were asked about degree of kindness of certain peoples. See Enclosure 1. 
The questionnaire was completed by 30 persons; 5 were Dutch, 5 Belgian, 
5 French, 5 German, 5 Italian and 5 EngUsh. All these 30 persons found the 
Unification of Europe an important or very important matter. 90% appeared 
to be advocates of European integration. The amount of preparedness, at 
least in theory, was not small. 80% were prepared to serve in a European army 
or in a women's auxiliary corps; 70% to pay Europe tax, 75% to live abroad 
and 50% willing to work one hour a week for a United Europe if this should be 
required. As active came to the fore: 35 % who regularly thought about Unifica-
tion of Europe, 30% had involved Europe in their vote, while 17% read a 
European magazine now and then; 13% had done some work for a European 
organisation and 11 % were members of a political party. 
The picture one had of a Europe of the future was far from sharp. The 
majority preferred a federation of countries, but not before the different alter-
natives had been explained and elucidated. The purpose of European inte-
gration was to ensure peace and good mutual understanding among peoples. 
Less preference was shown for the development of the economy or the 
establishment of an independant European power. More than 50% of the 
persons questioned summed up realistic objections to a United Europe, among 
which were fear of loss of culture, elimination of national independence, 
domination by one of the member states, economic drawbacks, and unrest in 
the first few years, clashes with America or Russia and a fear of a European 
(third) power. Of some 10 persons tested we traced the reasons for their 
answers in a certain way. In general a vague motive came to the fore; a faulty 
interpretation of the question asked, limited knowledge of the particular 
subject, a tendency to make a given answer less positive. A small number of 
persons appeared to be able to give a considerably better appreciation of the 
exact meaning of the questions, to be more familiar with the subject and 
showed more ability in formulating their motives. The latter category largely 
appeared to have had a higher or academic education. 
The group consisted of 24 men and 6 women. It appeared that the women 
had three times as many 'no opinion' than the men and had hardly any objec-
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tion to the integration. Two thirds of the men appeared to have objections. 
The men appeared to be much more familiar with the subject than the women. 
15 persons were older than 35 years. No great differences appeared be-
tween these two groups. People with a higher education and a higher income 
appeared more interested in politics and had more objections to a United 
Europe than those in the lower education and income group. Politically 
interested persons largely expected the European integration to be realised 
in 5 to 10 years and considered an independent European power and policy 
a very important matter. Persons with no interest in politics did not expect 
the integration to take place until after more than 10 years and proved 
to be particularly interested in personal welfare and economic developments. 
In brief, in spite of a high degree of concord on the European integration there 
were considerable differences with respect to expectations and image of the 
Europe of the future. 
The second part of the test questions on the six countries and their inhabitants 
brought some remarkable discrepancies to light. In this connection it should 
be mentioned that the test persons were only reluctantly willing to voice their 
distrust or antipathy with respect to a particular country. It was striking to learn 
how moderate the role was they meted out to Belgium and the Netherlands, 
although the Dutch are found to be kind and it was said they could be relied 
upon in periods of crisis. Italy got an unfavourable mark particularly in the 
scientific and social fields. 
The emphasis is laid on England and Germany and partly on France. 
Germany was considered important, economically powerful, strong in science 
and military power; confidence in its economy proved to be rather great; in its 
military power little confidence was shown. England was also considered to 
be important, democratic and strong in education. The English language was 
considered to be the most important in Europe. Politically England came 
strongly to the fore, and met with great confidence: England was allowed to 
play a dominant role and her military power was no point of fear. France got a 
high amount of appreciation for its culture, and its language was marked as 
being rather important. One was gladly willing to share rooms with the French 
(contrary to with the Germans) and one liked to live in France. The French 
(and the English) were also welcome to the countries of the other nationalities. 
The political power of France and the kindness of the French appeared to be 
in dispute. 
In general the positive amount of appreciation for England was striking, 
particularly the importance of the country and the role one was willing to 
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award to England in the frame-work of Europe (influence and language). 
Nevertheless, it would have to be corroborated in a more exact and full enquiry 
whether this picture is an accurate one. If this should be the case one would be 
inclined to presume some connection between the resistance from certain 
quarters against England joining the six and the role that might be awarded 
to England when she would indeed join the European Community. 
The main conclusion from this pre-test is the great number of advocates 
for Europe and the willingness to undertake action for this unification. In 
addition, it is striking that there is little activity and knowledge in this field. 
A vague motivation and pretty large differences in the picture visualised of a 
future Europe further prove that there are considerable differences in the 
amount of appreciation for and confidence in the eventual partners of a 
European Community, on the ground of which it was interesting to find out 
which countries would be included in a United Europe with preference. 
Thispre-testmade the need felt for a better instrument to measure the attitude 
and picture with respect to the future of Europe. At the same time it was felt 
desirable to select beforehand test persons with a certain amount of knowledge 
on the subject, a critical attitude and who are in a position to formulate an 
opinion. In order to promote comparability of the various countries and to 
restrict the number of variables, it was further deemed advisable to involve in 
the enquiry groups of persons with a similar level of education, intelligence 
and frame of reference. 
Newcomb (1952) says about this: only when people perceive information 
against a background of about the same frame of reference is there a good 
chance that the intention will be understood and not misunderstood. As the 
enquiry was to be held in different countries and comprise a considerable 
number of test persons, a written enquiry was preferable to personal interviews. 
Pre-coded questions are given preference to open-end questions in order to 
avoid a hopeless analysis of their contents (in different European languages). 
In compiling the pre-coded questions use would be made of the answers 
received in our pre-test, and in previous interviews among the populations 
about the Unification of Europe such as the Gallup enquiry in 1962 and the 
one of Readers Digest in 1963. In this connection Albinsky (1967) quotes an 
enquiry by Barbara Dohrenwerd, who made a laboratory test about the 
relative value of pre-coded and open-end questions. The open-end questions 
did not appear to probe deeper or to have more validity; they were indeed 
clearly less efficient than the pre-coded questions. Drenth (1968) refers to 
the findings of an enquiry by Bouvier from which it appeared that with the 
open-end questions the answers were more superficial, more casual and were 
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rather orientated to previous events. The answers in the form of selection from 
statements proved to be better founded, to require a greater amount of reflec-
tion and to appeal more to the deeper layers of personality. 
It seemed a hopeless task to approach large numbers of intelligent, verbally 
gjfted persons with a critical attitude in the various countries. However, hope-
ful prospects in this direction presented themselves after contacts with students 
of the various universities. The students appeared largely to comply with 
the above-mentioned criteria. By selecting only certain groups per department, 
age and level of education we were able to meet the requirements of an equal 
or almost equal frame of reference. By taking students who were bom at the 
end of or after the second World War and were not younger than 20 years we 
could reach a group of persons who, on the one hand, were not burdened 
with pre-war ideas, and on the other, entitled to vote, i.e. were deemed 
capable of taking a political decision. By selecting students as test persons 
for the enquiry we were also able to formulate a basis of the opinions of a 
certain 'minorité stratégique' for the future, i.e. the opinions of people who 
are likely to play a part in a Europe of the future. 
The generally respected lecture-hour would give us an opportunity to reach 
many groups of people in a short space of time, if professors and students were 
prepared to lend their support to the project. The question of which countries 
ought to be involved in the enquiry on the basis of the situation of the 
moment was obvious. Our first thought went to those countries that had 
the closest ties in the frame-work of Europe in the economic, social and 
scientific fields, and partly also in the political field. Namely, the countries of 
the European Economic Community, thus Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands. England was found to be too important not 
to be involved, while on second consideration Luxemburg seemed to have too 
few inhabitants for a comparison with other countries to be valid. As a result 
four large countries were left (with populations between 50 and 60 million) 
together with two smaller ones, namely Belgium and the Netherlands, with 
populations of 9 and 13 million resp. 
2. PURPOSE OF THE ENQUIRY 
On account of the reconnaissance dealt with above and the research with 
respect to Europe by Gallup and others, it seemed interesting to us to go 
further into the following points. 
1. What is the attitude of students with respect to the Unification of Europe 
and is this attitude based on knowledge of the subject? 
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2. What are their ideas and the pictures they have framed about the Europe 
of the future? 
3. How can pro's and those who are not pro a United Europe be distin-
guished and can a difference in personality be shown? 
4. Is it in general possible to suggest what factors play a part in an attitude 
pro or contra the Unification of Europe? 
3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MEASURING INSTRUMENT 
3.1 What is an Attitude? 
In the enquiries mentioned above we asked for an opinion, and invited the 
test persons to voice a certain judgment. On doing so we found that there 
were a great many Europe advocates, a great amount of willingness to make 
sacrifices, a slight degree of activity in this direction and many objections 
to unification. Is it valid to declare a person pro, less pro, neutral or contra 
this Unification of Europe on the grounds of these opinions? 
Has the preparedness to pay taxes or to settle abroad anything to do with an 
attitude pro European Unification? Do objections to a United Europe stand 
in the way of being pro Europe? We should like to have some guarantee that 
the questions have been understood well enough, and know which question 
must preponderate in assessing a person's opinion. We should also like to be 
reasonably certain that the test persons would give about the same answers if 
we put the same questions before them some time later. The enquiry would 
gain in importance if we could register not a casual opinion but a firm con-
viction or rather a definite attitude or behavioural pattern of the person. As a 
matter of fact a certain attitude cannot be determined by a single opinion or 
statement. It is possible of course that an opinion is related to a certain attitude 
but this is not certain. If one is vexed at the barking of a neighbour's dog and 
therefore condemns it to be slaughtered, this is probably not one's general 
attitude towards dogs and certainly not at a quiet moment. 
The meaning of attitude, the relationship toward a person or a thing, is not 
easy to describe. Of the enormous amount of literature we only mention a few 
publications. Eysenck (1963) quotes an investigation by Nelson in which he 
gives a survey of 23 different definitions and descriptions of the meaning of 
attitude, as they occur in scientific literature. A much used description is that 
of G. W. Allport (1935): an attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness 
organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon 
the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related. 
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Albinski (1967) and others call an attitude the entity of cognitive, effective 
and striving factors that define a person's behaviour with respect to a certain 
object, i.e. the total of factors that make a person into an advocate or an 
opponent of some body or some object. Van Doom and Lammers (1959) 
mention four elements which occur in some combination in the current defi-
nitions: the inner state of the individual, which is to some extent of a lasting 
nature and is related to a person or a thing and predisposes to a certain be-
haviour. 
A definite attitude is determined on the ground of a person's utterances or 
behaviour. The attitude itself cannot be grasped. It has already been noted 
before that it is a precarious task to determine a human attitude or relationship 
on the ground of an opinion or an act. The more opinions and acts we can regis-
ter, at least if they are related direct to the object, the sooner we arrive at con-
clusions with regard to a certain attitude. If we know of a person who goes to 
church on Sundays, that he is a member of a religious party, regularly reads the 
Bible, believes in Providence, and makes considerable contributions to the 
church, chances are great that the attitude of that man or woman is positive 
with respect to a christian belief. We make this conclusion on the ground of 
all these criteria combined. None of these indications alone is sufficient to draw 
a conclusion with regard to a positive attitude. Of course there are differences 
between the degree in which certain indications contribute towards a con-
clusion. The membership of a party and going to church on Sunday will con-
vince us less easily than the other criteria. Daily Bible reading and belief in 
Providence will convince us better than giving money to the church. It may 
even be possible that one of the indications has nothing to do with a positive 
attitude with respect to a christian belief. Besides, it may depend strongly on 
what we understand ourselves as a positive christian attitude. In other words 
it is difficult to state exact criteria and in the beginning it will be necessary to 
trace these exact criteria empirically. 
3.2 Measuring of Attitude toward Unification of Europe 
We should like to get to know true Europeans and study them as a group. For 
this we need an accurate instrument to enable us to objectify our method and 
to render it possible to compare test persons. A first requirement is that one is 
sure that the questions axe understood as intended. It is at any rate necessary 
that the questions do refer to the subject and measure the phenomenon we are 
trying to trace, and preferably so in different degrees. A certain gradation will 
be obtained by including questions with some significance which are aimed at 
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the subject in a strongly positive, positive and neutral manner or against it. 
In doing so one should be able to award a certain weight-factor to each ques-
tion. This is why we need a measuring scale consisting of a number of questions 
or statements which deal with the subject and have been 'weighed' beforehand, 
i.e. that one knows what weight must be given to each individual question or 
statement in order to be able to calculate a score. 
For the purpose of the enquiry a number of questions presumed to refer 
to the subject is first collected. The questions are submitted to a large number 
of judges, who are requested to compare the statements and to arrange them 
in the order of degree to which the statement expresses a positive attitude 
towards the subject. The statement: 'I am willing to make real sacrifices for 
the benefit of the European Unification', has of course more significance than 
the statement: 'I for one do not care much for a United Europe'. In this way 
one gets from each judge a range of all statements from strongly positive and 
neutral to negative. 
By comparing the order of the various statements we are able to select the 
statements which have been given the same or about the same place in the 
range by the test persons. Of these statements it may be assumed now that they 
have been understood and that they pertain to the subject. For each question 
it is possible to calculate the 'weight' that must be awarded to it. The scale 
value of each question is the degree of positive attitude with respect to the 
statement. With the aid of this scale we can - on completion of the forms -
calculate the score made by the test person in indicating his attitude with 
respect to the subject. 
A second method is to submit the original statements to a number of test 
persons telling them to state if they personally agree with the contents of a 
statement or not. The pro's will give more positive answers than the cons, 
whereas some statements will be equally appreciated by pro's and cons. Of the 
questions that show the greatest discrepancy between pro's and cons or dis-
criminate most, it may be said that they have been exactly understood, and 
that they do pertain to the subject (though this need not necessarily be so). 
Of these one can also calculate their weight by the degree to which they dis-
criminate between pro's and cons. In this way it is possible to make a scale 
afterwards and to calculate the score of each test person. 
However, the certainty that the statements pertain to the subject is not as 
large as with the previous method, which may lead to difficulties in inter-
preting what one is measuring. On the other hand, in the latter case we are 
not dependent on judges, who may attach a different value to the statement 
than the test person who will have to complete the forms in a later stage. It is 
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of course also possible, if one has an opportunity to do so, to combine the 
advantages of the two systems by availing oneself of judges to select the state-
ments that pertain to the subject and determining what questions discriminate 
most between pro's and cons. 
A first effort to make an attitude scale with respect to European Unification 
was made by International Research Associates, at Brussels at the initiative 
of the Sociological Institute of the Free University of the same city. This scale 
was meant to measure the attitude of a representative sample of the population 
of Belgium. A provisional, unpublished report was finished in December 1966. 
The persons involved were prepared to make the research material available 
for a further analysis of its data. The scale comprised the following 9 state-
ments: 
1. If I knew that this would speed up the political integration of Europe, 
I would be prepared to pay slightly higher taxes. 
2. The failure of European Unification would mean a disaster. 
3. The countries that would be economically harmed if they would join a 
European Convention prematurely, are right in not embarking rashly on 
the venture of European integration. 
4. In the long run the political structure of Europe would have to be as 
uniform as possible. 
5. Every national political party should bring its programme in line with 
the political Unification of Europe. 
6. If the Unification of Europe should demand substantial sacrifices, I 
would be willing to make them. 
7. Within a United Europe I would not object to settling outside Belgium 
and would be prepared to encourage my children to do so. 
8. One is European in the first place and in the second place Belgian. 
9. The disadvantages of a political Unification of Europe outweigh its ad-
vantages. 
Research Associates had selected these questions from 40 statements that had 
been submitted to 80 judges. The results in the order from strongly pro to 
neutral to strongly contra appeared to be: 
6,1,2, 7, 5, 8, 4, 3, 9, likewise with well-divided scale values. 
After a careful interpretation we submitted the 9-item scale to 30 students 
from the E.E.C, countries and England for their opinion. Their opinions 
showed the following order: 
6, 7, 8, 5, 4, 2, 1, 3, 9, (also with well-divided scale values.) 
The amount of correlation in the order of these two ranges is: .57. As full 
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correlation would have yielded 1.00, we can only speak of a reasonable 
amount of correlation. It is particularly the questions 1, 2 and 8 which show 
a great difference in appreciation. 
The second method for the construction of a scale, applied to these 9 items, 
did not show the desired result either. The questions 8, 3, 6 and 2 appeared 
to discriminate rather well between the pro's and cons. The items 5 and 9 did 
so to some extent only and the statements 1, 4 and 7 hardly if at all. Actually 
this result is not surprising, as we used this scale, which was meant for the 
population of Belgium, for other nationalities which, moreover, consisted of a 
very particular group of the population (students). Still, what emerged from 
this experiment was a need for the construction of a new scale for the popu-
lation for which we wanted to use our scale. As an illustration we mention the 
items 1 and 7, which are not significant for unmarried students, who pay no 
taxes. We also deem the wording of some questions less effective and prob-
ably responsible for the disappointing results. 
In order to be able to make a new scale we shall have to find outj what 
utterances and behavioural patterns are likely to pertain to what we want to 
measure and check later on which phenomena do so and which do not. It is 
possible to analyse on theoretical grounds a number of opinions of which we 
assume that they pertain to an attitude for a United Europe. One will have to 
know something of United Europe; one will have to be in favour of it and be 
willing to do something for it; one will have to believe in it and have certain 
motives to make it worthwhile to strive after unification. We can include in 
our research a collection of opinions on the Unification of Europe from news-
papers, radio and T.V., from speeches and literature in order to find the 
building stones of which the idea of a United Europe is constructed. As in 
establishing a positive religious attitude, the church, the Bible, Providence and 
contributions play a certain part, we shall have to find the points of contact in 
order to establish successfully what a Europe attitude is. 
In order to eliminate misunderstanding and confusion as much as possible 
we shall have to observe certain rules such as avoiding vague or ambiguous 
questions, preclude premature opinions that will be assented to or dismissed 
by every one; further we shall have to avoid foreign words and ideas that have 
no meaning for the test person. Emotional statements, suggestive and some-
what obscure questions or stereotypes cannot be used either. We shall have 
to confine ourselves to short, straightforward statements that are unambiguous 
and of which translations into the different languages will not cause large dif-
ferences in emotional values. 
In this way we collected about 80 opinions on the Unification of Europe, to 
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which we added, with their consent, 40 statements of Research Associates. 
Of the later statements we adapted some with small modifications. By com-
paring these 120 statements and opinions, and striking off identical or almost 
identical questions, we managed to reduce the number to 40. In case of doubt 
about the wording of questions we used those of Research Associates, because 
we had already some experience with them. Of the 40 statements in our ques-
tionnaire two thirds had a positive tendency and one third a negative one. 
See Enclosure 2. 
The next step was to ascertain which of the questions had to be considered 
for the establishment of an attitude pro or contra European Unification. 65 
students of the College of Europe at Bruges and the Europe Institute of the 
University of Amsterdam were prepared to lend their assistance to our enquiry. 
The group consisted largely of men in the ages of 24 to 30 years from some 
15 European countries, who had just completed their university education. As 
these students had been selected to attend the lectures also on the ground of 
their knowledge of English, there were no objections to submitting the 40 
questions to them in the English language. 
First of all the students were requested to peruse carefully the questionnaire 
and ask for further information when a question was not understood. Next, 
the students were invited to state after each question whether they were in full 
agreement with it, just in agreement or not at all, or had no opinion about it 
(Likert method). After thus having expressed their personal opinions the 
students handed in their forms, and the results were collected. 
After this the students were asked to act as judges for the establishment of 
the emotional value of a statement with respect to unification. Under each 
question a scale was printed consisting of the figures 1 to 11 and included, 
running up from very unfavourable (1) to neutral (6) to very favourable (11). 
(Method of Thurstone and Chave). The students were asked to show in this 
scale their opinion on the pro European (emotional) value of each statement 
and to express it in one of the figures 1-11. 
A comparison of the results of the two systems showed that eleven state-
ments were about equally appreciated (Q value 2.5) and duly discriminated 
between the pro's and cons. (Average: 1.4). At the same time it appeared that 
by the Thurstone method the items 1, 12, 15, 28, 32, 36 and 40 had a fairly 
low Q value, but discriminated insufficiently. On the ground of the Likert 
method the items 8, 9 and 16 also discriminated well, but appeared to have a 
rather high Q value. As we preferred a short scale that clearly discriminated 
between pro's and cons we decided to take all discriminating items as a starting 
point for the Europe scale. The scale values after Thurstone of these 14 items 
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were as follows: 2, 3, Syi, 6, 8/2, 9, 9/2, 10, with the largest amount of con-
centration of items between 85^ and 10. The statements with a relatively high 
Q value had the proportionately strongest concentration in the middle of the 
scale (5/2 and 6). A comparison of our 14-item scale with the 9 statements 
used by Research Associates showed that 5 of their original items, though 
formulated somewhat differently, occurred in this scale, namely the numbers 
2, 5, 6, 8 and 9. See Enclosure 3 (Al to 14). This says a good deal about the 
reliability of these questions (internal consistence). 
3.3 Definition of the Image of Europe 
It was the intention of the 14-item scale to select pro's and cons on the ground 
of a certain attitude score. A question that emerged now was to trace what 
picture one has made for oneself of a Europe of the future. One of the most 
important issues is which country one would prefer to include in a United 
Europe. For the collection of data on this point a list was drawn up of all 
countries of Eastern and Western Europe and instructions were given to mark 
the countries one would or would not, or not yet, include in this United Europe. 
In view of the differences in the appreciations of the E.E.C, partners and 
England in the pre-test we inserted another question: mention 5 countries in 
the order of preference with the exception of your own country. It was under-
stood that advocates of European integration would in the first place include 
their own country in this group. In the questionnaire, briefly called 'image test' 
a few other points were included, with reference to the image of Europe, such 
as desired form of government (central of federal), form of administration, the 
purpose of this Europe, the achievements to be expected, the ties with other 
world powers, the degree of mutual integration, and desired internal measures. 
In addition points were raised with regard to Development Aid, the army, the 
language, election systems, freedom of religion, the place of reigning royal 
families in the frame work of a United Europe etc. Questions were also asked 
about the rate at which unification should be realised, how to realise it, at 
what time a United Europe is expected to come about and what tensions might 
arise. A number of these questions were quite suitable for answers with pro 
or contra. With other questions it was considered desirable to mention some 
alternatives. This latter form offers an opportunity to ask the test persons to 
rank the alternative in their order of preference, and to divert their train of 
thought. 
From the pre-test it had already appeared that for the ranking of preference 
to make sense the number of alternatives should not be too large. We fixed 
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the maximum at 5. This number can be easily ranked by seeking the extremes 
(1 and 5) and defining the mean point of preference. The alternative answers 
to a certain question were obtained on logical grounds and we also made use 
of answers obtained before in our own interviews or in those of others 
(Gallup, Readers Digest, etc.). The intelligibility of the questions and instruc-
tions and the distribution of answers among the various alternatives were 
tested on a small group of persons. As a result some questions and instructions 
were omitted and worded anew, until we were reasonably certain that the 
meaning and purport of the image test would be understood sufficiently well. 
3.4 The Measuring of Knowledge of European Unification 
The disadvantage of pre-coded questions is that the test person is forced to 
answer in a certain way and an opinion is required on matters he has perhaps 
never heard of or thought about. Of course the latter will occur less frequently 
as one knows more of the subject. Although it may be supposed that students 
will have some knowledge of the Unification of Europe on the ground of their 
intelligence, education and political interest, it seemed advisable to make 
further enquiries about this matter. At the same time we could take advantage 
of this enquiry because it would supply us with information to enable us to 
distinguish between very well, moderately and badly informed persons. 
As a criterion of being well-informed we started from the following points 
in compiling our knowledge test: 
1. Knowledge of the organisations among countries in the frame work of 
Europe such as E.E.C., E.F.T.A., COMECON and European institutions 
such as the Council of Europe, the European Parliament etc. 
2. Knowledge of the contents of agreements and treaties among European 
countries. 
3. Being informed of measures already taken in the frame work of E.E.C. 
A number of questions about knowledge of internal measures in the E.E.C. 
had already been included in the enquiry of Gallup International. These ques-
tions were included unmodified in order to be able to compare the results with 
the information obtained by Gallup. A provisional test with some test persons 
had already proved that the questions were not too easy or too difficult and 
the answers showed a sufficient degree of variation. 
3.5 Collection of Personal Antecedents 
Apart from attitude, image and knowledge with respect to Europe it is 
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desirable to know more about the test persons themselves, preferably data 
related to a certain Europe attitude. If it is found that tall persons are more 
in favour of Europe than short ones, this is information of little interest. It 
seems more important to try to get to know something about environment 
and father's profession, education, nationality, sex, age, university, faculty 
and number of years one has studied at a university. 
A questionnaire is extremely well suited for the quick collection of these 
data, and certainly if the questions are pre-coded, which facilitates completion. 
Usually information about environment and the profession of the father is 
collected in personal interviews. We can, however, also ask the test person 
to evaluate his environment himself e.g. on a S-point scale from high to middle 
to low, as well as his father's profession on a scale from the highest directorate 
or management functions and free professions to executive or supervisory 
functions down to skilled and unskilled jobs. This last classification coincides 
with the Hall-Jones standard classification as quoted by Eysenck (1963) with 
which reliable results were obtained. An important item of enquiry is the 
degree of political interest and whether or not one is a member of a political 
party or a movement for a United Europe. 
We made enquiries on this point by inviting test persons to rank a number 
of political currents in Europe from extremely left to extremely right in the 
order of their preference and to indicate for what political party they would 
vote if elections were held now. We also inquired about their father's political 
conviction in order to find out if this conviction had any bearing on the prefer­
ence of the test person. In order to round off the personality test we asked 
information about religious conviction, number of inhabitants of place of 
residence, knowledge of the various European languages and the E.E.C, coun­
tries one had visited. 
At first we had little confidence that the questions about political conviction 
or preference would be answered i.e. filled in truthfully. From the completion 
of these political questions by students and discussions we had afterwards, it 
appeared that there was little aversion if one was convinced that the data were 
not misused or could not be misused. 
3.6 Motivational Distortion Scale 
Since in a written examination one depends on what is filled in, without having 
ац opportunity to make further enquiries, we looked for a means to make 
some sort of check on any motivational distortion in the answers given. Many 
efforts have been made to compile a motivational distortion scale or 'truth 
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scale'. Partly successful were Wilde (1963) in his questionnaire (A.B.V.), 
Eysenck (1957) in his M.M.Q. and Calteli (1962) in his abridged Personality 
Factor Scale (16 P.F. form C). 
What we want to know is not only if a person distorts the facts intentionally 
(sabotage), since the number of people who would do so is considered to be 
very small, but rather if a person has wittingly or unwittingly an inclination to 
give another representation of himself than is the case. Conscious distortion 
of facts can usually be detected with the aid of a computer, unconscious un-
truthfulness is more difficult to trace. 
For our purpose the 'Motivational Distortion Scale' of Calteli seems to 
enter into consideration for us first, although it is still in the experimental stage. 
The 7 items this scale consists of have been obtained on the ground of a factor 
analysis of some 200 statements of which it was assumed that they discrim-
inated between test persons that were motivated and those that were not. In 
other words whether the test persons made a real effort correctly to complete 
the questionnaire or not. Though it was not our intention to accept or reject 
certain questionnaires, it seemed fit to verify in what group of persons moti-
vational distortion occurred most, and at the same time if we should perhaps 
have to attach less value to the results of the pro-Europe groups on the ground 
of a high distortion score. (This would not be imaginary if the pro-European 
would belong to the group of unrealistic idealists, as is sometimes suggested). 
It is also for this reason that we wanted to know something of the character or 
personality of the test persons, as it was not deemed impossible that in our test 
we would, through some coincidence, involve a particular 'kind' of test per-
sons, different from a normal sample of an average population group. This 
might be all the more the case since our sample was barely or not representa-
tive for students. 
3.7 Measuring Personality by means of a Questionnaire 
The measuring of personality factors can be done in several ways. However, 
we do not want to know more than is strictly necessary for our purpose. Thus 
only the personality features of which we may expect that they pertain to our 
subject and can lead to a useful and easily workable classification. A per-
sonality test developed by Cattell in the form of a questionnaire seemed quite 
suitable for our purpose. It is the aim of the test to measure 16 independent per-
sonality factors by means of which one can decide upon a personality profile. 
The length of the test is a drawback (100 questions in the abridged form). So 
is the abundance of information of which only a part enters into consideration 
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for our test. Whether a person is reserved, outgoing, trusting or suspicious, 
emotionally stable or not has probably little to do with an attitude toward a 
United Europe. Even if this should be the case it would not be very relevant. 
Among these 16 factors there are two of paramount importance to determine 
a person's social attitude, i.e. the way he faces social events. Independent of 
Cattell, two factors were located by Eysenck in 1945 and, after a thorough 
analysis (The Psychology of Politics 1963), were converted by Melvin into a 
so-called 'Social Attitude Inventory'. The two factors or dimensions at issue 
are: 
1. radicalism versus conservatism 
2. tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness 
By a conservative attitude, denoted by R-, Eysenck understands a com­
bination of the following attitudes: that nationalisation of enterprises is inef­
ficient, that religious education ought to be compulsory, that coloured people 
are inferior, that birth control is illegal, and that the death penalty must be 
maintained. 
Radicals (R + ) think that private property should be abolished, that Sunday 
observance is old-fashioned, that national sovereignty must be abolished for 
the sake of peace, etc. 
Being tough-minded (T + ) presupposes a positive attitude with respect to 
public agression and sexual behaviour, as comes to the fore in the promotion 
of the death penalty, harsh treatment for criminals, corporal punishment also 
for children and in the sexual field in being an advocate of a trial-marriage, 
abolishment of anti-abortion laws, simplification of wedding and divorce 
formalities. 
Being tender-minded (T-) refers to ethical and religious restrictions and 
taking a positive attitude towards pacifism such as giving up national sover­
eignty, doing away with the atom bomb, abolishment of corporal punishment 
and the death penalty, declaring birth control unlawful, returning to religion 
and the necessity of religious education. Eysenck considers the R factor the 
main dimension in 'social attitudes', the Τ factor a projection of the extravert or 
introvert personality in the plane of the 'social attitudes'. Cattell considers R 
and Τ (denoted by him as Q and I) two personality factors, independent of 
each other. 
By making use of this Social Attitude Inventory - which has proved its value 
in England, France and Germany - we thought it possible for our test to meas­
ure relevant personality features. It would at the same time be possible to 
check whether the test persons would be distributed normally over this scale or 
not, compared with other population groups such as published by Eysenck 
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(1963). If the inventory should prove to be reliable and our test persons show 
a regular distribution on the scale, it would perhaps be possible to take a further 
step and to make attitude and image with respect to Europe correlate with 
certain personality factors. Further it was an important question if with this 
scale we would be able to give a particular Europe attitude a wider scope. 
Eysenck has shown in detail that attitude and opinion do not act independent 
of each other in the social plane, but are mutually organised and constructed, 
in other words have a tendency to occur in clusters. It was important to know 
whether a Europe attitude would prove to be associated with other attitudes, 
or form part of a larger entity, part of a super-attitude, or ideology. In this 
connection Eysenck distinguishes a superficial opinion, a stabilised opinion, 
an attitude and an ideology (such as conservatism). Opinion and idea or 
view are the domain of public opinion research. Attitudes can be determined 
by means of a unidimensional scale. Ideologies can only be approximated with 
more complicated techniques including factor analysis. 
In 1954 Melvin devised the Social Attitude Inventory on the basis of Eysenck's 
work (quoted unabridged by Eysenck in 1963). This scale consisted of 41 R 
and Τ items, which were submitted to a reliability test by the split-halves 
method. The reliability between the two halves lay between .85 and .95. 
By taking about half of the statements (by the split-half) we succeeded in 
considerably abridging the scale and avoiding some less applicable items, e.g. 
European refugees should be left to fend for themselves, bloodsports like 
foxhunting are vicious and cruel and should be forbidden. A drawback of 
abridging a scale is that in doing so reliability and validity (the degree in which 
a scale answers it purpose) are decreased. However, the validity (and this is 
what matters) is only reduced by the root of the decrease in reliability (Drenth 
1968). With a highly reliable scale as Melvin's Inventory, the validity is thus 
not greatly decreased, even with a decrease in reliability of e.g. 2 5 % . As a 
result of this abridgment of the scale 23 items were left and included in the 
questionnaire for the determination of social attitude. 
3.8 Compilation of the Definitive Questionnaire 
Successively we had for our test an Attitude Scale, an Image Test and a Know­
ledge Test. With the consent of the authors we were also allowed to make use 
of a Motivational Distortion Scale and a Social Attitude Inventory. In ad­
dition, we had in our possession a number of pre-coded) questions to collect 
personal antecedents. We combined the 14 attitude questions with some 8 
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image questions, which had to be answered with pro or contra, and attained a 
scale of 22 items. In order to avoid answering with 'no opinion', we gave in-
structions so that it was only possible to agree with the statements, or strongly 
agree and to disagree with them or strongly disagree with them. Of course a 
chance was given to the test persons not to complete the form for certain ques-
tions on which they had no opinion. For the image questions we took as the last 
item the order of political preference because the instructions for this question 
linked up well with the instruction for the order of preference questions. 
The Social Attitude Inventory was combined with the 7 'distortion' items to 
a scale of 30 statements. We based the instruction for the answers on Melvin 
who distinguishes strongly pro, pro, neutral, contra and strongly contra. This 
instruction fits in rather well with the distortion scale, although Calteli dis-
tinguishes only 3 categories: agreement, no opinion and non-agreement. 
The most important measuring instrument for our purpose is the Europe 
Scale. Therefore we gave it the first place in our instructions in the final ques-
tionnaire. Also we had the intention of starting to sound out the general attitude 
of the test persons with respect to a United Europe in order to give them an op-
portunity at a later stage to further clarify their picture or visualization of this 
Europe. The disadvantage of voicing one's pro or contra without knowing 
exactly which United Europe is meant by the questioners clearly appeared 
to offset the illogical situation of asking the test person to picture his idea of 
a United Europe and asking him only afterwards to pronounce his pro or 
contra. There is little sense in asking an opponent what picture he has visu-
alized; one can only ask him which form would be most acceptable. 
The Social Attitude Scale and the Motivational Distortion Scale followed the 
Image Test. The personal items came only afterwards, because some of these 
questions e.g. on social class and politics may easily arouse some aversion, 
which is of course not required for answering the attitude questions. For this 
same reason we put the Knowledge Test at the end of the questionnaire, also 
to prevent the attitude questions from being misunderstood as a test as would 
have been the case if we would have given the Knowledge Test a different place. 
In addition, the Knowledge Test lends itself best to calculating a score if be-
cause of lack of time the questions would not have been completely answered. 
At the bottom of the questionnaire, room was left for the test person to 
comment on the questions. This was gone into in the introduction on the 
first page. We were anxious to know the reactions of the test persons, 
but would also provide for an exhaust valve after two hours of strenuous and 
schematic work. 
The beginning of the questionnaire, the introduction, had to comply with 
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certain particular requirements. It was a condition that no further elucidation 
should be required in order to prevent the test persons from being influenced 
by the conductor of the test. The introduction itself should be neutral, i.e. not 
suggest any opinion pro or contra Europe and sufficiently induce the test 
person to produce a solid piece of work. The international and inter-university 
character of the enquiry was not made mention of in order to urge the test 
person to give his own opinion and not that of his group, his university or his 
country. In order to convince the test persons of the importance of the test the 
scientific purpose was underlined and the name of the university from which 
the enquiry originated mentioned. In order to show that the results of the 
enquiry were easily obtainable the title and the name of the author of the 
work was stated. By promising a copy ta each university library we wanted 
to avoid creating any suspicion of commercial design. 
In order to test the questionnaire as a whole on its intelligibility, degree of 
difficulty and frustration, a 'pilot-study' was made with some 10 test persons. 
Half of them were students or graduates; the other half consisted of persons 
who had followed a few years of education at a secondary school. Intelligibility 
appeared to be amply sufficient, the Knowledge Test too difficult and the 
number of frustrations occurring considerably less than was expected. The 
questionnaire proved to be too long for completion within an hour. After 
abridging the Image Test and the Knowledge Test and the introduction of a 
number of modifications the final questionnaire was compiled. In doing so 
it was necessary to accept compromises as regards set-up, sequence and num-
ber of questions. As the questionnaire was to be used in 6 countries, it was 
necessary to have it printed in 5 different languages. 
The introduction and instruction, the Image Test together with the personal 
antecedents and Knowledge Test lent themselves very well to direct translation. 
It is less easy to translate an attitude scale which must be understood exactly 
as it is meant. It is especially the questions with a particular emotional 
value that are subject to some change in their meaning. In order to avoid 
this for the Europe Scale, the Social Attitude Scale and the Motivational 
Distortion Scale, which were originally drawn up in English, we chose the fol-
lowing procedure. A Dutchman who speaks English very well translated the 
English text into Dutch. After this an Englishman who speaks Dutch very well 
(and there are some!) translated the Dutch text into English, and the two 
English texts were compared by an expert. Deviations in the second English 
version undeniably pointed to irregularities in the translation into Dutch, so 
that this was amended. The Dutch version thus obtained was now taken as a 
basis for the next translation. The same method, or practically the same, was 
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adopted for translations into French, German and Italian and adopted in the 
questionnaire (Italians who speak Dutch well are rare.)· In this manner we 
managed to obtain questionnaires that could be used in Germany, England, 
France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. For the English text of the final 
questionnaire we refer to Enclosure 3. 
4. THE GROUP OF STUDENT TEST PERSONS 
4.1 Which Students? 
In order to improve comparability among the test persons we gave preference 
to students of the same college and faculty in each country. It was important 
that the test persons took an interest in international affairs and as a conse-
quence were sufficiently inspired to complete the detailed questionnaire, 
independent of their attitude pro or contra European Unification. For the 
same reason we restricted the test to students of law and economics. In doing 
so we would at the same time get opinions of a group of students of whom 
some might very likely play an active part in the making of a United Europe. 
(On the ground of the present European problems we have a strong im-
pression that the studies of law and economics are a fruitful preparation 
for activities in the framework of Europe). If possible we would involve 
two universities of each country in the test, preferably one of the large in-
stitutions of higher education, and another university different from the first 
in size, region or nature of students' community. With the cooperation of the 
Information Bureau of the European Communities at Brussels and their 
representatives in the various countries, contacts with the professors of a dozen 
universities in the E.E.C, and England were established. As a result of their 
collaboration we were enabled to involve the following universities in our 
enquiry: In Belgium the Universities of Brussels and Louvain; in England the 
Universities of London and Sheffield; in France Paris and Nice, in Germany 
Munich and Bochum, in Italy Rome and Genoa and in the Netherlands 
Amsterdam and Tilburg. 
It was our purpose to aim at young students bom after the war and entitled to 
the vote, i.e. persons aged between 20 and 25 years. Drawing representative 
samples from the students' population of a university appeared to be un-
feasible. Even where one had the use of a good card-index system it was 
impossible to gather the students selected for the test at an appointed place 
or time. 
The questionnaire, particularly the Knowledge Test, was not suitable for 
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being sent to the personal addresses of the students. Moreover, we had a suspi-
cion that a number of questionnaires would not be returned. In this way the 
sample would be distorted, presumably in the direction of enthusiastic advocates 
of a United Europe. The same thing would happen if the test persons would 
participate on their own accord. We were not only interested in advocates of 
a United Europe but wanted to obtain attitudes and pictures of non-advocates 
as well. In order to meet these objections, after consultation the professors 
decided that the students would meet for the test at one selected lecture. For the 
selection of this lecture hour we laid down some criteria. We intended to select 
a general lecture on law or economics, thus not specifically referring to Europe, 
which would be attended by the average students of approx. 22 years. No stress 
was laid on an equal number of years of academic education in order to avoid 
great differences in age. In France a university study is generally started at the 
age of 17 or 18. In Germany this is around 20. 
In order to do justice to the enquiry and to get about the same number of 
students per country, it was agreed that the number of test persons per faculty 
would not be more than 40 and that the questionnaires would be completed 
in a room giving adequate space to do written work. 
4.2 The Actual Enquiry 
It was also agreed upon that the students would not be informed before the 
commencement of the lecture hour selected, and to ask for their cooperation 
in a brief 'neutral' explanation, upon which the questionnaire would be handed 
out together with an envelope. The sealed envelopes would all be sent to the 
Mathematics Centre of the Psychological Laboratory at Nimeguen. Before the 
date of the test, provisionally fixed between mid March and Mid May 1968, 
verbal consultation would be had with the professors of the faculties concerned, 
the actual conductor of the test and the author, in order to solve any problems, 
to arrange the procedure of the enquiry in detail and to fix the exact date. 
The number of test persons required to draw a representative sample from a 
certain population can be established on the ground of statistical calculations. 
Of course some data are required for this purpose such as the degree of 
accuracy with which one wants to draw conclusions, and the percentage of 
pro's and cons one expects to find. It is easier to predict a proportion between 
pro's and cons of 90% and 10% than a proportion of say 40 and 60 or 50 
and 50%. If our sample was to be representative for students of law and 
economics in Western Europe, and if we wanted to make a prediction of the 
attitude pro or contra a United Europe with an accuracy of 5%, it is pos-
42 
sible to calculate the required numbers of test persons, at least if we have 
some idea of the relation between pro's and cons. In our case we may assume 
safely that the number of opponents would amount to a maximum of 20%. 
p x q 
The application of the formula (Σ Ep = J/ ) and a certain table (see 
η 
Eysenck 1963, pag. 48) indicates that for a representative sample we would 
require 578 test persons, thus about 600. 
In the above calculation, homogeneity of the population has not been taken 
into account, namely the degree to which the test persons belong to the same 
category and the total numberi of persons in the population group of which 
the test persons form part. In our case homogeneity is decidedly very great; 
in all the countries students of law and economics are concerned and the 
extent of the population is relatively small. Because of this, considerably fewer 
test persons would be required to reach an accuracy of 5 % in our prediction, 
if our sample had been drawn in the correct proportion per country from the 
population of students of law and economics. As this is not the case the num­
ber of 600 does not give us a firm hold, although it seemed desirable to adhere 
to this number of test persons. In order to improve comparisons between the 
countries we intended to involve an equal number of test persons per country 
in the enquiry, i.e. 100 test persons per country which amounts to 25 per 
faculty. 
During our visits to the various universities in order to make arrangements 
with the professors and the conductor of the test for each university, some diffi­
culties were encountered. For the university of Bochum and Munich the period 
between mid-March and mid-May appeared to be unsuitable, because of the 
long (Easter) vacation in Germany. Because of this the enquiry was postponed 
by one month. In Munich it proved to be impossible to find a sufficient number 
of test persons. We solved the problem by engaging a larger number1 of test 
persons in Bochum. 
The difficulties we met with in Italy in April were of a more serious nature. 
Owing to unrest in the students' world the University of Rome was closed 
and the situation in Genoa not suited for holding the enquiry. Thanks to the 
special cooperation of the Information Bureau of the European Economic 
Community in Italy and the personal intervention of professors in Rome and 
Milan we succeeded in holding the enquiry 2 months later. 
In Paris there were already signs in March foreshadowing what would lead 
to 'les événements', the students' rebellion in May. Under these circumstances 
43 
it was not possible for the conductors of the test to obtain the desired number 
of test persons so that they had to do with half the number planned. 
Owing to a faulty interpretation of the instructions the enquiry at the 
University of Nice was held before the deliberation for its arrangement had 
taken place. Anonymity was insufficiently warranted as a consequence of the 
fact that the envelopes had not been supplied. As a further consequence a 
large number of questionnaires had not been fully completed. The incomplete 
questionnaires were removed in Nice and the remaining forms were sent 
to Nimeguen. After all this we had at our disposal only part of the selected 
material and the number of test persons was reduced to about half. 
Finally it appeared impossible to have a complementary test in the last 
mentioned cities, so that the number of French participants was limited to 
half the number of test persons in the other countries. 
In England, Belgium and the Netherlands no surprises presented themselves 
and the enquiry was held in the period agreed upon with the required number 
of students. 
4.3 Participants per Country 
Altogether 672 completed questionnaires were returned. All questionnaires 
were fit for mathematical compilation. This is all the more striking since the 
enquiry was strictly anonymous and there was every possibility of neglecting it. 
At the 12 universities (except Nice) there was no pre-selection of com-
pleted and incompleted forms. (The students scaled their own envelopes). 
It was surprising to note the great care with which the questions were an-
swered and the low number of test persons (2—3 % ) who did not complete 
the form. 
In table No. 4 we give a survey of the actual number of test persons as per 
country, sex and faculty. The number of test persons of each university is 
exactly or practically half the number of students of each country. An exception 
is made by Munich with only one third of the number of the German 
participants. 
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TABLE 4 
Sex and faculty in percentages per country, the number of test persons per nationality 
and in percentages of the total 
Sex Faculty Number of In % 
Nationality Men Women Law Economics test persons of 672 
Belgian 
Italian 
English 
Dutch 
German 
French 
not mentioned 
72 
66 
81 
96 
92 
67 
28 
34 
19 
4 
8 
33 
or other (S) nationality 
66 
33 
55 
55 
42 
68 
34 
67 
45 
45 
58 
32 
137 
122 
114 
113 
110 
58 
18 
20 
18 
17 
17 
16 
9 
3 
672 100 
For further information about the sample of test persons we refer to the 
questionnaire in Enclosure 3, notably C19 and El to 12. At C19 and ЕЮ 
we have only mentioned the first preference. 
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CHAPTER IH. 
ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS TOWARD UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
1. EUROPE ATTITUDE SCALE 
It was the purpose of this scale to determine the degree to which the test 
persons voiced their pro or contra. As an indication we considered the pre-
viously selected 14 statements of which we could reasonably suppose that they 
were suitable for this purpose. Besides, we had at our disposal a number of 
statements, of which on the ground of pre-tests, we expected that they pertained 
to an attitude pro or contra European Unification. It was one disadvantage of 
our method that for the selection of the items we used students as test persons 
who had already completed their university education and who were studying 
at a Europe Institute. 
It was therefore necessary to verify whether these statements could be succes-
fully used for our actual group of international students to determine their 
behaviour and attitude with respect to a United Europe. Of statements that 
measure an identical attitude it may be expected that they will show a certain 
relation or correlation. In order to check this we calculated the correlation 
between the original 14 items increased by 8 other statements (altogether the 22 
items of part A of our questionnaire) with all test persons. 
As the survey in Enclosure 4 shows, 11 items appeared to be strongly 
related. All correlation coefficients but two proved to have a value upwards of 
.20 and the correct symbol + or —, according to the nature of the item. 
Another 6 statements showed a certain amount of correlation, though the 
coefficients were largely under .20. The 5 remaining items did not show an 
appreciable relation to each other or to the other items. As the greater part of 
the 17 correlating items originate from the 14 originally selected Europe state-
ments it is obvious that these statements do pertain to an attitude toward a 
United Europe. 
An important question is now whether these items are unidimensional i.e. 
whether all statements do measure the same factor or feature, or whether 
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various factors are the cause of their mutual relation. As the amount of correla-
tion between all items is higher, the chance that only one factor is responsible 
for the mutual relation increases. In this case it would be considerably easier 
to interpret what the scale measures. 
By means of factor analysis it is possible to obtain more information about 
this. This mathematical compilation is meant to analyse the mutual relation 
between variables and thus to detect one or more factors the variables have in 
common. The factor analysis applied to the 22 items of part A of the question-
naire showed that we have to do with a strong factor on which 11 factors had a 
high load (varying from .69 to .40) and 6 items with a relatively low load 
(varying from .25 to .30). The remaining 5 statements showed no load or hardly 
any. In brief a distribution in items groups as came to the fore from the correla-
tion matrix. At the same time a second factor came to light less strongly than 
the first, on which the following statements had some load: 
Personally I do not care much for a United Europe. (.29) 
The disadvantages of a political Unification of Europe outweigh its advan-
tages. (.18) 
The failure of European Unification would be a highly regrettable thing. (.13) 
This second factor appeared also of some importance (.20 as an average) 
to all items that showed no or a relatively low load on the first factor, and of 
little importance (.08) to all items that showed a high load on the first factor, 
with the exception of the 3 statements mentioned above. Although this second 
factor was considerably less strong than the first, it seemed desirable to 
eliminate a possible influence of it, and to avoid factor contamination in the 
total score. By selecting only 11 items with a high load on the first factor for the 
determination of an attitude pro or contra Europe, the influence of the second 
factor could practically be reduced to nil, as appeared from a new factor ana-
lysis of these 11 statements. Only one strong factor on which all items appeared 
to have a decent load was left. 
The factor matrix in Enclosure 5 represents the strength of the load on the 
various statements and gives at the same time a measure for the strength of this 
factor as a whole, for the extracted variance, i.e. the proportion of the variance 
of the one variable (the scale), which is explained by the other one (the factor). 
That there was only question of one factor appeared also from the correlation 
matrix which was left after the extraction of this one factor, as afterwards the 
11 items hardly showed any correlation (less than .10). 
From the contents of the 11 statements, but still more from the fact that 
9 items originate from the 14 originally selected statements in the various pre-
tests, it proves that the factor found is related directly to an attitude pro or 
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contra a United Europe. Therefore we assume that the degree to which a person 
expresses an opinion pro or contra these 11 items determines the degree 
to which this person is pro or contra a United Europe. Advocates of a United 
Europe will thus answer positive statements largely positively or very positively 
and answer negative statements negatively or very negatively. The reverse will 
apply to opponents. 
The contents of the various statements can be summed up as follows: 
— One feels to be emotionally interested in the Unification of Europe, 
would regret it if unification failed to be realised, would personally want to 
have a United Europe. 
— One is willing to give active assistance to its realisation, wants to do 
one's bit, would be willing to give up one's own nationality and be willing to 
make a real sacrifice if this would be demanded. 
— One has confidence in a United Europe because one considers its set-up 
realistic (thus not unrealistic or impossible), one is convinced that religious 
freedom will be warranted to everybody and that customs and habits in one's 
own country will be favourably influenced by contacts with the inhabitants 
of other countries. 
— One is for a continuation of the efforts for political integration because: 
one considers the advantages to be greater than the disadvantages, considers 
economic integration a step in this direction and believes that the political 
parties should cooperate towards political integration of Europe. 
2. SCORES ON THE EUROPE SCALE 
Calculations of a score per test person of the 11 statements can be made in 
different ways, as already appeared in Chapter II. As in our case all items 
had a load from rather high to high on the one factor, we decided to con-
sider all items to be equal in measuring strength. The number of points awarded 
were: 5 points for a highly positive statement, 4 points for a positive statement, 
2 points for a negative statement and 1 point for a highly negative statement. 
It stands to reason that statements of a negative character with respect to a 
United Europe were scored in the reverse order. 
If a statement was not answered, which seldom occurred, 3 points were 
awarded (neutral). The maximum number of points that could be scored was 
thus 55; the minimum score was 11 points. In Figure 1 a division on the 
Europe scale is given of all test persons. In the figure a neutral zone is shown 
comprising the test persons that had a score of 32, 33 or 34 points. Though 
there are different ways along which one can get this number of points, it seems 
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reasonable to suppose that with a score of 32, of the 11 items 6 had a negative 
score, and 5 items a positive. As a consequence they obtained 6X2 and 5X4 
is 32 points. For the students with a score of 34 this is: 6 X 4 and 5 X 2. Of these 
test persons it is difficult to say whether they must be reckoned to belong to the 
Advocates or to the Opponents. For the rest, this does not only apply to the 
test persons with a score of about 33. 
Because of lack of an absolute zero point, we have in general no real certainty 
of who is pro or contra a United Europe. On the other hand we can assert that 
test persons with a high score will be more in favour of a United Europe than 
students with a low score, and that students with a low score will be more contra 
than test persons with a high score. However, it is not unusual to draw a certain 
line of demarcation and give a name to the various groups. In this case we shall 
assess test persons with a score of upwards of 34 (11 X 3 = 33) to the 
Advocates and test persons with a score of less than 35 to the Non-Advocates. 
The number of Advocates established in this way, i.e. with the restriction in-
dicated above, proves to be very large, namely: 570. This is 85 % of all students. 
The average score of the entire test group is 43.70, from which it may be con-
cluded that the students group as such pronounces an opinion in favour of a 
United Europe. More than half of the students (376) obtain a score of more 
than 44, while a quarter of the students (187) score 50 points or more and thus 
vote strongly for the Unification of Europe (11 X 4.5 = 49.5). The number of 
Non-Advocates is relatively low, namely: 102. This is 15% of the total number 
of test persons. See Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 
Scores on the Europe Scale 
Average Neutral Average Average 
100 NP zone total group 100 RP 
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It was mteresting to compare the Non-Pro's with a group of real Advocates. 
In order to get an exact impression of the differences between two groups it 
is desirable to compare a number of test persons of one group with the same 
number of persons of another group. For this reason we compared 100 Non-
Pro's (N.P.) on one end of the scale with the 100 most fervent Pro's, to 
be called 'Real Pro's' (R.P.) on the other end. 
In comparing these two groups we shall - as an illustration - state the 
average of the total test group (Tot) together with the average in a percentage 
of the most fervent Non-Pro's or Cons (C), in order to get an impression of 
this latter group on the extreme end of the scale. 
Category R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C.) 
score 53.0 (43.7) 28.6 (24.9) 
From this it appears that there is a clear similarity in Europe attitude between 
Real Pro's and the total test group, as was to be expected, but also between 
Non-Pro's and Cons. A mutual similarity, which we shall meet with later on 
in the discussion of the results of the other scales. 
3. RELIABILITY 
In summing up we based our conclusions on the score per test person, which 
was calculated by taking the sum of the score of each item. For the selection of 
the statements we adopted the method of factor analysis. 
Are the results we obtained reliable? This comes down to the question of 
whether the same test persons would come to the same or about the same results 
if they completed the Europe scale for a second time. In order to obtain a reply 
to this question we made a test-retest enquiry at the College of Europe at 
Bruges. Twenty-five of the students who had been tested before completed 
the questionnaire again 8 months after the first enquiry. 
Of the 40 items used 9 formed part of the Europe Scale. The correlation 
among the scores of the 25 tests persons on these 9 items at the first and 
second test proved to be .66, in spite of the fact that the students had received 
6 months of intensive training and information on Europe matters. The average 
attitude score of the 25 test persons together did not appear to have changed, 
or hardly at all, in the course of these months; the first time the average score 
of these 9 items was 41.5 and the second time 40.6. This means in both cases 
an attitude between pro and strongly pro European Unification. 
The reliability of a scale can also be measured by the degree of item con-
sistence, i.e. to what extent exactly the same value is measured from item to 
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item. If all items measure the same factor in the same way, the interrelations 
between the items will be very high. When, on the contrary, they measure 
various factors, or if chance plays a part, this coefficient will be very low 
(Drenth 1968). A calculation of the reliability of the Europe scale (according 
to KR. 20) yields a coefficient of 0.904. This appears to be a very high degree 
of item consistence which we could actually have presumed on the ground of 
the results of the factor analysis. 
4. VALIDITY 
The most important question about the Europe scale is whether the scale is 
valid, whether it does indeed measure whether a person is pro or contra Europe 
and to what extent. The question is thus whether the scale answers its purpose 
(Drenth 1968). 
In general it is difficult to give conclusive proof of the validity of a scale or 
a test. Fortunately there are certain indications that may be helpful in this 
respect. 
— It may be expected that students of a specific European training, such as at 
the College of Europe at Bruges, will score higher on the scale than students in 
general. The same thing may be supposed of students who are members of a 
special Union or movement for a United Europe. (Questionnaire E 8). It 
also seems plausible that people who are strongly in favour of integration will 
have a better knowledge of this subject than people who are not interested in 
or are against integration. 
As mentioned before the 25 students in Bruges got an average score in the 
pre-tests of 41 points on 9 statements of the Europe scale. Converted to 11 
items, this is an average score of 50 against a score of 43.7 for the student test 
group. Fifty students who are members of a movement for the Unification of 
Europe appear to have an average score of 46.6 against a score of 43.6 by 
persons who form no part of such a movement. As to knowledge of European 
matters, it appears too that there is a great difference between the (less than 
average) knowledge of the Non-Pro's and the great amount of knowledge of 
the Real Pro's of a United Europe. We shall deal with this matter again in the 
next chapter. 
— Of previous public opinion tests, including Gallup's, it is stated that the 
most fervent Advocates of European integration are to be found among the 
people who are interested in politics and persons who belong to the higher 
circles or higher professional groups, especially with a classification in income 
or education level. In the Gallup report the enquirers observe that 9 out of the 
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10 persons in the E.E.C, that have followed a higher education (étude 
supérieure) take a favourable attitude toward a United Europe. 
Students who are very interested in politics ( E l l ) attain a score of 46.2 in 
our Europe enquiry against a score of 34.7 by those who have no interest in it. 
Persons moderately and little interested score respectively 42.6 and 40.5. 
In our enquiry we found 15% Non-Advocates. If we do not take the English 
students, among whom there are relatively many Non-Advocates, into account, 
the percentage drops down to 11 % which is to a large extent in agreement 
with the findings of Gallup. On the other hand, and contrary to the Gallup 
findings, we find no or practically no differences on the grounds of class (E 6) 
or professional category of the fathers: (E 9). The scores from low to middle 
to high for environment are 43.3, 43.7 and 43.9 resp. In the professional cate-
gory they are 43.5, 44.2 and 43.1. In the next chapter at the Knowledge 
Test and afterwards at the Image Test and the Social Attitude Inventory, we 
shall also find slight differences on the ground of environment. Though we shall 
revert in detail to this question it may be assumed already now that the scores 
found on the ground of environment cannot be used as an argument for or 
against the validity of the Europe scale. 
— The Gallup enquiry of 1962 shows some differences among members of 
political parties. AH political groupings have 60 tot 80% Advocates in their 
ranks, the Communists counting about 60% and the Socialists about 80% pro 
Europeans. Also by nationality there are some differences, although they are 
not large. In Belgium and Italy Gallup finds 60 tot 70% Advocates, in Germany 
and France between 70 and 80%, and in the Netherlands more than 80% pro-
Europeans. According to Rabier, who derives his information from Gallup 
Political Index, 1961—1962, the percentage of Advocates in England barely 
exceeds the 50% in the same period. Although the student test group is not 
representative for political groupings or nationality, it may be supposed that 
in our enquiry certain differences will be shown for these criteria, at least if 
political conviction and nationality play a part in the determination of a Europe 
attitude. 
The results are as follows: Among Socialists and Liberals we find 9 1 % 
Advocates, against 77% among the Communists. Christian Democrats and 
Pacifists count ± 8 8 % pro-Europeans; the Independents 8 3 % . (The Conserv-
atives, not mentioned by Gallup, count 57% Pro's.) By nationality we find 
± 9 7 % Advocates among German and French students against 73% among 
Italians and 67 % among the English. Belgian and Dutch students take an inter-
mediate position with ± 9 0 % pro-Europeans in their ranks. On the whole 
these results are in agreement with the findings of Gallup, by political classi-
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ficatioQ as well as by nationality, although in our enquiry the Belgian students 
count in proportion to the other nationalities a few more Advocates and the 
Dutch a few less. 
On the ground of the data stated in this paragraph we would conclude that 
the Europe Attitude Scale measures an attitude with respect to European 
integration, that it has a high degree of reliability, and possesses a reasonable 
amount of validity. 
5. ATTITUDE SCORES BY VARIOUS SUB-GROUPS 
Non-Pro's and Cons occur proportionately more frequently among Con-
servatives, Right groupings and Communists, although all parties have Non-
Pro's in their ranks. The Communists with an average attitude score of 40.8 
belong as a group to the Advocates, the Right groupings with a score of 39 
perhaps rather to the moderate Advocates, while the Conservatives with an 
average of 36.7 hold a rather neutral position with respect to European in-
tegration. (Note: The score of the Conservatives is the lowest measured in 
comparison with all other groups, exept the Non-Pro's). Socialists, Liberals 
and Christian Democrats attain a score above average i.e. 45.8, 45 and 45.1 
resp. Pacifists and Independents stay under the average with scores of 43.2 
and 41.9 resp. 
Non-Pro's and Cons are found most among the English and Italian students. 
Yet, the English students as a group with an average attitude score of 38.2 
may be reckoned to belong to the moderate Advocates, as the Italians who 
with a score of 41.2 may be considered to belong to the Advocates. The 
German, French, Belgian and Dutch students scored respectively 47.2, 47, 
45.9 and 44.4 on the Attitude Scale. 
In Enclosure 6 a summary is given of Real Pro's and Non-Pro's on the 
grounds of political conviction and nationality. 
Next to the above-mentioned differences in average attitude toward a United 
Europe between the various groupings by environment, nationality, political 
party etc. some relatively small differences were noted among students who 
had visited one or more countries, or spoke one or more languages, gradually 
running up in score from 40 to 46 between test persons who had travelled in 
1 to 6 countries, and a score of from 41 to 47 between test persons who spoke 
1 to 5 languages. By faculty, sex, age, place of residence, religion or duration 
of academic study differences of some significance could not be shown. 
6. CONCLUSION 
It may be asserted that the vast majority of the student test group is for or 
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strongly for a United Europe. There is a good deal of feeling involved in the 
matter. One is willing to actively cooperate in its realisation, one has confi-
dence in the future of a United Europe and one wants a continuation of the 
efforts for integration in political respect. 
Only a small minority (15%) is against or not for a United Europe. From 
the scores on the various items of the attitude scale it appears that this latter 
group has little confidence in the future of a United Europe and feels hardly 
involved if at all. This group is further not prepared to take an active part in its 
realisation, and outspokenly against a political integration of Europe. 
The group of Non-Advocates is distinguished from the test group as a whole 
in that they are less interested in political affairs and have a lesser amount of 
knowledge of the facts about European Unification, as was stated in the 
beginning of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
IS THE EUROPE ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS BASED ON 
KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS? 
1. THE KNOWLEDGE TEST (Part F of the questionnaire) 
With the help of this test we wanted to verify whether the test persons were in-
formed about the European organisations, the contents and purport of the 
mutual agreements, and the results already obtained in the frame-work of the 
E.E.C. In a knowledge test based on a careful selection of items, which proved 
to be suited for the purpose, it is not unusual (as in examinations) to take it for 
granted that we know: What the test measures (knowledge about Europe), 
that in a second test the test persons will to a large extent attain the same score, 
and that by means of this test we can indeed establish whether a person is more 
or less in the picture of what we want to measure. In this respect a knowledge 
test is essentially different from an attitude scale. 
In assessing the score we decided to give the same weight to the three diff-
erent sub-tests (organisation, agreements and results obtained). For the 
questions on organisation (F 1) 60 answers can be filled in, of which 21 
answers are correct. The maximum score is thus 21 points. In an effort to 
introduce some corrections for the benefit of the 'prudent' with respect to the 
'gamblers' we decreased the number of correct answers by half of the faulty 
answers. A consequence of this was also that a test person that answered 
all questions would get the same score as one who could not manage to give a 
single answer. 
In the test about 'mutual agreements' (F2 to 6) the correct answers were 
only accepted as such if not more than one answer was given. The maximum 
score of 5 points was multiplied by 4. With the 11 questions about knowledge 
of results obtained in E.E.C. (E 7) only the correct answers were counted and 
afterwards multiplied by 2. The maximum score of the whole of the test was 
thus: 21 + 20 + 22 is 63 points. 
If we claim to measure with this test knowledge of European matters, we 
presume that there is a certain relation between the scores made by the test 
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persons for the three sub-tests. In other words test persons who have a high 
score in one part of the test will most likely also obtain a rather high or high 
score in the other two parts. Of course no perfect similarity may be expected 
as organisational matters are of a different nature than questions in connection 
with results obtained in United Europe. Yet it may be logically expected that 
there will be a due amount of correlation between the three tests, if every 
part-test measures knowledge of Europe. Whether or not the correlations 
found are in agreement with our presumption is shown in the following table. 
(Product-moment correlation coefficients). 
TABLE S 
Correlation among the 3 knowledge sub-tests and the total score (Ft). 
Fl F2-6 F7 Ft 
Fl 
F2-6 
F7 
Ft 
1.00 
.67 
.41 
.86 
1.00 
.46 
.88 
1.00 
.71 1.00 
The sub-tests show a high degree of correlation between themselves and with 
the total score. Actually the latter is not surprising, since in the case of 
a considerable amount of correlation among sub-tests the final score conforms 
to the average 'distance' from each test. 
2. SCORES ON THE KNOWLEDGE TEST 
Figure 2 gives a survey of the scores of all test persons in this test. 
FIGURE 2 
Scores on the Knowledge Test 
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The average of the entire test group is 38.6. The number of test persons which 
obtained less than half the maximum number of points, i.e. scored less than 32 
points, is 166, which is 25 % of the total number. The average score of what we 
may call persons with a limited amount of knowledge is 21.4. Their knowledge 
is considerably less than the average of the test group. About the same number 
of persons (163) obtain more than three fourths of the maximum number of 
points, with a score of more than 48, and an average of 52.2. Taking into 
account the degree of difficulty of the questions it is justified to say that these 
persons have a good knowledge of European affairs. 
Previously we presumed that there was a relation between Europe attitude 
and knowledge of Europe. On the ground of the amount of knowledge 
it appears that the 25% persons with a limited amount of knowledge of 
Europe get a score of 39.8 for Europe attitude. Those with a good knowledge 
make an average attitude score of 46.6. Yet, it is more interesting to take the 
Europe attitude as a starting point and to compare Pro's and Non-Pro's in 
knowledge of European affairs, as indicated in Figure 2. The difference be­
tween these two groups in attitude and knowledge score is shown in table 6. 
TABLE 6 
Scores of Europe attitude and knowledge among Pro's and Non-Pro's of a United Europe. 
Group R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C.) 
Attitude score 53.0 (43.7) 28.6 (24.9) 
Knowledge score 45.3 (38.6) 30.2 (32.2) 
Real Pro's have a better than average knowledge of a United Europe without 
however, being reckoned as a group to belong to the good 'knowers'. Non-
Pro's score lower than the average, but decidedly do not belong to the group 
of persons with a limited amount of knowledge. The same thing may be said 
of the Cons (C). 
Again it appears that there is some relation between Europe attitude and 
knowledge of Europe, though this relation does not seem to be strong. We 
shall return to this point in chapter П. On the other hand this survey does 
induce us to establish another fact. The knowledge score of the group of 
Non-Pro's and Cons shows that as an average they scored about half of the 
total points to be scored. It is in view of ihe degree of difficulty therefore not 
to be maintained that the Non-Pro's as a group know little or nothing of 
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European matters. This means also that an attitude of the greater part of 
Non-Pro's cannot be accounted for through lack of knowledge. For the same 
reason the picture the Non-Pro's have formed of a United Europe gains in 
significance, and the comparison of this picture with that of the Real Pro's 
makes considerably more sense. 
3. KNOWLEDGE SCORES OF THE VARIOUS SUB-GROUPS 
In E 11 of the questionnaire we enquired about the degree of political interest. 
The scores in the Knowledge Test in the order of great interest to moderate to 
little or no interest appeared to be successively 44.2, 36.4 and 29.8. Among the 
various environments the difference from high to intermediate to low was: 
38.6, 38.6 and 39.2. In the professional category this was 37.5,40 and 39 resp. 
Of the political parties the Socialists appeared to be best informed with a 
score of 42, followed by the Christian Democrats and Liberals with ± 39. The 
Communists and Independents scored 37; Pacifists and Conservatives 33 and 
the Right groupings had 27 points. 
The French, Dutch and German students got a score of ± 45, the Belgian 
and English test persons scored 38 and the Italians had a score of 26 points. 
(Partly on account of the percentage of female students). A difference was 
noted between men and women, who scored 41 and 31 points resp. 
Test persons stating that they had visited some countries or who spoke 
several languages appeared to be better informed than students who appeared 
to have travelled less or to speak fewer languages. The scores showed a gradual 
increase from 32 to 42 among persons that had visited 1 to 6 countries and 
a gradual increase from 34 to 42 among persons who spoke 1 to 5 languages. 
By faculty or place of residence, by religion, age, membership of a political 
party or a European movement, no or relative slight differences were shown, al-
though older students or advanced students appeared to be somewhat better 
informed than the younger students or those with a shorter academic education. 
4. CORRECT AND FAULTY ANSWERS IN THE KNOWLEDGE TEST 
An average score of 38.6 of all test persons out of a maximum of 63 points 
shows that a great number of questions was answered correctly. 70% of the 
questions on organisational matters (F l ) were correctly answered, while an 
average of 10% was registered for faulty answers. 
More than 90% correct answers were given to the question about which 
countries belonged to the E.E.C., against 75 % correct answers to the question 
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about the European Parliament in which only the E.E.C. countries have a seat. 
England, Switzerland and Sweden were wrongly stated to belong to the 
European Parliament in 28 % of the answers on an average. 
The countries belonging to the Council of Europe had an average of 60% 
correct answers, although Turkey was mentioned by only 25%. Spain was 
wrongly stated to belong to the Council of Europe by 25 % of the test persons. 
Great Britain and Sweden were stated to belong to E.F.T.A. in well over 75% 
of the answers. Switzerland got only 45%, while Spain was again wrongly 
stated to belong to E.F.T.A. by 20% of the test persons. The Comecon 
countries Poland and Hungary both obtained a correct indication by 70% of 
the students. Half of the test persons wrongly thought that Yugoslavia also 
belonged to Comecon. 
The questions on European agreements (F 2-6) were answered correctly 
with an average of 70%, although the largest group of the countries associated 
with E.E.C, was located in Africa by only 38% of the test persons. 
The questions on the results hitherto obtained in the frame-work of E.E.C. 
(F 7) yielded 57% correct answers against 32% faulty answers and 11% 'no 
opinion'. The existence of a common agricultural policy in the E.E.C, and the 
absence of a joint foreign policy in the E.E.C., a European Defence Com-
munity, equivalent social provisions and the harmonisation of diplomas were 
rightly pointed to in 75 % of the answers. The use of tax revenues for aid to 
poor districts in Europe and in African countries was, on the contrary, only 
known to be in existence by 22% of the test persons. 
The first 8 questions of F7 on the results obtained in the frame-work of 
E.E.C, have been taken from the Gallup report of 1962. The Gallup reporters 
stated in their enquiry, which is representative of the inhabitants of the E.E.C. 
countries, that a fourth of the persons questioned appeared to have little or no 
knowledge of the European Community, the figures varying from 62% no 
knowledge in Italy to 26% in Belgium, about 22% in Germany, 19% in 
France and 12% in the Netherlands. The above-mentioned 8 questions were 
submitted to the test persons who had shown to have a certain amount 
of knowledge of European affairs. These results showed that only 26% of the 
answers were completed correctly against 13% faulty answers and 61% 'no 
opinion'. 
A remarkable difference will be noted if one compares these figures with 
the 57% correct answers, 32% faulty ones and 11 % 'no opinion' to the 8 ques-
tions in our test. Most likely the score of the Gallup test persons would have 
been higher if this test had been made also in 1968, or if the test persons had 
been more eager to guess at the answers. This does not do away with the fact 
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that our group of test persons appeared to be much better informed than the 
average inhabitant of the E.E.C. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to our expectations, it appeared that the student test group as a 
whole is well informed about European organisations, the tenor of the agree-
ments made and the results obtained in the frame-work of the E.E.C. The 
Non Pro's or Non-Advocates of the Unification of Europe as a group prove 
also to have a fair amount of knowledge of the facts, though a lesser amount 
than the Pro's and the Real Pro's. 
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CHAPTER V. 
CONCEPTION AND IMAGE OF A UNITED EUROPE 
From the contents of the Europe scale a certain vision of the Europe of the 
future was already discernible. The greater part of the test persons, but still 
more the Real Advocates believe in the realisation of a United Europe and 
picture this Europe to themselves as politically closely integrated. They are 
convinced that they have to do their bit and are willing to urge also others to 
become active, particularly the political parties. They expect that a United 
Europe will exert a favourable influence on the habits and customs of their 
own country. Non-Advocates expect few or no advantages from the unification 
and do not consider a United Europe as a realistic concern. Yet, afterwards it 
will appear that in the long run the integration will be a fact for them also. 
1. THE 27 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE 
(Part В1 of the questionnaire) 
We distinguish advocates and opponents of a United Europe on the ground of 
a certain attitude. However, an important question is what is meant by a United 
Europe. What countries are to be included? All test persons were asked to state 
which countries ought to be included in a United Europe if this would be 
brought about, and which countries not or not yet. 
The Non-Pro's were asked to indicate which countries would be most accept­
able to them. From the answers of the total group a pronounced opinion emerg­
ed and a clear pattern of countries came to the fore. 96% of all test persons vote 
for the following countries as members of the present European Community: 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Western Germany, Luxemburg and France. 
92% of the total test group vote also for Great Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries: Denmark, Sweden and Norway. 85% think it also desirable to 
include Switzerland, Ireland, Austria and Finland. 
In brief, a vast majority is for the integration of all Western European countries, 
with the exception of Spain and Portugal. Yet, it appeared that generally one 
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is not against these two countries. 50% of the test persons are also willing to 
give a place in a United Europe to Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia 
and Turkey. 40%, thus a minority, find it desirable to also take up Greece in 
the new Europe, as well as most of the Eastern European countries such as 
Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany and Bulgaria. 22% want to 
see Russia and Albania involved. A great number of them have in view a 
United Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural. 
This general picture appears not to deviate greatly from the picture the Real 
Pro's and Non-Pro's as a group have formed to themselves of a United Europe. 
A calculation of the relations among the countries that were mentioned succes-
sively by Advocates, the test group as a whole and the Non-Advocates shows 
the following (product-moment) correlation coefficients. 
TADLE 7 
Correlations in the order of preference of all European countries of Real Pro's and Non-
Pro's and the test group as a whole (Tot). 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. 
R.P. 1.000 
Tot. .997 1.000 
N.P. .969 .977 1.000 
The similarity among the various groups in the order of preference of countries 
is thus very great. This means, however, that both opponents and advocates 
have pictured the same Europe. Deviations in attitude and image with respect 
to a Europe of the future may not be attributed solely to differences in con-
ception between Pro's and Non-Pro's about what they understand by a 
United Europe. At large one speaks of the same Europe as regards the 
preference one has for countries to form part of it. Still, there are differences 
in accents. Real Advocates register in general fewer preference votes for coun-
tries with autocratic governments, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. They 
give also fewer votes for strongly communist countries like Russia, Eastern 
Germany and Poland than Non-Pro's and the test group as a whole. 
Non-Pro's seem to be less enthusiastic about some Western European coun-
tries such as Ireland, Great Britain, Austria and Finland, than the other two 
groups. The group as a whole shows slightly more appreciation for the Balkans 
of which they mention Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, 
Bulgary and Albania, than the Pro's and the Non-Pro's. 
62 
By environment or degree of political interest hardly any difference is shown. 
The middle class is less against Yugoslavia than the highest and lowest classes. 
Those that are highly interested in politics have some slight preference for 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. By nationality the German students appear to 
have an opinion different from the others. They are by a vast majority (60%) 
for the admission of the communist countries, with the exception of Albania 
and Russia, and to a somewhat higher extent of Greece (48%). The Dutch 
are by a majority (70%) against entry by Spain and Portugal, like the French 
(60%), and a bit more strongly for Turkey and Yugoslavia (56%). 
By political party large differences are noted, although all political parties 
prove to be quite unanimous about the admission of the Western European 
countries; however, most parties except Spain and Portugal. Socialists are 
likewise for the admission of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania (60% ) 
and by a majority not against the other communist countries with the exception 
of Bulgaria, Albania and Russia. Communists are moderately for (60%) the 
admission of all communist countries, especially Yugoslavia, but not for 
Albania or Russia. Socialists as well as communists are against Spain, Portugal 
and Greece (60%); however, the socialists are for Turkey (58%), the com-
munists being strongly against it. 
Right and extreme right are outspokenly against communist countries 
joining, but in favour of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey (57%). The pa-
cifists feel to the same extent in favour of the four last-mentioned countries. 
They are by a majority also against the communist countries, with the exception, 
however, of Eastern Germany, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (54% for). 
Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Independents and Liberals show the same 
picture as the student group as a whole. 
2. SPECIAL PREFERENCE FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES 
(Part B2 of the questionnaire) 
In the questionnaire the students were asked to mention 5 countries, which 
they would most preferably incorporate into a United Europe, without men-
tioning their own countries. By only taking into account the number of test 
persons that were able to vote for a particular country (the total number of test 
persons minus the students of that country) it was possible to calculate the per-
centage of foreigners that voted for a particular country. Great Britain, followed 
by France and Germany were given preference by 75 % of the test persons. 
With the advocates this percentage is more than 80% as an average while with 
the opponents it is slightly lower than 60%. 
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Real Advocates are rather more in favour of Great Britain than in favour of 
France; Non-Advocates are more in favour of France, and less in favour of 
England. Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium are given preference by 46% of 
all test persons. Real Advocates are more in favour of the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Italy than Non-Advocates who mention the last three countries 
less frequently. 
It shows that there is also a certain amount of preference for Sweden though 
the amount of interest in this country of both Pro's and Non-Pro's is smaller. 
Switzerland and Denmark obtain 22% of the preference votes as an average; 
Luxemburg and Norway 13%. With the Non-Pro's these percentages are some­
what higher; with the Pro's somewhat lower. The other European countries 
are hardly mentioned if at all except Spain and Russia which are mentioned 
considerably more by Non-Pro's than Real Pro's. See table 8. 
TABLE 8 
Special preference for certain countries in percentages. 
Great Britain 
France 
Germany 
The Netherlands 
Italy 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Luxemburg 
Norway 
Spain 
Russia 
R.P. 
86 
77 
81 
70 
50 
54 
28 
13 
18 
12 
10 
4 
2 
(Tot) 
75 
72 
71 
46 
46 
45 
38 
23 
20 
14 
11 
10 
8 
N.P. 
52 
64 
56 
40 
43 
40 
32 
24 
29 
11 
17 
19 
13 
In general it may be asserted that in the three groupings the first preference 
is given to the countries of the Euromarket with a clear stress on Great Britain, 
France and Germany. 
3. PICTURE OF SITUATION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPE OF THE FUTURE 
(Part С of the questionnaire) 
In the preceding section (1) we discussed the countries that were preferred as 
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eligible candidates for the United Europe. We also observed that there was only 
a slight difference between Advocates and Non-Advocates and the whole group 
of test persons. In this section we are painting first the general picture of the 
whole of the group as regards the aspects of a United Europe. 
In a next section we intend to go further into the differences between Real 
Pro's and Non-Pro's with regard to these aspects. A picture of the Europe 
of the future will be described containing the following views: I. Situation as 
is generally portrayed. II. Internal objectives. III. Vision and expectations of 
the future. IV. Critical comment on integration. In doing so we shall base our 
conclusion on the percentage of the whole of the test group that voiced its 
preference for a certain alternative in the items of part С by marking this with 
the figure 1, as well as on the 11 items not discussed yet of part A of the ques­
tionnaire. We shall restrict ourselves to the most important results. The exact 
percentages of each alternative will be stated in a following section on the 
comparison of the pictures of the Pro's and Cons. 
3.1 General Situation 
Nearly half of all test persons (46%) are for a United Europe of a large number 
of countries; of the others (54%) the votes are equally divided in their pref­
erence for a small or a medium-sized Europe. 75 % of the test persons vote for 
a federal Europe of which 43 % for a close federation and 32% for a federation 
with a large amount of independence for each country. The rest is equally 
divided in their preference for one large country with a central government or 
a group of countries with common agreements. 
Well over 80% are for a democratic form of government and 11% for a 
democracy with full power in the hands of one person. Only a very small 
minority is for a people's democracy or autocracy. A majority of 69% is of 
the opinion that members of a European Parliament should be elected directly 
by the voters i.e. without the intermediary of the governments or parliaments of 
member states. (A 20 of the questionnaire). 
According to the opinion of about half the test persons, it will not be 
possible in this democratic Europe to give a proper place to royal families 
(A 18). As purposes of the United Europe, the development of economy (48 % ) 
and the establishment of an independent European power (33%) are consid­
ered to be of paramount importance. 11 % consider the improvement of per­
sonal welfare as the first purpose. Neither aid to developing countries, nor the 
protection of European art and culture are considered as being essential. 
Mutual integration of the countries is considered by a majority to be an 
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economie proposition (62%). Only 15% give preference No 1 to political 
integration. Social integration and integration of education were both 9% 
whereas military integration obtains 5% of the opinions. For the rest is has 
already been shown that (85 % of) the test persons do not share the opinion that 
the disadvantages of political integration will outweigh its advantages. 
As to ties with other world powers, 62% are for an independent Europe, 
separate from other world powers, 29% are for an orientation towards both 
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. A very small minority is for ties with the U.S.A. or 
with the U.S.S.R. In this connection it is not surprising that 80% of the 
test persons hold the view that the establishment of a new world power along-
side the United States and the Soviet Union is one of the greatest advantages of 
a United Europe (Al). 
3.2 Internal Objectives 
Opinions on the priorities with respect to internal measures to be taken differ 
also. An equal price-level in all member states, an equivalent taxation 
system, coordination of diplomas and qualifications for trades and professions 
are considered to be of greater importance than equal social provisions (16%) 
and equal pay (8%). 
As to language, only a small majority is for the introduction of a common 
language (56 % ) in addition to the existing national languages (A 15). There is a 
distinct preference for the English language (67%) followed by French 
(23%), if it is considered desirable to have a common language. The German, 
Italian and Spanish languages are hardly considered. 
The necessity of an army is clearly seen; only 20% are for the abolition of 
it. Preference is given to an army of regulars (51%) contrary to an army of 
conscripts. Only a slight minority indulge in the thought of a strong army 
(14%). 
A small majority (60%) considers European integration as a necessity to 
supply large-scale aid to developing countries (A 4), although aid to developing 
countries does decidedly not come to the fore as one of the more important 
objectives of a United Europe. If development aid is supplied, almost half of it 
will be sent to districts were the needs are most urgent. For a third of the 
test persons, charity begins at home and the first thoughts are given to districts 
within the United Europe. Nearly 25% of the test persons want to restrict their 
preference to development aid to those countries where effective control of 
expenditure is possible or to those countries where economic benefits may be 
expected. 
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As regards common achievements preference does not go out to a European 
space programme, nor to a well-equipped army, but mainly to common research 
on a large scale (43%), economic projects (32%) and to a lesser extent to a 
vast network of motorways (15%). 60% are not in favour of alterations in 
existing boundaries of the member states in order to achieve more homo-
geneous (closely integrated) populations (A 17). From the Attitude Scale it does 
appear that in general many (70%) are willing to give up their own nationahty 
and accept European nationality instead. 
3.3 Vision and Expectations of a United Europe 
For nearly two thirds of all test persons the rate of European integration should 
be accelerated even if this is attended with changes and discomfort; 29 % want 
to continue at the present rate. Only 11 % would like to bring integration to a 
halt until it is certain that no country or professional group is harmed. 11 % 
expect that a United Europe will not, or probably not, be brought about; 89% 
expect that the integration will be realised. One third of the last group believe 
that integration of Europe will be brought about within 15 years. 
Of the various alternatives mentioned for the promotion of integration, 33 % 
think that information by the Press, Radio and T.V. will be most effective, 
next to cultural and scientific exchanges. European teaching programmes and 
language courses, international tourism and exchange of visiting labourers and 
trainees are considered to be less effective. 38% of the test persons are of the 
opinion that the most important contribution towards integration at the moment 
is made by the industrial world. 29% credit it to the governments of the 
countries concerned. 23% state pressure groups such as the European mov-
ement and only 11 % make mention of political parties. 
It appeared from the Europe Scale that many (75%) think that the political 
parties should bring their programmes into line with the political integration of 
Europe. Further a majority of 73% believe that the attitude taken by some 
countries renders the integration impossible. (A 3). Their opinions with regard 
to a United Europe appear to be largely based on the expectations of the future 
(62%) and less on what happened in the past (31 %). Only a small percentage 
of the test persons stated discontent with the present state in their countries. 
Finally, 73 % of the test persons do not agree to the thesis that Europe, as it 
is now, has nothing to fear. (A 22). 
3.4 Critical Comments 
80% of all test persons think that the integration of Europe will give rise to a 
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number of real objections (A 14). Difficulties are particularly feared in the 
relations between the member countries from domination of one of the states 
as a result of difference in economy, size or leadership (39%), and tensions 
among member states as a result of differences in views or culture (31%). 
There is less fear for crises in certain sectors of industry, domestic political 
troubles or clashes with one of the world powers. 
Half of all test persons think that the consequences of the political integration 
are incalculable (A 7). In addition 47% do not agree that European integration 
would mean an asset to those regions that are now being neglected by their na-
tional governments (A 8). Though the test persons feel largely involved in the 
European integration, as appeared from the attitude scale, and are convinced 
that they ought to do their bit and make sacrifices if this would be demanded, 
this does not really mean that integration is regarded to be one of the most 
important problems of the world. The prevention of hunger and starvation in 
the world (45 % ) and stopping the war in Vietnam (28 % ) are deemed to be con-
siderably more important than a United Europe (13%) or the struggle against 
the atom bomb (11%). Campaigns for road safety or the prevention of acci-
dents have hardly come forward as problems of importance. 
4. IMAGE AND PICTURE OF EUROPE AMONG REAL ADVOCATES OF A UNITED 
EUROPE COMPARED WITH NON-ADVOCATES OF UNIFICATION 
In the preceding section we started from the items that were singled out from 
the alternatives and marked as having first priority. However, it is also possible 
to start from the order of preference of the alternatives given by the test persons, 
as in the completion of the questionnaire the answers were ranked in the order 
of preference (1,2, 3, etc.). 
On the ground of the data thus supplied by a group of test persons we are 
able to calculate from each alternative its relative place in the order of pref-
erence, by taking the sum of all the numbers given to an alternative and dividing 
the figure by the number of test persons in the group. 
In this way we obtain an average appreciation or preference of the group of 
all the alternatives to a certain item. Thus we obtain an average appreciation 
as a result of adding and dividing, which means that we consider the distances 
between the various alternatives to be equal, which in fact is not really the case. 
On the ground of the measuring and data theory objections could be raised to 
this procedure. However, in this case it did not (yet) appear possible to apply a 
data theory for 'non-metric scaling' (See Roskam and others 1969). Therefore 
we decided to proceed on our above-mentioned course. This has the advantage 
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that by means of mathematical compilation we can establish that by comparing 
the scores of two groups for a certain alternative real differences are at stake, 
or whether these differences are the result of coincidence; in other words, 
whether they are significant or not. 
The preference for a certain alternative can thus be derived from its place 
in the rank. If there is decreasing preference for the five answers to a certain 
item, the order of preference will then be: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If all the alter­
natives are on the average appreciated equally strongly, there will be no 
order of preference but all answers will obtain the figure 3. We can make a 
graph of various alternatives to an item by using a measuring line, divided in 
3, 4 or 5 equal parts according to the number of alternatives, from which we 
can read in detail the average preference. In comparing the two groups X and 
Y for 5 alternatives, we shall use the following figure: 
' · t ι . 
Ι ι 2 J i3 ι 4 J 5 
y 1 — > — · 1 ! . — ! • — . — ! 
a b ' с e d 
X and Υ are the measuring lines for the two groups; the vertical line shows the 
middle. The division in 5 equal parts shows the difference in the order of 
preference. A black dot provided with a small letter refers to a certain alter­
native for both group X and group Y. The alternatives to the left of the 
middle line have a higher appreciation than the alternatives on the right. The 
alternatives around the middle hold an intermediate position. The order of 
the answers gives us an opinion of the line of thought in a certain group. 
By means of variance analysis we can calculate whether the differences in 
appreciation of the alternatives between X and Y are significant. 
The Real Advocates and Opponents of Europe will be compared on two 
points. First of all we state preference No. 1 of Real Pro's and Non Pro's of the 
alternatives to the items of part С of the questionnaire. For the sake of com­
parison we are at the same time stating preference No 1 of the whole of the 
test group (Tot) and the Cons (C). Then a graph as above will be given 
of Real Pro's and Non-Pro's in which all alternatives of an item are represented 
and which denotes the average appreciation of each group in the order of 
preference. 
The results of the analysis of variance between the two groups is shown in 
Enclosure 7. The table shows the degree of likely hood in which the difference 
between Real Pro's and Non-Pro's must be attributed to chance (Interaction). 
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4.1 General Situation 
TABLE 9 
Size of the Europe of the future on the basis of preference No. 1 per person in percentages 
of the total number of persons. 
R.P. (Jot) N.P. (C) 
a. for a small Europe 
b. a large Europe 
c. medium-sized Europe 
In the order of preference: 
38 
37 
25 
(28) 
(46) 
(27) 
11 
58 
31 
( 8) 
(56) 
(36) 
-lis-
Real Advocates (RP) are divided in their preferences, namely partly for a 
small and partly for a large or medium-sized Europe. Non-Advocates (Non-
Pro's) are clearly for a large or medium-sized Europe, but not for a small 
Europe. 
This same picture comes to the fore from the order of preference given. 
There is a difference in the order of Pro's and Non-Pro's but also a distinct 
difference in the appreciation of the various alternatives among the Non-Pro's. 
TABLE 10 
Form of control in a United Europe by preference No. 1 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. a close federation of countries 
b. one large country 
c. less closely-knit federation 
d. long-term agreements 
In the order of preference: 
63 
26 
U 
0 
(42) 
(12) 
(32) 
(14) 
10 
15 
41 
34 
(10) 
(8) 
(40) 
(42) 
a 
1 2 
b ¡c 
3 
d 
4 
Advocates show a strong preference for a close federation and are not for 
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agreements between countries. Non-Advocates are for a less closely knit 
federation or for long-term agreements. 
In the order of preference the same differences emerge, although the 
Advocates show in their second preference to prefer one large country as well 
as a less closely-knit federation. Unanimity with respect to a close federation 
is larger among the Pro's than unanimity among the Non-Pro's for a less closely-
knit federation. The opinions of the two groups diverge strongly as regards 
form of control. 
TABLE 11 
Form of government by preference No. 1 
R.P. (Jot) N.P. (C) 
a. for a democracy 
b. democracy with full powers 
c. people's democracy 
d. autocracy 
83 
15 
2 
0 
(81) 
(11) 
( 7 ) 
( 2 ) 
64 
9 
18 
9 
(62) 
( 8 ) 
(22) 
( 8 ) 
In the order of preference: 
bic 
The Pro's in their preference No. 1 are poetically exclusively for a real de-
mocracy, or as the case should be f or a democracy with full powers in one 
hand. Non-Pro's are also, but less strongly, for a democracy although well over 
25% of them feel rather for a people's democracy or autocracy. 
The ranking of alternatives does not appear to show differences in the order 
of preference. Advocates are more unanimous in their preference for a real 
democracy and in their rejection of an autocracy. Non-Pro's appear in their 
second preference to prefer a democracy with full powers in one hand as well 
as a people's democracy. From question A 20 of the questionnaire it appears 
that the Real Pro's are considerably more in favour of direct votes for a Euro-
pean Parliament than the Non-Pro's (82% against 54%). Most test persons 
in the first group are convinced that it will be impossible to give an adequate 
place to monarchies. (A 18; 57% against 45%). 
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TABLE 12 
Purpose by preference No. 1 
R.P. 
σοο 
N.P. (C) 
a. development of economy 
b. independent European power 
с personal welfare 
d. aid to developing countries 
e. European art and culture 
In the order of preference: 
49 
40 
8 
5 
2 
(48) 
(33) 
(11) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
48 
16 
21 
7 
8 
(46) 
(22) 
(22) 
(6) 
(4) 
с b! d e 
Pro's give first preference to the development of economy and regard Europe 
as an independent power. Non-Pro's are likewise first of all for the develop­
ment of economy, but personal welfare plays a part at the same time. 
This difference also appears from the order of preference. Among Pro's an 
independent European power distinctly plays an important part, contrary to 
personal welfare. With the opponents personal welfare and a Europe as an 
independent power both appear to hold a second (intermediate) position. 
TABLE 13 
Integration by preference No. 1 
R.P. 
σοο 
N.P. (C) 
a. for economic integration 
b. for political integration 
с social integration 
d. integration of education 
e. military integration 
54 
32 
9 
8 
2 
(63) 
(15) 
(10) 
( 9) 
( 5) 
50 
4 
15 
19 
13 
(44) 
(6) 
(16) 
(18) 
(16) 
In the order of preference: 
a b 
» *— 
1 ! 2 
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Pro's have a clear preference for economic and partly for political integration. 
Non-Pro's are likewise in favour of economic integration, but are clearly not 
or hardly for political integration. 
This difference in appreciation is also to be noted from the order of prefer­
ence. Among Pro's political integration holds the second place; among Non-
Pro's the last place. Integration of education holds second position with the 
Non-Pro's compared with a fourth place with Pro's. Military integration comes 
more strongly forward with the Non-Pro's than with the Real Pro's. 
TABLE 14 
Ties with other powers by preference No. 1 
a. independent Europe 
b. orientation towards both USA and USSR 
с orientation towards USA 
d. orientation towards USSR 
R.P. 
72 
24 
4 
0 
σοι) 
(62) 
(29) 
( 7 ) 
( 3) 
N.P. 
46 
32 
10 
12 
(C) 
(38) 
(42) 
(14) 
( 6) 
In the order of preference: 
a b ι с d 
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Advocates show a clear preference for an independent Europe. A minority is 
for orientation towards both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Non-Pro's are divided; 
a little less than half of them are for an independent Europe; the other half for 
ties with other world powers or either of the two. 
Unanimity among Pro's for an independent Europe is also visible from the 
order of preference, which is the same as with Non-Pro's but shows the prior­
ities more emphatically. An orientation on the U.S.S.R. occurs outspokenly in 
the last place with practically all Advocates. 
In A 1 it is also shown that Pro's are more enthusiastic about Europe as a new 
world power than their opponents (85% against 68%). 
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4.2 Internal objectives 
TABLE 15 
Standardization by preference No. 1 
R.P. 
σοο 
N.P. (C) 
a. equivalent taxation systems 
b. co-ordination of diplomas 
с equal price-levels 
d. equal social provisions 
e. equal pay for certain categories 
In the order of preference: 
29 
25 
23 
16 
7 
(25) 
(23) 
(29) 
(16) 
( 8) 
19 
16 
32 
20 
14 
(16) 
(18) 
(33) 
(24) 
(18) 
c a d 
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Advocates show some preference for equal taxes and prices, co-ordination of 
diplomas and attach little importance to equal pay and social provisions. 
Non-Pro's have first of all equal prices in mind. 
In order of preference differences seem small, even if equal pay is clearly in the 
last place with Advocates. Non-Pro's prefer an equal price-level. With Pro's as 
well as Cons there is thus hardly any difference in priority between the alter-
natives to be noted. It is therefore not surprising that on further investigation 
into the order of preference beween Pro's and Non-Pro's (by means of variance 
analysis) no significant differences could be shown. 
TABLE 16 
A common language by preference No. 1 
a. English 
b. French 
с German 
d. Italian 
e. Spanish 
R.P. 
66 
31 
3 
1 
1 
(Tot) 
(67) 
(23) 
( 5) 
( 2 ) 
( 4 ) 
N.P. 
55 
24 
9 
2 
10 
(C) 
(60) 
(24) 
( 4 ) 
( 2 ) 
(10) 
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In the order of preference: 
a 
1 
b 
2 
E 
1 
3 
1 
. ! ^ 
4 
·— 
d e 
5 
e d 
Advocates show a real preference for the English language if a common 
language is considered necessary. A minority show an opinion in favour of 
French. Non-Pro's are in the majority for the English language, French 
holding a second position. There is also some interest in Spanish and German. 
By their order of preference Pro's are more unanimous in their preference 
for English and French and more unanimous in their rejection of Italian and 
Spanish. The need of a common language in a United Europe (A 15) is felt 
in both groups, but hardly pronouncedly. (61 % against 55%). 
TABLE 17 
The army by preference No. 1 
R.P. 
σοο 
N.P. (C) 
a. for an army of regulars 
b. for abolition of the army 
с for a strong army 
d. for an army of conscripts 
51 
22 
14 
12 
(51) 
(20) 
(14) 
(15) 
35 
23 
21 
23 
(34) 
(28) 
(22) 
(16) 
In the order of preference: 
J-
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Advocates are by a great majority against abolition of the army (78%) and in 
favour of an army of regulars. An army of conscripts or a strong army are 
hardly preferred. Non-Pro's are also against abolition of the army (72%) with 
a slight preference for a regular army compared with an army of conscripts, 
whereas a minority is for a strong army. 
In the order of preference a clear preference is shown by Pro's for an army 
of conscripts and no preference for a strong army, nor for the abolition of an 
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army. Non-Pro's are likewise in favour of an army of regulars, though less 
pronouncedly, and divided as regards the abolition of the army or an army of 
greater strength. 
TABLE 18 
Development Aid by preference No. 1 
a. for areas with greatest needs 
b. areas within United Europe 
с areas with effective control of expenditure 
d. areas yielding economic benefits 
R.P. 
59 
31 
7 
3 
σοο 
(46) 
(32) 
(16) 
( 7 ) 
N.P. 
47 
23 
14 
16 
(C) 
(50) 
(24) 
(10) 
(16) 
In the order of preference: 
a b ¡ c d 
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A majority of the Advocates are in favour of aid to territories in the world where 
the needs are most urgent. A minority is for aid within a United Europe. 
Neither effective control nor economic benefits play a part of any significance 
in their first choice. Non-Pro's show about the same picture, although econo­
mic benefits and effective control are preferred by almost one third of the 
Non-Pro's. 
The order of preference is the same with Pro's and Non-Pro's, though the 
Pro's are more outspokenly for aid in the world or in Europe and clearly find 
effective control or economic benefits less important. 
The integration of Europe is acknowledged to be necessary for development 
aid on a large scale by 76% of the Pro's and 47% of the Con's (A 4). 
TABLE 19 
Common achievements by preference No. 1 
R.P. 
σο« N.P. (C) 
a. combined scientific research 
b. combined economic projects 
с interconnected motorways throughout Europe 
d. an independent and well-equipped army 
e. European space programme 
46 
34 
11 
3 
6 
(43) 
(32) 
(15) 
( 6 ) 
( 5) 
30 
23 
23 
12 
13 
(23) 
(27) 
(26) 
(12) 
(12) 
76 
It was not possible to make a general calculation of the order of preference 
because in the French text of the questionnaire one of the alternatives was left 
out. The percentages on the basis of preference No. 1 were calculated taking 
into account the answers of all test persons except the French and the Wal­
loons. Advocates appeared to be particularly interested in scientific research 
and economic projects. European space programmes and army are hardly 
considered. Non-Pro's are also, through to a lesser extent, in favour of scien­
tific research, but at the same time in favour of combined economic projects and 
interconnected motorways. 
A European space programme and a well-equipped independent army 
together are stated as first preference by 25 % of the Non-Pro's. Pro's as well 
as Non-Pro's are largely in disagreement with alterations of boundaries in 
order to achieve homogeneous population groups, although Non-Pro's are 
stronger in their refusal than the first group, viz. 62% against 54% resp. 
(A 17). 
4.3 Vision and Expectations of a United Europe 
TABLE 20 
Desired rate of integration by preference No. 1 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. acceleration of integration 84 (61) 19 (14) 
b. continuation of present rate 13 (29) 47 (48) 
с stopping integration 3 (11) 34 (38) 
In the order of preference: 
a i b с 
— 1 г — τ — 
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The majority of Advocates are of the opinion that the rate of integration should 
be accelerated. The majority of Non-Advocates are of the opinion that the 
present rate should be continued or that integration must be brought to a halt 
until it is certain that no country or occupational group will be harmed. 
In the order of preference Advocates are clearly in favour of acceleration 
and against any plan of stopping integration. Non-Advocates show some 
77 
preference for a continuation at the present rate and reject acceleration of 
integration, although their opinion is less pronounced than that of other groups. 
TABLE 21 
Expectations of period of achievement by preference No. 1 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. to be expected after 1S years 
b. to be expected within 15 years 
с not or probably not to be expected 
61 
37 
2 
(61) 
(28) 
(ID 
47 
21 
32 
(48) 
(14) 
(38) 
In the order of preference: 
? 
All Advocates expect that a United Europe will be realised; one third think 
that the realisation will be brought about within IS years. Two thirds of the 
Non-Advocates also expect a United Europe to be realised against one third 
of them who do not expect that the European integration will ever be realised. 
From the order of preference it appears that the Non-Pro's as a group are 
of the opinion that non-realisation stands a fairer chance than integration 
within 15 yean. 
TABLE 2 2 
Measures for the promotion of European integration by preference No. 1 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. information by news media 
b. exchange of culture and science 
с teaching programmes and language instruction 
d. international tourism 
e. exchange of labourers and trainees 
In the order of preference: 
41 
24 
15 
11 
11 
(33) 
(24) 
(18) 
(13) 
(13) 
21 
23 
21 
17 
18 
(17) 
(26) 
(22) 
(15) 
(22) 
Lijd 
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Advocates expect that integration is promoted best by information through 
news media, and also by exchange of culture and science. Non-Advocates 
prove to be strongly divided in their preferences. 
In the order of preference the Pro's are first of аД in favour of information 
and cultural exchange and expect less of exchange of labour or trainees and 
international tourism. With the Non-Pro's the order of preference shows some 
preference for cultural and scientific exchange and also little confidence in 
tourism. 
TABLE 23 
In reply to the question as to who makes the most important contribution towards unifica­
tion the first preferences given were as follows: 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. the industrial world 
b. governments of the countries concerned 
с leagues such as European Movement 
d. political parties 
In the order of preference: 
34 
30 
28 
8 
(38) 
(29) 
(23) 
(П) 
38 
26 
21 
15 
(48) 
(26) 
(16) 
(12) 
a b j с d 
Advocates and Non-Advocates show little difference both in first preference 
and in the order of preference. Industry and governments are considered 
more important as regards their contribution towards European integration 
than a European movement or the political parties. No significant differences 
between the two groups were shown. As regards the present governments 
both Advocates and Non-Advocates largely find (72%) that the attitude of 
some countries precludes the Unification of Europe (A3). 
TABLE 2 4 
The first preferences as to the reason for a certain opinion: 
R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. expectations of the future 
b. avoiding what happened in the past 
с discontent with present state in one's own country 
72 
24 
5 
(62) 
(31) 
(7) 
53 
31 
15 
(52) 
(36) 
(12) 
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In the order of preference: 
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Advocates look strongly to the future and their opinion is largely not based 
on discontent with the present state of affairs in their own country. For Non-
Advocates being not in favour of a United Europe this question has little signif­
icance. 
That Europe as it is now has nothing to fear (A 22) is confirmed by 15% 
of the Advocates, against 36% of the Non-Advocates. So it may be said that 
with Non-Advocates and very strongly so with Real Advocates the feeling that 
Europe holds a vulnerable position predominates. 
4.4 Critical Comments 
Both Advocates and Non-Advocates are of the opinion that the integration of 
Europe brings with it a number of realistic drawbacks (75%, 8 3 % resp. at 
A14). Although Advocates are strongly in favour of political integration, 
half of them (47%) think that nobody can foresee the consequences of this 
step (A7). Non-Advocates are strongly against political integration and also 
hold the view that the consequences are incalculable (63%). Advocates do 
think (72%) that the integration will bring benefits to those regions that are 
now being neglected by their national governments; the majority of their 
counterparts do not share this conviction (41 % does). 
TABLE 25 
If difficulties should arise in a United Europe, the test persons expect that they will in the 
first place be caused by. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
dominance by one of the member states 
tensions between states due to differences 
in mentality 
crises in certain sections of industry 
domestic political problems 
difficulties with e.g. America 
R.P. 
38 
27 
15 
12 
7 
(Tot) 
(39) 
(31) 
(12) 
(10) 
( 9) 
N.P. 
36 
33 
9 
14 
8 
(C) 
(32) 
(36) 
(14) 
(12) 
( 8 ) 
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Advocates as well as Non-Advocates see difficulties arising between member 
states. Neither political troubles in one's own country nor difficulties with one 
of the world powers are expected in the first instance. Fears of dominance by 
one of the member states and tensions on the ground of differences in culture 
or mental attitude appear to hold a first place with Advocates, but more 
clearly with Non-Advocates. With both groups there is less fear of clashes 
with America or Russia. 
As a result, variance analysis between the order of preference of Advocates 
and Non-Advocates showed barely any difference of opinion between the two 
groups. 
TABLE 2 6 
Position in world events. 
The relative position of the integration of Europe with regard to other international 
issues by preference No. 1. 
RP. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
a. freedom from hunger campaign 
b. stopping Vietnam war 
с Unification of Europe 
d. campaign for nuclear disarmament 
e. campaigns for road safety and prevention 
of accidents 
51 
20 
19 
8 
(45) 
(28) 
(13) 
(11) 
39 
39 
8 
7 
(38) 
(40) 
( 8 ) 
( 6) 
( 4 ) ( 8 ) 
In the order of preference: 
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Advocates focus initial attention on the struggle against starvation in the world. 
Stopping the Vietnam war and the European Unification figure in the second 
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place. With Non-Advocates starvation in the world and stopping the Vietnam 
war play an equal first role. European Unification, the atom bomb or road 
safety are in the first instance barely considered to be of importance. 
In order of preference Advocates appear to consider road safety as clearly 
less important, contrary to the central problem of starvation in the world. 
Stopping the Vietnam war and the integration of Europe are given an almost 
equal second place. In order of preference Non-Advocates make a clear dis-
tinction between the importance of the Vietnam problem and the struggle 
against starvation on the one hand, and the less important second place 
awarded to the atom bomb, European Unification and road safety. 
Variance analysis has shown that there is a question of real difference between 
Advocates and Non-Advocates as regarding their order of preference, which 
cannot be accounted for by coincidence. 
From this analysis in Enclosure 7 it appears that particularly the forms 
of a United Europe (forms of control and government and mutual integration) 
are quite different. There are also large differences in the opinions of Ad-
vocates and Non-Advocates regarding the desired rate and the expectations 
of the time when integration will be realised. For the rest clear differences 
between Pro's and Non-Pro's are noted in all the image questions, except the 
matters that deal with measures to be taken in the frame-work of Europe, 
internal problems to be expected and the question as to who at the present 
makes the greatest contribution towards European integration. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The most remarkable differences between Pro's and Non-Pro's are as follows: 
The Pro's vote for democratic, economically and politically integrated close 
European federation, with restricted individual independence of countries and 
independent of other world powers. European integration is felt to be an im-
portant international problem. Most of them would like to accelerate inte-
gration and would be willing to make a personal contribution towards the 
realisation of it. Most of them have confidence in integration and expect that 
it will be brought about, perhaps even within 15 years. Most of them are not 
particularly in favour of a strong army, although they realise the necessity 
of military forces, preferably of regulars. One wants to see more collective 
achievements in a United Europe, particularly in the field of scientific re-
searches and the execution of economic and technical projects. 
Interest is generally focused on economic integration. Personal welfare plays 
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a role, however, and so does aid to developing countries. Most Pro's are aware 
of the fact that European integration brings realistic drawbacks with it, par-
ticularly with regard to mutual relations of the countries, and that the conse-
quences of e.g. political integration can hardly be foreseen. However, most 
are willing to take risks and make real sacrifices for integration. Advocates 
are concerned about the present position of Europe in the world and expect 
that a United Europe will strengthen its position. 
Non-Advocates take a neutral attitude or are against a United Europe. 
In general they expect that integration will be effected (in the end), but find 
that the faith in a United Europe can only be regarded with a feeling of un-
reality. They axe not willing to cooperate towards the realisation of integration. 
If unification should be effected, they are for a democratic or, if need be, for 
a people's democratic Europe, preferably for a loose-knit federation of coun-
tries with long-term agreements. At any rate they are not in favour of political 
integration. 
Europe as an independent power is less appreciated than ties with one or 
both of the two great world powers. European integration is not regarded as 
an important international problem. They feel hardly involved in it. Yet, a 
majority does not think that the present efforts should be discontinued, even if 
Non-Advocates have little confidence in the benefits of integration. 
Some are more in favour of military than political integration, whereas the 
necessity of an integrated army is acknowledged. A minority is even in favour 
of a strong army, against an equal minority (23 % ) which wants the army to 
be abolished. In their picture of a future Europe, an independent army and 
space programmes take an important though not first position. 
The greatest amount of interest is shown for economic integration. Personal 
welfare plays an important role in this matter. European integration of 
education comes in the second place. Integration of Europe is not regarded 
as an essential condition for aid to developing countries; nor are advantages 
expected of it for the benefit of neglected regions in Europe. Non-Pro's do 
hold the view that Europe as it is now may have something to fear, but less 
strongly than the Pro's. For them the integration of Europe is no solution to 
this problem of fear. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
PERSONALITY AND EUROPE ATTITUDE 
1. THE SOCIAL ATTITUDE INVENTORY (PART D OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE) 
In Chapter II par. 3.7. we stated that according to Cattell and others a person's 
attitude toward social events was particularly determined by certain factors 
or dimensions. Cattell (1965) says the following: 'The personality analysis 
carried out by the present writer and his colleagues in the forties, showed two 
personality factors in particular which influenced views and values, namely, the 
radicalism-conservatism factor, indexed Q, and the tender-tough-minded di­
mension (later called premsia-harria) indexed as I factor. Thurstone had 
independently located the attitude pattern Q, showing its extensive deter­
mination of 'willingness to change' over more than political fields and Eysenck 
has independently extended our knowledge of the range of the tender-tough 
effects of I factor from art to zoology.' 
On the basis of Eysenck's work, Melvin (1955) constructed a combined 
scale by means of which the above-mentioned dimensions, called R an T, 
could be measured. Namely, the factors radicaUsm-conservatism (R) and 
tender-tough-mindedness (T). For the construction of this scale he made use 
of a number of items or statements of which it had been shown that they were 
representative for certain attitudes toward social occurrences. He named his 
measuring instrument: The Social Attitude Inventory. 
In this connection Eysenck (1963) says of the factors R and T: 'In com­
bination, these two factors, principles or dimensions appear sufficient to 
account for the great majority of observed relationships between social atti­
tudes in his country, in the United States, in Sweden, Germany and other 
countries having similar forms of social organisation.' 
In using the Social Attitude Inventory we hoped to gain insight into the 
personaUties of the test persons, in terms of R and Τ and at the same time 
to find out if there was any relation between 'Social Attitudes' and an attitude 
pro or contra the Unification of Europe. First of all, however, we shall deal 
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with the dimensions R and T, in order to go into the meaning of the two 
personality factors. 
2. THE MEANING OF THE FACTORS R AND Τ 
2.1 Conservatism (R—) versus Radicalism (R + ) 
Calteli (1962) describes conservatism as follows: 
'The person who scores low on factor Q is confident in what he has been 
taught to believe and accepts, the 'tried and true', despite inconsistencies, 
when something else might be better. He is cautious and compromising in 
regard to new ideas. Thus, he tends to oppose and postpone change, is 
inclined to go along with traditions, is more conservative in religion and 
politics, and tends not to be interested in analytical 'Intellectual' thought.' 
Of radicalism he says: 
T h e person who scores high on factor Q tends to be interested in intellectual 
matters and has doubts on fundamental issues. He is sceptical and inquiring 
regarding ideas, either old or new. He tends to be more well informed, less 
inclined to moralize, more inclined to experiment, in life generally, and 
more tolerant of inconvenience and change.' 
For the meaning of the R factor thus of conservatism and radicalism Eysenck 
refers to the well-known controversy between right and left in the ideological-
political plane. In terms of attitude he gives the following description of the 
R factor: 
'Conservative beliefs apparently include the view that nationalization is 
inefficient; that religious education should be made compulsory; that col­
oured people are inferior, that birth control should be made illegal, that the 
death penalty should be retained; and so forth. Radicals, on the other hand, 
believe that private property should be aboUshed, that Sunday observance 
is old-fashioned; that we should give up our national sovereignty in the 
interest of peace; and so forth.' 
2.2 Tough-mindedness (T+) versus Tender-mindedness (T—) 
Eysenck quotes the terms tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness from W. 
James (1907), who denoted them as 'two opposed types of temperament, 
(leading to opposed philosophical beliefs) as follows: 'I will write these traits 
down in two columns. I think you will practically recognize the two types of 
mental-make up that I mean!' 
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The tender-minded: The tough-minded: 
Rationalistic (going by 'principles') Empiricist (going by 'facts') 
Intellectualistic Sensationalistic 
Idealistic Materialistic 
Optimistic Pessimistic 
Religious Irreligious 
Free-willist Fatalistic 
Monistic Pluralistic 
Dogmatical. Sceptical. 
Eysenck describes the factor Τ in terms of attitude: 
'On the tough-minded side we have openly aggressive and sexual attitudes. 
The aggressive ones favour flogging, the death penalty, harsh treatment for 
criminals, corporal punishment for children; and so forth. The openly 
sexual attitudes are those in favour of companionate or trial marriage; 
easier divorce laws; the abolition of abortion laws, thus making abortion 
easily available to everyone; and so on. On the other hand, attitudes, charac­
terizing the tender-minded end of the continuum emphasize ethical and 
religious restraints and pacifism; the giving up of national sovereignty; going 
back to religion; and making religious education compulsory; the making 
illegal of birth control and the abolition of flogging and the death penalty -
these are characteristic of tender-minded views.' 
Of the nature of factor Τ Eysenck says the following: 
'Detailed analysis disclosed that while the R factor could truly be called a 
major dimension of social attitudes, the Τ factor was of a different charac­
ter altogether. It appeared essentially as a projection onto the field of social 
attitudes of certain personality traits, in the sense that a person's social 
attitude (radical, conservative or intermediate) would seek expression in 
terms of the fundamental personality variables so closely connected with 
the T-factor.' 
On going further into the matter he says: 
'Identification of these personality factors became our next task, and it 
was shown that there is a close relationship between Tough-mindedness and 
Extraversion on the one hand and between Tender-mindedness and In­
troversion on the other. In view of the importance of this relationship three 
separate experimental proofs were given, all of which verified this hypo­
thesis.' 
For the definition of Introversion and Extraversion Eysenck refers to Jung. 
'Jung states very extensively all the personality traits which characterize the 
introvert and the extravert respectively; they all derive from the fundamen-
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tal fact that the extravert has turned his interests and his instinctual energies 
outwards, i.e. towards the world of objective reality, while the introvert has 
turned his interests and his instinctual energies inwards, i.e. towards himself. 
'Quite generally one might characterise the introvert point of view by 
pointing to the constant subjection of the object and objective reality to the 
ego and the subjective psychological process . . . according to the ex-
traverted point of view the subject is considered as inferior to the object; 
the importance of the subjective aspect is only secondary. Apart from this 
fundamental distinction the extravert emerges as a person who values the 
outer world both in its material and in its immaterial aspects (possessions, 
riches, power, prestige). He shows outward physical activity while the in-
trovert's activity is mainly in the mental, intellectual sphere. The extravert 
is changeable and his emotions are easily aroused, but never very deeply; 
he is relatively insensitive, impressionable, experimental, materialistic and 
tough-minded. The differentiation between extravert and introvert according 
to Jung lies at the basis of the great dichotomy which we find in neurotic 
illnesses. The extravert is prone to disorders like hysteria and psychopathy, 
i.e. asocial illnesses in which moral rules tend to be disregarded. The intro-
vert on the other hand, is more liable to disorders involving manifestations 
of anxiety, depression and obsessional-compulsive features.' 
Eysenck has shown that especially particular 'traits' in the total group of 
features, which are denoted by the terms introversion and extraversion were 
characteristic for tender-minded and tough-minded resp. Tough-mindedness 
appeared to be clearly related to agression and dominance. Some relation 
came also to light between tough-mindedness and rigidity, intolerance or am-
biguity, narrow-mindedness and mental concreteness, although these cor-
relations were considerably lower than those found with agression and 
dominance. 
3. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE ANSWERS RECEIVED 
Our first task was now to verify whether the results of the student test group on 
the Social Attitude Inventory would indeed show the existence of the factor R 
and T. 
The first effort made to this purpose was to analyse the factors in the an-
swers of all the students to the 30 questions of part D of the questionnaire. In-
cluded were the 23 statements of the Attitude Inventory of Melvin and 7 
motivational distortion items of Cattell. We had included these last 7 state-
ments in the questionnaire in order to find the extent of 'the need and the 
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willingness to distort', (Cattell IPAT handbook form, C) as discussed in Chap­
ter II, par. 3.6. In the factor analysis of the answers given we could expect at 
least 3 factors, namely: 
a factor R : radicalism versus conservatism 
a factor Τ : tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness 
a factor Md: motivational distortion. 
The results of the analysis brought factors to light which showed great 
conformity with Eysenck's dimensions R and Τ to which we shall return 
soon. The third factor appeared to present considerably more difficulties in the 
interpretation. Although 5 out the 7 Cattell items showed a decent load on 
this factor (from .24 to .41), it also appeared that 10 out of the 23 items of 
Melvin had a certain load on this factor (from .22 to .46). In addition, two of 
the distortion items showed a positive load instead of the negative load to be 
expected by Cattell. (D 9 and D 30). The heaviest load was shown in the 
statements on the subjects of the atom bomb, clearness of mind at certain 
times, influence of the church, the Jews, being considerate to other people, 
and the divinity of Christ (average: .36). 
A further consideration of all items with a load upwards of .20 induced us 
to suspect that there was less question of 'the need and the willingness to dis­
tort' than a factor related to social desirability. In fact, the inclination of a test 
person to state what 'one' deems socially desirable and not what he thinks 
oí it himself. Thus they conform to the general opinion or to the opinion 
of a certain group. In view of the uncertainty on this point and the fact that 
this third factor had a relatively low load compared to the other factors, we 
decided to discontinue the enquiry on motivational distortion or social desira-
bility and to cancel the Cattell items D 4, 8, 9, 16, 25, 28 and 30. 
A new factor analysis of the 23 statements of the Inventory alone clearly 
illuminated two factors as is shown in Enclosure No. 8. From the correlation 
matrix in said enclosure it can be seen that all inventory items have a decent 
load on one of the two factors. The correlation matrix which resulted after the 
extraction of these two dimensions exclusively showed correlations under .10, 
with the exception of six correlations around .20 for the Melvin items that 
previously showed the highest load on the third factor. 
The next step was to identify the two factors found or, in other words, 
to check what is exactly measured with each factor. This can sometimes be 
derived from the tenor of the item and the load of a factor. However, this may 
present difficulties such as in our case. (See Enclosure No. 8). Another method 
to identify two factors is to represent the load of each item in a two-dimen-
sional plane, as is also mentioned by Eysenck (1963, page 130). In doing so we 
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get a summary of the position of each item with respect to both factors. A 
comparison of Eysenck's 'distribution of attitudes' with our item distribution 
appears to show a great amount of similarity, although Eysenck has given a 
number of attitude items a formulation which is slightly different from the 
Melvin items used by us. See Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 
Distribution of attitudes with respect to the two factors found rotated under an angle of 
20° so as to make them correspond with Eysenck's factors R and T. 
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The figure shows: An attitude for free love and sexual intercourse and against religion 
figures in the quadrant R + T + ; an attitude against extramarital sex relations and 
acknowledgment of religion in the quadrant R—Τ— 
Harsh treatment of criminals, compulsory military training and an attitude pro one's own 
country ('my country right or wrong') but against maintenance of order within the nation 
figures in the quadrants R — T + ; an attitude against death-penalty, the atom bomb and 
capitalism, but for the curing of criminals and equality of Jews is shown in the fourth 
quadrant. 
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In both enquiries all corresponding attitudes lie in the same quadrant and 
also the mutual distances between the attitudes correspond very well. This is 
still better shown if we rotate the factor axes found by us under an angle 
of 20 degrees, as can be seen from Figure 3. In this manner all attitude items 
that were formulated in exactly the same way in the two enquiries figure in a 
same position with respect to the two factor axes. Attitudes and factor axes 
of both enquiries coincide, from which we may conclude that the rotated 
factors correspond with Eysenck's factors R and T. 
4. SCORING METHOD 
(In order to determine the scores of the test persons on the factors R and Τ 
we availed ourselves of factor scores: a mathematic compilation enabling us 
to calculate an accurate score of each factor. This is less possible with 
total scores on the basis of the score per item, because the items of the Social 
Attitude Inventory show a load on both factors as can be seen in the factor 
matrix (Enclosure 8). With factor scores the average of a group is taken 
as a basis, i.e. that the group as such is considered to be neutral with respect 
to the two factors. In our case this point lies on 500 R and 500 T. The 
sigma (the square of the standard deviation) is 100. The factor scores were 
calculated on the non-rotated factors. 
5. RELIABILITY 
Factor scores are at disadvantage in that the reliability calculation as applied 
to the Europe Scale (KR 20) is not feasible. Yet, there are indications that 
enable us to get information on the reliability. 
The fact that we find the two factors on a scale which was developed 15 
years ago indicates a high degree of stability of the scale. The same holds true 
of course for the conformity in the distribution of attitudes as was shown 
above. Eysenck mentions a reliability of between .85 and .95 (item con­
sistence) for the complete Attitude Inventory of Melvin (over 40 items) for 
an unselected group, with a reliability of the factor R which is somewhat 
higher than that of factor T. However, the fact that we used only half of the 
inventory items indicates a lower degree of reliability in our enquiry than was 
found by Eysenck. 
6. VALIDITY 
Also here the most important question is the validity of the scale; the question 
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of whether the scale answers its purpose, in other words, measures whether a 
person has a radical or conservative, tough-minded or tender-minded disposi­
tion. Eysenck (1957, page 303) makes mention of a distinct difference in dis­
position between members of various political parties from which Socialists 
come to the fore as being radical, and the Conservatives as being conservative 
without an outspokenly tough or tender disposition. The Communists appear 
to be rather tough and very radical, the Fascists slightly conservative and very 
tough- The Liberals hold an intermediate position with regard to the R axis 
and are slightly tender. 
Before giving a representation of our own results we will first make a few 
remarks: There are a few arguments that can be put forward against the com­
parison of our results with those of Eysenck's on the point of 'political con­
viction': 
1. Eysenck starts from representative groups of political parties, which is 
not the case in our enquiry. 
2. Our enquiry refers to test persons of very different nationalities, which 
brings certain objections with it. What is understood by conservative or 
liberal in England, is not the same as in every other country. In the Nether­
lands e.g. the Liberal Party (WD) is considered by many people to be 
conservative; on the other hand the Dutch Liberals are allied to the British 
Liberals, although not identical to them. As regards Communists and 
Socialists the question is different, perhaps less complicated, although these 
parties have their own colour in most countries. The work of J. Meyer ('62) 
'Classification of political parties 1957-1959', is quite clarifying in this 
regard. 
3. In the range of political currents in Western Europe we have made no 
mention of the Fascist Party. An opportunity was given to express likes or 
dislikes for right or extreme right, but of course this is not the same thing 
(see questionnaire С 19). The group of Communists also includes the cate­
gory of 'left groupings'. Contrary to Eysenck's enquiry we also stated Chris­
tian Democrats, Independents and Fascists as alternatives. Fifteen percent of 
the English students gave their vote to these parties, which are not or less 
known in the English political constellation, most likely at the expense of 
the position of the Conservatives and Liberals in respect of the R and Τ 
axes. In spite of the above-mentioned restrictions we feel justified in expect­
ing that on a valid scale we shall on the whole find the same distribution as 
given by Eysenck. 
As appears from Fig. 4 the results are as follows: 
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FIGURE 4 
Position of the most important subgroups on the Social Attitude Inventory (factors R 
and T) 
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On the R axis the Communists are most radical, followed by the Socialists; the 
Liberals hold an intermediate position, the Conservatives are conservative as 
well as the extreme rights. 
As regards the position of the parties with respect to the Τ axis, some differ­
ences are to be noted. The Communists are neutral and not tough; the Liberals 
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tough to some extent, whereas the Conservatives are tough and not neutral. If, 
however, we verify the position of the 'English' Liberals, it appears that this 
group (18 test persons) is slightly tender, which is thus in conformity with 
Eysenck's data. There seems to be a similar shift as regards the 'English' 
conservative students, who, as a group (42 test persons), appear to be con­
siderably less tough than the Conservatives as a whole and hold a position on 
the Τ axis which is about equal to the average Τ position of the Liberals as a 
group. 
The number of 'English' Communists is too low to allow us to draw con­
clusions. That the Communist students as a whole are less tough may be ac­
counted for by the fact that among this category there are also followers of the 
'left groupings', who tend toward an extremely radical but at the same time 
neutral Τ position. Or are Communists less tough than found by Eysenck? 
(Christie 1956). We have no certainty about this point. The position of the 
Pacifists as a group practically corresponds with the position of Eysenck's 
items expressing a Pacifist Attitude (1963, page 130). 
The position of the right and extreme right groupings as being conservative 
and very tough, and of the Christian Democrats as being conservative and 
tender may well be in line with the expectations, as well as the position of the 
Independents who rather tend to be intermediate. It may thus be said that 
with regard to the position of political parties especially as to the R axis, we 
find in general a fair amount of comformity with Eysenck's results. 
In our previous discussion of the significance of the R factor, we quoted 
Cattell, who says that persons having a high score on this factor are inclined 
to have greater interest in intellectual matters and prove to be better informed 
than persons who have a low score on this factor. Differences in intellectual 
interest and in being better informed about European matters also came to the 
fore from the scores on the Knowledge Test of those who had a good know­
ledge and those who had less knowledge. As is shown in Figure 4 the first 
group appears to be radical in social attitude, those with limited knowledge as a 
group appearing conservative. The two categories show little difference in 
respect of the Τ axis. 
The great amount of political interest and the activity of radical and 'left' 
students compared with the more conservative 'right' groupings (e.g. in the 
student's revolt in 1968) leads us to suppose that students with a great amount 
of political interest will be more radical than those who are moderately inter­
ested or have little or no political interest. The supposition is confirmed in 
Figure 4. 
There are considerable differences between the three groups. Students having 
93 
little or no interest are more conservative than those who are moderately 
interested; the test persons showing a great amount of political interest appear 
to be radical. 
With regard to tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness it is difficult to 
base definite hypotheses on experimental data. Yet, on the ground of traditions 
in students' organizations in the various countries it is evident that German 
students will appear to be tougher than their English colleagues, and that 
Dutch students will be more tender than their French and German counter­
parts. The results are in keeping with our expectations. 
The German, French and also the Italian students appear to be moderately 
tough, the Dutch (and Belgian) students moderately tender and the English 
students hold a neutral position with respect to the Τ axis. Noteworthy with 
respect to the R axis is the radical position of the German and Dutch students 
and the conservative position of the Italian test persons. 
From the Europe Scale it appeared that a Europe attitude comprised 
various components such as involvement in the unification, desire to make a 
personal contribution, willingness to make sacrifices and confidence in the 
outcome. 
A certain relationship was also showing as regards the necessity of develop­
ment aid and a certain fear for the position of Europe at this moment. A 
similar attitude may be supposed more discernible in the tender-minded 
(-radical) quadrant, in the field of sympathy and consideration for one's neigh­
bour, than in the tough-minded (-conservative) quadrant, the field of the 
no-nonsense, the 'hard-line' attitude. It would be an asset for the validity of the 
Social Attitude Inventory if this supposition was confirmed. 
An opportunity to roughly establish the relationship between a Europe 
attitude and the social attitudes of the Inventory is offered by factor analysis. 
Analogous to the method of Melvin, who for the localization of one certain 
attitude only used a few 'strong' items, we shall represent a Europe attitude by 
means of the four items with the highest load on the Europe factor. These are: 
1. Failure of European unification would be a highly regrettable thing. 
2. If the unification of Europe should demand substantial sacrifices, I 
would be willing to make them. 
3. Personally I do not care much for a United Europe. 
4. The disadvantages of a political unification of Europe outweigh its ad­
vantages. 
The factor analysis of the answers of all test persons to the 23 Melvin items 
and the 4 Europe statements together brought two strong factors to the fore, 
clearly identifiable as the factors R and T. 
94 
The distribution of attitudes in respect of these two factors proved to be 
similar to that represented in Figure No 3, although the mutual position of the 
attitudes in a quadrant proved to be slightly modified. However, the most 
important result was that the two pro-Europe items appeared to be situated in 
the centre of the quadrant R + Τ—, and the two negative Europe items in the 
centre of the quadrant R — T + . The positive items showed a somewhat 
stronger 'tender'-load on the Τ factor than the sympathetic social attitudes in 
the same quadrant. The same higher Τ load, but now towards the tough 
applied to the negative Europe items in respect of the 'hard-line' attitudes in the 
quadrant R — Τ + . 
As the four Europe items mentioned show a high amount of correlation with 
the seven other statements of the Europe Attitude Scale, we think we may 
safely assume that in general there is a direct relation between the attitude in 
respect of the Unification of Europe and certain social attitudes. 
Returning to our starting point we would conclude that the Social Attitude 
Inventory of Melvin possesses a great amount of reliability and validity on the 
ground of the distribution of attitudes found, the analogous factors R and Τ 
and the confirmation of the suppositions formulated above. 
7. SCORES ON THE ATTITUDE INVENTORY 
7.1 Positions of the Various Sub-Groups 
On discussing the validity of Melvin's Inventory we already found considerable 
differences on the ground of political party and nationality and between those 
having a knowledge of Europe and those with less knowledge on the one hand, 
and between people showing much and little political interest on the other. 
Some differences were also found between students who had travelled a lot 
or little, and those who had a good or modest knowledge of languages. It is 
particularly the test persons who have never visited a foreign country or only 
one (166 persons) and those who spoke only one or two languages (179 
persons), who are distinct from the travelled people and those who have a 
good knowledge of foreign languages. Both the 'little travelled' ones and the 
unskilled linguists as a group take a position in the conservative tough-minded 
quadrant. 
The first group is situated off LK. in Fig. 4, but is somewhat tougher. The 
unskilled linguists take a position that can be compared with the Liberals in 
this figure, but are a bit more conservative. The more travelled persons as a 
group, as well as the linguists take a position a little under and left of the centre. 
As with the Europe Scale and the Knowledge Test only shght differences -
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but on no account systematic differences - occur on the ground of faculty, 
duration of academic study, age, environment or sex. It is clear, however, that 
the upper classes and higher upper classes are slightly more conservative than 
the middle class which is situated in the centre, such as the labourers and lower 
middle class, who are somewhat more tender than the middle class in the 
centre. The female students are slightly more conservative compared with the 
men. 
A few considerable differences in the position with respect to R and Τ are 
to be noted by religion. Roman Catholics prove to be conservative and tender; 
the non-religious persons are more radical and tough. The Protestants take 
an intermediate position, a little right of the centre. The very small group of 
religious non-christian persons appear to be tough and slightly conservative. 
The inhabitants of the large towns (upwards of 500,000 inhabitants) are tough, 
such as the Liberals in Figure 4; the inhabitants of the smaller towns (less 
than 10,000 inhabitants) are tender and have the same position as the Belgians. 
The students from the medium-sized towns take a position in the centre. By 
the size of place of residence differences are thus only shown with regard to the 
Τ Axis. 
7.2 Position of Pro's and Non-Pro's on the Inventory 
In the frame-work of our enquiry the positions of the groups of 100 Real 
Pro's and 100 Non-Pro's are of course most interesting. The position of the 
two groups is shown in Figure 4. The centre point of the figure, where the 
origin coincides with the average of the factor axes, represents the position 
of all the students together. 
Non-Pro's appear to be conservative and tough, the Real Pro's radical 
and tender as compared to the whole of the test group. Next, the position of 
all the Pro's together (AP) is also indicated. This is the entire test group less 
the Non-Pro's. This group takes a position left of the centre and - as was to be 
expected - in the direction of R.P.'s. 
It appears thus that there is a difference between Pro's and Non-Pro's on 
the Social Attitude Inventory. A difference which indicates a different in­
clination or disposition in a person. According to Calteli a difference in per­
sonality in the terms of the factors R and T. 
8. DIFFERENCE IN PERSONALITY 
8.1 Position of Europe Attitude with respect to Social Attitude 
In the discussion of the validity of the Inventory it was already shown that 
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mere is a relation oetween an attitude for the unification and the R — T + 
items. The same relation appeared to exist between a negative Europe attitude 
and the R + T — statements also. In this respect it is no wonder that also the 
'bearers' of a positive or negative Europe attitude, in other words Pro's or 
Non-Pro's hold an average position in the radical-tender-minded c.q. con-
servative-tough-minded quadrants. In a next chapter it will be more apparent 
that the Real Advocates are distributed over three (other) quadrants, contrary 
to the Non-Advocates who are largely found in one quadrant. 
The relation between 'Europe' attitude and the 'social' attitude of Melvin 
also gives an answer to the question we put in the beginning of this book. 
Namely, the question whether a 'Europe' attitude would perhaps form part of 
a larger aggregate, according to Eysenck of a super-attitude or ideology. The 
answer is in the affirmative. The results show that a non-positive or negative 
attitude with respect to a United Europe is closely related to or forms part of 
the conservative ideology. As a matter of fact there is one important restric-
tion: a conservatism that is attended with tough-mindedness. According to 
Eysenck this is the projection of a set of personality variables (in this case 
extraversion, agression and dominance) onto the field of social attitudes and 
as such forming no alternative ideological system. A positive attitude with 
respect to the European integration would in this same connection, thus broad-
ly speaking, form part of a radical ideology, combined with tender-mindedness, 
closely related to introversion. The above findings are in line with Eysenck's 
statement in 'The Personality of Politics' (1963) and confirmed by him: that 
attitudes and opinions are an integral part of personality. 
8.2 A nswers to specific items of the Inventory 
The position of the Europe items in the distribution of social attitudes led to 
our finding that a Europe attitude bore a certain relation to certain attitudes. 
Thus it is to be expected that it is particularly the items that represent these 
social attitudes on which the differences between Pro's and Non-Pro's are 
most manifest. Although we have already a rough idea of the items at issue 
it is possible to define more accurately which items have to do with a Europe 
attitude and which more or less or not at all. 
This can be done by means of a factor analysis of all the answers of all test 
persons to the 11 items of the Europe scale and the 23 inventory items 
together. As a result of this analysis the factor matrix shows various dimen-
sions among which the Europe factor comes to the fore most strongly. This 
dimension can be identified without difficulty by the high load of all Europe 
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items on this item (from .38 to .68) in the same order of strength and with the 
same symbol as in the Europe matrix of Enclosure 5. Of the 23 inventory 
items, 10 statements also prove to have a load of upwards of .20, varying 
from .21 to .38. 
As was to be expected these are for the greater part the items which rep-
resent attitude in the tough-minded-conservative and tender-minded-radical 
quadrants. The 10 items are stated in table 27 below together with their factor 
loads. As an illustration of the differences between the 100 Pro's and the 
100 Non-Pro's we have shown the number of persons of each group who 
answered the statements concerned in the affirmative. For the sake of com-
parison we also mention between brackets the percentages of both the entire 
test group (Tot) and the 50 Cons (C). 
Actually this comparison gives only a rough picture, as from this survey it 
does not appear whether one agrees whole-heartedly with these statements, 
or just agrees, or whether one takes a neutral attitude or is opposed or strongly 
opposed. 
TABLE 27 
10 Inventory items with a load of upwards of .20 on the 'Europe' factor, together with the 
number of Real Pro's (R.P.) and Non-Pro's (N.P.) who answered the statement in the 
affirmative. The percentages of positive answers of the whole of the test group (Tot) and 
the 50 Cons (C) are stated in brackets. 
Factor Item R.P. (Tot) N.P. (C) 
load. 
.37 Jews are equally valuable 
.37 The death penalty is barbaric 
.28 Treatment of criminals is too harsh 
.21 Atom bomb is morally wrong 
—.23 Sex criminals ought to be flogged 23 (31) 41 (36) 
—.22 Underdog deserves little help 14 (16) 24 (26) 
—.22 Production and trade should be free 29 (39) 48 (44) 
—.31 My country right or wrong 
—.29 Extra-marital sex relations wrong 
—.23 Church should attempt to increase influence 
From this table it appears that the 'sympathetic items' are confirmed by con-
siderably more Real Pro's (50%) than by Non-Pro's. The 'hard-line' items 
and some clearly conservative statements have been answered positively by 
twice as many Non-Pro's than by the Real Advocates of European integration. 
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77 
72 
64 
(90) 
(68) 
(61) 
(65) 
71 
48 
44 
50 
(72) 
(48) 
(42) 
(50) 
7 
10 
22 
(21) 
(15) 
(25) 
30 
23 
31 
(32) 
(20) 
(32) 
98 
The 13 other Inventory items not mentioned above also show differences 
between the two groups, which is in line with our expectations. (Non-Pro's are 
more conservative than Real Pro's). However, the differences are slight, i.e. 
maximum 10% between the two groups. An exception is shown in the posi-
tive answers to the two items about there being no harm in occasionally 
travelling without a ticket (R.P. = 32; N.P. = 48), and encouragement of 
free love (R.P. = 34; N.P. = 21). 
On the ground of our factor analysis it may be said that the differences in these 
answers of the test persons have little to do with a Europe attitude as 
such, but are to be attributed to incidental features of the groups R.P. and 
N.P. (or coincidence). The answers of the whole of the test group to the 13 
unmentioned items will be discussed in par. 9.2 in the survey of the social 
attitude of the students in general. 
8.3 The Picture of the future Europe 
When there is a question of differences in social attitude or personality be-
tween Pro's and Non-Pro's, it is obvious that these differences will also be 
manifest in the pictures they have portrayed for themselves of a United Europe. 
This applies particularly to the items that are allied to the 'sympathetic' or 
'hard line' items, or in general to the items that refer to a conservative-tough-
minded c.q. radical-tender-minded attitude. 
According to Eysenck tough-mindedness proves to be related to agression 
and dominance and is attended with a more authoritarian attitude and a sen-
sitivity for status, prestige and personal welfare. 
According to Cattell conservatism as an ideology goes along with resist-
ance to change and traditional (nationalistic) thinking. The combination 
of conservatism and tough-mindedness leads to less consideration for the 
underdog and the fellowman in general, and to an appreciation of hard 
measures and the army. It is obvious that we feel justified in assuming that the 
Non-Pro's as a group will have a less democratic and more nationalistic 
mind than the Pro's in Europe matters and may be more in favour of the army 
and objects of prestige, but less in favour of development aid. 
In the 'image' test the following answers come to the fore: 
— In the choice of countries that enter into consideration for a United 
Europe (Bl) its appears (as mentioned before) that the Real Advocates are 
less in favour of countries with autocratic governments and the purely commu-
nist countries than the other groups, such as in the quesdon about the form of 
governments preferred (C6), where Non-Pro's appear less democratic-minded 
than the Pro's. 
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— A more nationalistic mind of the Non-Pro's comes forward in that they 
are by a majority not willing to give up their own nationality, rather prefer 
their own language and vote for greater amount of independence for their 
own country (A9, C14, 6). Also their resistance to a common foreign policy 
(CI 1 ) points to the same tendency. 
— Non-Advocates seem to be more in favour of all 'military' items than 
Real Advocates, particularly more for a strong army (of conscripts), common 
defence and a well-equipped army as a common achievement; a space pro-
gramme is also preferred as an object of achievement (CIO, 11, 15). With 
regard to development aid Non-Pro's are considerably more in favour of 
aid to those countries where economic benefits may be expected, or where 
effective control of expenditure is possible than Advocates (C9). Considerably 
more Non-Pro's than Pro's consider improvement of personal welfare the 
main purpose of a United Europe (CI2). 
In this connection it is not surprising that the Non-Pro's as a group 
also feel less for direct elections, a common language or alterations of the 
boundaries in a United Europe; nor do they consider unification necessary for 
development on a large scale. (A20, 15, 17, 4). 
The above-mentioned facts confirm or at least are not at variance with the 
supposition that an attitude pro or contra a United Europe is related to certain 
personality factors, which as such have an influence on the picture and pres-
entation of a future United Europe. Still, it must be noted that there is to some 
extent a question of gradations and not of an utterly different picture among 
the Pro's and Non-Pro's. 
9. THE SOCIAL ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS COMPARED TO NON-STUDENTS 
9.1 Conformity in the Distribution of Social Attitudes 
In Fig. 3 we found that the distribution of social attitudes corresponded 
very well with the distribution published by Eysenck. From this it may be 
deduced that the students as a group deviate relatively little in social attitude 
from a representative cross-section of the English population Eysenck's data 
referred to. He also states that enquiries in France and Germany produced 
similar results. 
The student test group proves to be regularly distributed over the various 
quadrants of the field formed by the factors R and T. The number of test 
persons in each quadrant is practically equally large, namely: 178, 177, 167 
and 150 (for the R + T— plane.) Our original fear on the ground of our 
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sample that the group of students might considerably deviate in personality 
from a normal test group appears unfounded. This adds to the probability 
that the relation found between 'Europe' attitude and 'social' attitude or per­
sonality in terms of R and Τ also holds true of non-students, although we 
have no certainty. Yet, there are some indications to this effect. We shall 
revert to this matter in Chapter VIII. On the other hand the conformity in the 
distribution of attitudes of students and non-students is not 100%. 
From a close inspection of the positions of the social attitudes we found that 
the students as a group appear to be somewhat more radical than the repre­
sentative sample of the population referred to. Eysenck too makes mention 
of a somewhat more radical attitude among students compared to non-students. 
This means, that the largely radical items (the 'sympathetic' and 'free-love' 
items) have in general been stressed by the students slightly more or more 
emphatically, and that the non-radical or conservative statements (religion 
and native country) are less preferred compared with a normal population 
group. 
9.2 The Social A ttitude oj the Student Test Group 
In table 27 we found indications of the positive attitude of the student test 
group as a whole toward their fellow-men. In Enclosure 9 we have given a 
survey in percentages of the answers of all the students to the 23 Melvin items 
grouped by the importance of their facets. For the sake of completeness we 
also stated the percentages of the test persons with 'no opinion' or 'no 
agreement'. 
From this survey it appears that about two thirds of all test persons vote 
against the death penalty, the atom bomb and harsh treatment of criminals, 
and are for help to the underdog and the equality of the Jews. 
In the student group there appears to be a strong tendency to defend oneself 
against an (in their opinion) exaggerated nationalism, militarism and pater­
nalism. More than two thirds of the students do not agree to the saying: right 
or wrong my country, and do not think a military training necessary for the 
survival of their country. Nor does one in general find the maintenance of 
internal order more important than complete freedom for all. On the other 
hand, only one fourth of all the students (all without experience of being 
occupied) prefer occupation by a foreign power to war. 35 % of the students 
(questionnaire E7) state they do not practise a religion or a Christian, religion. 
In the light of this figure it is not surprising that about one third of the 
test persons deny the divinity of Christ or consider God to be an invention of 
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the human mind. That, however, one third of the group think to be free to 
take their own lives and consider that the majority of religious people are 
hypocrites points rather to a tendency to defend oneself against religion or to 
disengage oneself from religious restrictions. 
Also the large number of students who have 'no opinion' in this respect is 
significant, as well as the fact that 75% of the test persons do not agree 
that the church should attempt to increase its influence. The same tendency 
toward freedom is to be noted from the opinions with regard to sexuality. 
The majority of the test persons do not think that sex relations except in mar-
riage are always wrong and hold the view that they have a right to a trial 
marriage. In this respect males are more radical than females. On the contrary 
encouragement of free love is considered by only few test persons to be a 
good thing. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
WHY PRO OR NOT PRO A UNITED EUROPE? 
1. IMPORTANT CRITERIA IN A EUROPE ATTITUDE 
In the discussion of the scores on the Europe Attitude Scale we referred to 
the distinction between sub-groups which showed differences among the 
various categories of each sub-group and those that did not. By means of a 
calculation of the odds it is possible to find out whether a deviation of the 
average score is significant or not, i.e. whether this deviation must be account-
ed for by coincidence or not. What is thus left is a calculation of the odds. A 
deviation found in the average is called significant if it is to be attributed to 
coincidence in only one out of twenty cases (5 % ). 
If, as in our case, a great many calculations of significances are to be made 
(altogether a few hundred for the various scales) these miss cases may have 
a disturbing effect, because one does not know in which cases the 'significant' 
has been awarded rightly or wrongly and in which cases not. However, there 
may also be useful evidence in this connection without making a calculation 
of significance. On the Europe scale there is a clear line of demarcation be-
tween groups with pretty large mutual differences! in the scores of the cate-
gories (from 6 to 9 points), and other groups that show hardly any or no 
mutual differences (from 0 to 2.5 points). 
To the former group belong the sub-groups mentioned before: political 
party, nationality, political interest, travelling, and knowledge of languages. 
We also have an indication in the percentage of Non-Pro's in a category. In 
Enclosure 10 mention is made of all sub-groups of which one of the cate-
gories includes considerably more Non-Pro's (at least 50% more than the 
average percentage of Non-Pro's in the whole of the test group). Also here 
we see that it is exclusively the groups mentioned above that are distinct 
from the others. In this survey we have also stated the number of Non-Pro's 
in knowledge of Europe and the number of Non-Pro's in each quadrant of the 
Attitude Inventory. 
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In the scores on the Knowledge Test it was likewise political party, 
nationality, political interest, travelling and knowledge of languages that 
showed the largest differences in the various categories. The same thing ap-
peared to be the case on the Attitude Inventory. This too is an indication that 
it is particularly these sub-groups that matter. Some relationship between 
Europe attitude, knowledge of Europe and personality is evident. This may 
possibly refer to a mutual aggregate in a way that knowledge and social at-
titude form an essential part of a Europe attitude and as such are more fun-
damental than the differences found on the ground of political conviction, 
nationality etc. First of all it is, however, important to know more accurately 
the nature of the relationship between Europe attitude, knowledge of Europe 
and social attitude. 
2. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SCORES ON THE EUROPE SCALE, THE 
KNOWLEDGE TEST AND THE ATTITUDE INVENTORY 
2.1 Europe Scale and Knowledge Test 
We obtained a Europe attitude score and a knowledge score of all 672 
students. In order to establish the relation between attitude and knowledge 
we can calculate the correlation between the two scores of all test persons. 
To this purpose it is important to know the validity of the scales: a lesser 
degree of reliability of either of the two scales will influence the correlation 
unfavourably. As we have seen before, the Europe scale is reliable. Also of 
the Knowledge Test it may be assumed that in a second test the scores would 
deviate little from the results of the first test. The correlation appears to be 
.33. There is thus a clear relationship between an attitude in favour of a 
United Europe and knowledge of Europe matters, although the relation does 
not seem to be particularly close. In this connection it is interesting to take 
note of table 28 in which the percentages of R.P.'s and N.P.'s are shown on 
the ground of degree of their knowledge of Europe matters. 
TABLE 28 
Real Pro's and Non-Pro's by degree of knowledge of Europe matters in percentages. 
Tot— (RP+NP) means the whole of the test group minus Real Pro's and Non Pro's. 
R.P. Tot— (RP+NP) N.P. 
Limited knowledge 6 24 48 
Average knowledge 50 53 40 
Good knowledge 44 23 12 
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From this table it appears that among Non-Pro's there are about as many test 
persons with an average (and good) amount of knowledge as with a limited 
amount. This indicates that knowledge as such has relatively little to do 
with a negative attitude in respect of integration. 
The correlation between the scores of Non-Pro's on the Europe scale and 
their score on the Knowledge Test is interesting in this respect. This is —.17. 
Thus negative, compared with the positive correlation of .33 in the whole of 
the group. On the contrary, it looks as if the amount of knowledge determines 
the extent of being for or strongly for: that knowledge is to some extent a 
yardstick for the strength of a Europe attitude. 
That a greater amount of knowledge of Europe matters often goes along 
with a positive attitude in respect of a United Europe is in itself quite under-
standable. A greater knowledge of matters on unification is often a conse-
quence of real interest in the unification. On the other hand it is natural that 
a reasonable amount of knowledge in itself need not guarantee a positive 
attitude towards unification. From the scores on the Knowledge Test we 
have seen that among the Non-Advocates and the opponents there are a 
great number of people who know what they are talking about in their attitude 
against a United Europe. 
2.2 Europe Scale and Social Attitude Inventory 
In the same manner as in the Knowledge Test, we are able to calculate the 
correlation between the Europe score and the social attitude i.e. the factors 
R. and T. However, we do not know the extent of reliability of the Social 
Attitude Inventory, although it was previously supposed that it would be 
lower than stated by Eysenck. This means that the correlations calculated are 
likely to be lower than is really the case, but at the same time that we shall 
not be able to use the formula to introduce a correction for attenuation of this 
lower reliability. The correlation between the Europe score and the scores on 
the factors T. and R. combined is .23, to which these two factors contribute 
to the same extent. It may thus be said that there is a certain relationship, 
although this correlation is by no means high. 
The reason for this, at first sight, somewhat disappointing result can only 
partly be found in the impossibility of introducing a correction for atten-
uation. A better explanation is obvious. If we verify the number of the Real 
Pro's in each quadrant of the Social Attitude Inventory we get a certain dis-
tribution. We can do the same thing for the student group as a whole and the 
Non-Pro's. The distribution is as follows: 
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FIGURE 5 
The distribution over the four quadrants of the inventory of Real Pro's, the test group 
as a whole and Non-Pro's. 
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The student group as a whole (Tot) appears to be regularly distributed over 
the four quadrants. Non-Pro's (N.P.) are largely found, and as was to be 
expected, in the conservative-tough-minded quadrant. However, Real Pro's 
(R.P.) are situated not so much in the radical-tender-minded quadrant, but 
rather regularly distributed over the various quadrants with the exception of 
the field R— Τ + . Also the Pro's in general (Tot — N.P.) are regularly 
distributed over three quadrants (28% as an average), but are to a consid­
erably less extent, situated in the quadrant R—T+ (17%). 
As we saw in the results of the Attitude Inventory the Real Pro's as a group 
came to the fore as radical and moderately tender. However, it appears clearly 
that this refers to an 'average' social attitude and that among the Real Ad­
vocates the number of radical-tough-minded and conservative-tender-minded 
persons is considerable. This accounts possibly for the relatively low corre­
lation coefficients we found between the Europe scores and the Inventory 
scores with all test persons combined. The relationship between Non-Pro's 
and an R—Τ + mind appears to be considerably greater than between Pro's 
and an R + Τ — attitude. It is obviously the Non-Pro's of a United Europe 
and only these who distinguish themselves in personality by a predominantly 
conservative-tough-minded attitude. 
2.3 The Relationship between Europe Attitude, Knowledge and Social 
Attitude 
Knowledge of Europe and social attitude show also a certain relationship. 
The correlation coefficient between the scores of all test persons on the 
Knowledge Test and the scores on the factor R and Τ combined is .28. This 
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relation is almost entirely the result of a correlation of the Knowledge Test 
with the scores on the R axis (.26). This is not surprising if we remember the 
findings of Cattell who attributed to the radicals an inclination towards intel-
lectual interest, contrary to the conservatives. On recapitulating the cor-
relations found we get a summary as shown in the following table. 
TABLE 29 
The correlation between Europe attitude, knowledge of Europe and social attitude. 
(No correction for attenuation.) 
Europe attitude Europe knowledge Social attitude (R+T) 
Europe attitude 1.— 
Europe knowledge .33 1.— 
Social attitude (R + T) .23 .28 1.— 
Although on the whole both knowledge and social attitude exercise an 'overall' 
influence on the attitude in respect of a United Europe, the question of which 
of the two factors is the more significant is of littlei interest. As we showed 
above there is a differentiation in knowledge between Pro's and Real Pro's and 
in social attitude or personality between Pro's and Non-Pro's, while on the 
other hand knowledge and social attitude mutually show a certain relationship. 
It would be more interesting if we could prove that the other criteria in a 
Europe attitude could be largely accounted for by a difference in personality 
or/and knowledge of the facts. As this in itself is practically impossible - one 
is not more Communist or less, more Dutch or less etc. - we shall have to 
restrict ourselves to drawing attention to the differences in a certain sub-group 
and trying to find evidence pointing to a difference in knowledge and/or per-
sonality. In doing so we shall not bother about differences caused by environ-
ment or sex, age or duration of academic study as these variables appeared 
to be of little or no importance on the two scales and the Knowledge Test. 
Neither do we have to pay attention to differences in intelligence in our group 
of young intellectuals. 
3. THE REMAINING CRITERIA 
3.1 Political Interest 
It is difficult to determine the degree of lesser or greater interest in political 
matters. That more interest in political matters usually goes along with more 
107 
interest in the unification as was mentioned in the Gallup enquiry, is fully in 
line with expectations. The data given in table 30 point to the same tendency, 
but also show a relationship with knowledge and the factor R. 
TABLE 30 
Political interest against Europe attitude, knowledge and social attitude 
Politically: Percentage Europe Knowledge Social 
of total score score attitude 
Quite interested: 42 46.2 44.2 Radical 
Moderately interested: 45 42.6 36.4 Centre (cons.) 
Little or not interested: 13 39.7 29.8 Conservative 
That a great amount of political interest would correlate higher with an at-
titude toward Europe than e.g. knowledge of the unification is little accept-
able, as knowledge presupposes a Europe attitude rather than political in-
terest. One exception to this assumption should be mentioned: No political 
interest at all may certainly refer to a negative Europe attitude and perhaps 
play a part more than lack of knowledge. This may be proved by the fact that 
in the small group of test persons (13) without any political interest nearly 
half (6) Non-Pro's are found. Moreover, it should be noted that the test persons 
without political interest appear to be equally tough, but more conservative than 
the Non-Pro's in Figure 4, which points to a certain personality. 
That the Non-Pro's in general are certainly not lacking in political interest 
can be derived from the fact that 25 % of them state to be highly politically 
interested against 55% with a moderate amount of interest and 20% with 
little or no interest. 
3.2 Political Party 
Eysenck (1963) showed that there is a direct relation between political parties 
and the factors R and T. The data shown before and in the table on page 109 
point to the same effect. 
In Europe score there proves to be a distinct demarcation between the con-
servative - tough minded parties and the parties of the other quadrants of the 
Social Attitude Inventory, especially between the four largest parties. In the 
political parties themselves Non-Pro's distinguish themselves sharply from the 
Pro's. This can be seen in Figure 6, in which the position is shown of the eight 
political convictions we found in the results of the Social Attitude Inventory. 
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TABLE 31 
Political party and its relation with Europe attitude, knowledge and social attitude. 
Political 
Direction 
Socialist 
Chr. Dem. 
Liberals 
Pacifists 
Independents 
Communist 
Right 
Conservatives 
Percentage 
of total 
24.5 
19 
27 
7 
5 
3.5 
2 
12 
Europe 
score 
45.8 
45.1 
45 
43.2 
41.9 
40.8 
39.1 
36.7 
Knowledge 
score 
42.1 
39.6 
39.1 
34.1 
37 
37.4 
27 
32.5 
Social 
attitude 
Radical 
Te/Cons 
Tough 
Rad/ Te 
Cons 
Radical 
Cons/To 
Cons/To 
The average position of the number of Real Pro's and Non-Pro's is denoted by 
political conviction by means of a plus ( + ) or minus (—). Where this number 
was very low (see Enclosure 6) the position is not marked. 
FIGURE 6 
The position of R.P. (+ ) and N.P. (—) by political party on the Social Attitude Inventory. 
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From tins it proves clearly that the Non Pro's in all political parties move into 
the direction of the quadrant R—Τ + with the exception of the Communists. 
For the Real Pro's of the political parties this is definitely less the case with 
regard to the quadrant R + Τ — . This is not surprising as we saw in section 2.2 
of this chapter. 
Regardless of their political conviction Non-Pro's of European Unification 
appear to have a considerably more conservative and (largely) more tough 
attitude than their ideological colleagues, with the exception of the Communist 
Non-Pro's who appear to be more radically minded. 
In an attitude pro or non-pro Europe differences in social attitudes seem 
to be more fundamental than differences in political party. 
We also find differences in knowledge. However, the differences in know­
ledge between parties are much smaller than e.g. between students of different 
countries as we wDl see in the next section. Of course the general attitude of a 
certain political party toward United Europe cannot only be accounted for by a 
particular social attitude or by the knowledge of Europe. The Communists as a 
group have an average amount of knowledge and are radical (perhaps too 
radical?), which would pre-suppose a clearly positive Euro-attitude. This does 
not appear to be the case both in attitude score and in percentage of N.P.'s 
(23%). That the stamp of the party tips the balance is not sure (other factors 
may be the cause), but seems rather reasonable. 
3.3 Nationality 
In the representative enquiry of Gallup there appeared to be a difference in 
knowledge about the unification among the inhabitants of the E.E.C, countries. 
The percentages of the peoples with little or no knowledge of United Europe 
amounted to 40% in the Netherlands, Germany and France, against 55% and 
75 % in Belgium and Italy resp. 
We also find large differences in knowledge as is shown in table 32. (The 
knowledge score of the French students may be too high, brought about by the 
previously mentioned pre-selection at the University of Nice.) 
Among the students of the E.E.C, countries there proves to be difference in 
Europe attitude scores of from 41.2 to 47.2, i.e. the distinction rather conforms 
to the differences towards pro or strongly pro integration, and less to a separa­
tion in Pro's and Non-Pro's. As we saw before this could refer to differences in 
the amount of knowledge. 
Of course the social attitude of students of the various countries plays also a 
part. However, the differences in social attitude between the various countries 
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TABLE 32 
Nationality and the relation with Europe attitude, knowledge and social attitude. 
Nationality 
Germans 
French 
Belgians 
Dutchmen 
Italians 
British 
Percentage 
of total 
16.5 
8.5 
20 
17 
19 
17 
Europe 
score 
47.2 
47 
45.9 
44.4 
41.2 
38.2 
Knowledge 
score 
44.3 
48.2 
37.8 
45.1 
25.8 
37.8 
Social 
attitude 
Rad/To 
Tough 
Tender 
Te/ Rad 
Cons/To 
Cons 
appear smaller than the differences between political parties. See page 92. 
That in general the differences in Europe attitude between the countries 
could be explained by the difference in knowledge and social attitude is, how-
ever, not very acceptable. This may be read from the position of the English 
students. In spite of a more or less average amount of knowledge and a not un-
favourable position as a group with respect to R and T, their Europe attitude 
score is lower, and the percentage of N.P.'s (34%) is higher than one would 
expect on the ground of knowledge and personality in terms of R and T. In all 
English political groupings we find considerably more Non-Pro's than among 
corresponding political parties of other nationalities. Only the English Socialists 
are an exception in this respect (see Enclosure 6). 
3.4 Travelling 
It is very probable that travelling is attended with a more positive attitude in 
respect of Europe. It is, however, equally probable that travelling is not 
primarily responsible but other reasons which may lead to travelling. Environ-
ment or sex, age or duration of academic study may be reasonably excluded 
from this enquiry, as these variables have appeared to show no relation to 
a Europe attitude and have relatively little to do with knowledge and social 
attitude. 
Cattell points to a leaning towards experimenting among radicals, contrary 
to conservatives, to which probably a love of travel 'in life generally' belongs. 
The well-known international orientation of radical groupings contrary to the 
more nationalistic mind of the conservatives seems also to be of some signi-
ficance in this respect. 
I l l 
TABLE 33 
Travelling in relation to other variables 
Countries Percentage Europe Knowledge Social 
visited of total score score attitude 
1 or 2 25 40.5 33 Cons. 
3 o r 4 30 43.9 39.5 Centre (Rad) 
5 or 6 45 45.3 41.7 Rad/Te 
The greatest difference in Europe attitude occurs between the students who 
have travelled abroad rarely or not at all and the large group of more trav-
elled students. In social attitude we find a contrast between the two groups 
practically solely with respect to the R axis (conservative-radical). Also in 
knowledge there are differences between the two groups. 
As the differences on the R axis seem to be largest, and the R axis correlates 
pretty well with knowledge of European matters, which implies differences 
with regard to knowledge, we are inclined to assume, also in the light of Catt-
ell's findings, that a radical or conservative attitude is the ground of a love 
of travelling abroad and as such of the difference in Europe attitude. In this 
connection the geographic position of a country will also play a role. 
The Belgians live in the (small) heart of Western Europe, contrary to the 
English and the Italians who are less fortunate in this respect. The fact that in 
our enquiry proportionately the most Conservatives and Non-Pro's are found 
in these countries may well be a confirmation of our above-mentioned suppo-
sition, the more so as it is less acceptable that English and Italian students 
would be more conservative precisely because they travel less. 
The fact that France is most preferred by foreigners is less hypothetic. 
74% of all non-French students have visited this country. For Germany, Italy 
and Belgium this percentage is 57%, after deducting the students of these 
countries. For the Netherlands this is 5 1 % and for England 4 1 % . 
3.5 Knowledge of Languages 
A bit less than 5 % of the students say that they master only their own lan-
guage, against 22% who state one foreign language. About 70% of the 
students state that they can read three or more languages. See table 34. 
The conformity with travelling more or less is striking. The sizes of the various 
groups are indeed different. More important, however, is that the starting point 
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TABLE 34 
Knowledge of languages in relation to other variables. 
Languages Percentage Europe Knowledge Social 
understood of total score score attitude 
1 or 2 27 40.7 34.3 To (Cons) 
3 33 44.4 39 Center (To) 
More than 3 40 45.2 41.7 Tender 
i.e. being able to read a foreign language or not, leaves a greater margin than 
the question whether one has visited a certain country. 
Unlike being more or less travelled, the greater or smaller amount of know-
ledge of languages is particularly manifest in a tender or tough-minded attitude. 
It is quite probable that tender-minded, sympathetic people are more interested 
in foreign languages and speak more languages than the no-nonsense tough-
minded category of persons. Before we proceed to this conclusion it should be 
remembered that previously the Belgians and the Dutch as a group appeared 
to be most tender compared with the other nationalities and that exactly in 
Belgium and the Netherlands knowledge of three or four foreign languages 
plays a great part in education, apart from the well-known fact that most 
Belgians are bilingual. However, that the Belgian and Dutch students are more 
tender-minded because of their being bilingual is not probable. 
Yet, it must be observed that it may well be believed that the study of foreign 
languages as such (as well as visiting other European countries) causes the 
mind to ripen and see the resemblances between the European peoples, creates 
an understanding for the common alliance and future and as such contributes 
toward the forming of a European idea. It seems to us that this process will 
come about considerably faster with the non-conservative-tough-minded 
people than with those who do not belong to this category, although we have 
no certainty. 
Which western European languages the interest of the student group is 
focused on most appears from the following. The percentages have been cal-
culated of the total of the number of test persons, after deduction of the stu-
dents whose mother tongue is the same as the language concerned. The 
Flemish students were reckoned to belong to those who speak Dutch and the 
Walloons were included in the French language group. 90% of the non-
English students state that they can read or speak English. For the French 
language this is 80%, for German 50%, for Dutch 19%, Spanish 15% and 
113 
Italian 9%. Most striking, however, is the high percentage of non-French c.q. 
non-Walloon students who state that they can read or speak French. This can 
be accounted for by the fact that the French language is not unknown to the 
Flemish and Italian students, that at most German and Dutch schools French 
is a compulsory subject, and in England French is listed high as a second 
language. The percentage of non-Germans speaking German is practically due 
to the large number of Dutch and Belgians in the test group, such as the fact 
that the percentage of non-Dutch or Flemish students reading Dutch consists 
largely of Walloons and Germans (Bochum). 
In the picture of Europe in Chapter V the preference for English as a 
(possible) common language has already been shown, followed by French, 
which can be easily accounted for by the data stated above. All this does not 
do away with the fact that in the E.E.C, countries and England, German is 
the most important mother tongue, i.e. spoken every day by more people than 
any other Western European language. 
4. CONCLUSION 
On scrutinizing the different variables combined we are inclined to suppose 
that a difference in social attitude or personality lies at the bottom of the fun-
damental distinction between Pro's and Non-Pro's of a United Europe. A diff-
erence in a sense that Non-Pro's as persons with a conservative-tough-minded 
attitude will feel better at home with conservative (tough) right groupings. 
That, owing to this attitude, they are less inclined to political interest or in-
tellectual interest may well account for their lower amount of knowledge of 
European matters. It is at the same time to be derived from this that this 
group, as a result of their conservative and nationalistic mind are less inclined 
to make acquaintance with 'foreign' countries and, through their tough-minded 
attitude, show less interest in and knowledge of 'foreign' languages and 
peoples. 
At the same time we are inclined to presume that knowledge of European 
matters, although no absolute condition, may contribute considerably towards 
a positive attitude, as knowledge of a United Europe mostly pre-supposes 
positive interest in the subject. It is in this respect not surprising that a greater 
or lesser amount of knowledge appears to be a graduator for the difference 
between Pro's and fervent Pro's and may consequently also account for the 
difference in attitude toward a United Europe between the inhabitants of the 
various countries. That collective nationalistic sentiments of guilt or 'grandeur', 
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of dependence or power, possibly connected with a particular national char-
acter, play a specific part in a Europe attitude is likewise probable. 
These are suppositions only based on evidence obtained from our enquiry and 
demand more research in order to prove their validity. 
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CHAPTER Vil i . 
LITERATURE REFERENCE 
1. CONNECTION WITH RECENT INVESTIGATIONS 
Unlike the enquiries into the opinions and ideas of a United Europe mentioned 
in our introduction, wei have tried to establish an 'attitude': a more lasting 
proneness, which predisposes to a certain behaviour. 
To this purpose the use of scale-techniques and more or less complicated 
mathematical compilations was a condition. With the help of factor analysis 
it is possible to dig deeper and to detect an undercurrent which may guide us 
in finding the 'why' of a certain attitude or behaviour. This means that for the 
verification of our findings we have to consult enquirers who also availed 
themselves of scale-techniques. Very little of this type of research has been 
made, although the use of measuring scales is increasing (e.g. by Doise 1969, 
Inglehart 1967). The most important project in this connection is an inter-
national enquiry on the initiative of the Information Service of the European 
Communities in Brussels into the attitude of young people with regard to 
the integration of Europe. This new enquiry is held by Gallup International 
and International Research Associates (INRA) in the E.E.C, countries and 
by R. Inglehart (from the University of Michigan) in England. As the results 
of this enquiry are not yet available, we shall have to restrict ourselves 
to the data of a pilot study for this enquiry among about 500 boys and girls 
of 15 and 16 years and young people in the ages of 19 and 20 in the E.E.C. 
countries and England. 
This group may be considered to be rather representative for the two groups 
amongst other things for environment and professional group, although the 
number of representatives from the self-employed agrarian workers seems a 
bit low (7%) and the number of young people who are still studying (63%) 
seems to be too strongly represented. The enquirers used the pilot study for the 
formulation of hypotheses for the enquiry proper and as such the results 
cannot be considered to be complete or final. Yet this pilot study for a provi-
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sional analysis by Gijs (INRA) and Inglehart, partly worked out by Rabier, 
provides us with a number of points of contact with our own findings. We shall 
further go into this matter in the following section. 
1.1 The Attitude in respect of a United Europe 
The intercorrelation of all items of the 486 questionnaires showed that there 
was a close relationship between a number of items. Some 7 items clusters could 
be distinguished. The clusters did not appear to be mutually independent (not 
unidimensional), but showed a clear distinction in item groups with a positive 
Europe attitude and others with a negative one. Three item clusters referred 
to a negative attitude and were classified by Gijs c.s. as follows: 
I. Conservative political dimension; 
II. Conservative socio-economic dimension; 
III. Conservative ethnocentric dimension. 
In particular the latter two item groups showed a great amount of affinity 
and correlated negatively with two cluster groups that clearly expressed a 
positive Europe attitude, namely the so called: 
IV. Supranationalistic dimension; 
V. Political-progressive dimension. 
As to their purport the 'negative' item groups appeared to comprise state-
ments that represented successively: 
I. an opinion in favour of the established order, a strong national army 
and against change. 
II. an opinion in favour of the maintenance of the welfare obtained; against 
too many foreign workers and change in general, 
III. an opinion in favour of the maintenance of the national identity, against 
too many foreign workers and agreement with the statement that the peoples 
of Europe are too egoistic to join hands fraternally. 
The positive item clusters comprised the following opinions: 
IV. strongly in favour of European integration (via the present governments), 
willingness to make sacrifices, in favour of a European army and in favour 
of a European government with distinct authorities. 
V. in favour of European integration, willingness to make sacrifices, agree-
ment with the students who protested; not against change or the presence of 
foreign labour. 
Inglehart made a factor analysis of part of the material, namely the answers 
from the juveniles in Germany, France and England. 
In his report he states that the willingness in each of the three countries to 
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make a personal sacrifice for the integration of Europe takes an essential place 
in a pro Europe attitude. This information shows a great amount of con-
formity with the Europe factor found by us, from which came to the fore: 
emotional interest in the integration, the willingness to take an active part, 
confidence in the aims and a desire to particularly proceed in political respect. 
On the other hand, a negative attitude appears to go along with nationalistic, 
materialistic and ethnocentric features, which show a relationship to conser-
vatism and tough-mindedness as personality factors. 
From the cluster groups found two measuring scales were constructed for 
the determination of a pro Europe attitude and a conservative attitude. The 
Europe Scale is the more interesting one in comparison with our results, as the 
conservative scale does not discriminate between tough-minded and tender-
minded conservatism. We shall closely follow the results of the Europe Scale of 
Gijs c.s. with scores of 2.5 to 4 and an average of 3.2 for the total group. 
— First of all it strikes us that with comparable groups (not less than 30 test 
persons), there appears to be scarcely any difference in Europe attitude on 
the ground of age, sex and religion; nor by income or profession of the father. 
There is also little distinction between juveniles who are still studying and 
those who are not. (All between 3.0 and 3.4; maximum difference 0.4). 
— The biggest difference in Europe attitude from 2.7 to 3.7 is found with 
the group of juveniles who are distinguished by their opinion of 'le bon 
citoyen', the good citizen. We shall try to prove that this opinion is closely 
related to a certain behaviour or social attitude in a next section. 
— Also among the juveniles that read the political news in the paper daily, 
or do so weekly or not at all, we find considerable differences on the scale 
(between 3.7 and 2.9). The same appears to be the case, but to a lesser extent, 
with respect to looking regularly or not at T.V. 
— Finally there proves to be some difference between students at universities 
or higher professional education institutions (3.7) and pupils of secondary 
schools (3.1), as well as between test persons that could enumerate the six 
countries of the E.E.C. (3.5) and those who could not or not exactly (3.0). 
As to political conviction, nationality or travelling abroad Rabier does not 
supply details. 
In general it appears that the sub-groups showing large differences per cate-
gory as well as those who do not do so correspond very well with the findings 
on our Europe Scale. 
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1.2 Governments and Countries in a future Europe 
Rabier makes mention of another remarkable difference in Europe attitude. 
This has to do with the form of government desired. Juveniles who are for a 
central government score 3.9 against a score of 3.3 by advocates of a federal 
Europe and 3.1 by those who plead for a certain form of cooperation among 
the various national governments. 
It may be of interest to mention that the variance analysis carried out in our 
enquiry (see Enclosure 7 No 5) discriminates exactly on this point most strongly 
between Real Pro's and Non-Pro's. In the two enquiries there is also an amount 
of conformity in the percentages of advocates of a certain form of government, 
as is shown in the next table. 
TABLE 35 
Classification by form of government desired. 
Gijs c.s. own enquiry 
For one central government 9% 12% 
For a European federation 64% 74% 
For agreements among governments 19% 14% 
No reply 8% 0% 
As regards the preference for countries to join the E.E.C., Doise (1969) states 
that Great Britain was mentioned in the first place against Russia in the last. 
This statement refers to an enquiry among 700 (catholic) pupils of secondary 
schools in the E.E.C, countries. Gijs reports a preference for Great Britain 
and Ireland to be included in the E.E.C, of 73% of the test persons against 
50% of advocates of including the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and 
Austria. Russia was declined as a partner by two thirds of the advocates of 
an extension of the E.E.C. (6% are against extension, such as 6% in our own 
enquiry.) 
In general our test persons appear to have a broader Europe mind, which 
may be accounted for by the greater amount of Europe-enthusiasm among 
university students compared to non-university students. 
1.3 Knowledge of European Matters 
In our enquiry knowledge of Europe appeared to be a yard-stick for a pro or 
strongly pro Europe attitude, but to discriminate considerably less between 
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Pro's and Non-Pro's. On further consideration the differences in knowledge 
quoted from Gijs c.q. seem to confirm this. 
Those who had no knowledge of the six E.E.C, countries as well as the test 
persons who were no longer students did not obtain a very low Europe score 
(both 3.0). Those having an exact knowledge of the E.E.C, countries do not 
have a very high Europe score (3.5), but this is understandable because the 
question as such does not discriminate between a large amount of knowledge 
and some knowledge. With those who are still students a higher plane of 
study is attended with a higher Europe score. Secondary school students score 
3.1; pupils of higher technical or professional schools 3.3; students at univer-
sities and 'écoles supérieures' 3.7. 
In this connection the great difference in knowledge per population group is 
also remarkable, as was found by Gallup in the representative enquiry in the 
E.E.C, countries in 1962. A knowledge test is in general reliable as was 
demonstrated in Chapter IV; in addition, the Gallup items in F7 of the 
questionnaire appeared to correlate high mutually as well as with the other 
parts of the Knowledge Test. In spite of the large differences in knowledge a 
remarkably unanimous opinion in respect of Europe came to the fore in all 
enquiries (as stated in Table 1), although some countries count more advocates 
than others. This being more or less pro appears to agree rather exactly with 
the percentage of test persons with a good or rather good knowledge of E.E.C. 
matters of Gallup's, namely 60% in the Netherlands, 55% in Germany, 50% 
in France, 40% in Belgium and 15% in Italy. 
1.4 Differences in Social Attitude or Personality 
In the Gallup / INRA pilot test the conservative 'dimensions' clearly proved to 
show a relationship, and particularly the socio-economic and ethnocentric item 
groups appeared to correlate negatively with the two most important pro 
Europe dimensions. Even on the first impression one is inclined to see here a 
difference between right and left, between conservatism and radicalism, and 
between 'the hard line' and 'the sympathetic mind', between tough-mindedness 
and tender-mindedness. 
In the enquiry the juveniles were asked to give an impression of their 
opinion on 'le bon citoyen', the good citizen. Of course all kinds of answers 
could be given to this extremely interesting question. This question was in-
tended to get to know something of the thoughts, the personality of the test 
person. A person's idea of 'le bon citoyen' represents an attitude with respect 
to social events. An attitude which originates from a certain social attitude 
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and is closely related to personality. On the ground of their answers to the 
question it was possible to classify the test persons in eight categories, as is 
shown in the table below. 
TABLE 36 
Europe score on the ground of opinions on 'the good citizen' 
Europe score 
Number % (average 3.2) 
I. Loves his country and protects it from foreigners 41 8 2.7 
II. Respects freedom and conviction of others 79 16 3.5 
ΠΙ. Serves general interest 91 19 3.6 
IV. Dares to protest against government 31 6 3.7 
V. Is concerned with public life 120 25 3.5 
VI. Is law-abiding 115 24 3.3 
VII. Is a hard worker 76 16 3.3 
VIII. Shows common sense and does not like problems 23 5 3.0 
Most interesting for our purpose are the categories that represent an attiude 
which shows a direct relation to certain social attitudes in the conservative-
tough-minded quadrant and the radical tender-minded quadrant respectively. 
Test persons of group I: 'the good citizen loves his country and protects it 
from foreigners', appear to have the lowest Europe score, which is at the same 
time the lowest score measured compared with all other sub-groups and 
categories as distinguished by Gijs c.s. On the contrary, test persons of the 
groups II and III: 'The good citizen respects the freedom and conviction of 
others, serves general interest', appear to score high on the Europe scale, such 
as the radical test persons in group IV, who stand for: those who dare to 
protest against their governments. Striking again is the slight difference among 
the last three categories of which the groups III and IV get the highest Europe 
score compared with the other groupings that were distinguished by the 
enquirers. 
Extreme radicalism doet not seem to contribute particularly towards a 
positive Europe attitude. 
2. THE ACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A PRO-EUROPE ATTITUDE 
2.1 Suppositions 
In the enquiries so far held the majority of those questioned express a positive 
to very positive opinion with regard to the Unification of Europe. The question 
arises what this favourable opinion actually means. Is there perhaps question 
121 
of a certain 'representation' of Europe and not of a particular 'will', writes 
Raymon Aron (1965). Avril (1964) speaks of a political consciousness based on 
certain preferences which are not very clear and hardly provide any ground 
for explanation. Rabier (1966) wonders if there is question of a temporary 
admiration, vaguely motivated and based on a small amount of knowledge, 
although he believes that no affirmative answer to this question can be given. 
If an attitude Pro or Non-Pro Europe is related to social attitude or 
personality, as we showed in the student group, it is not surprising that the 
motives seem so vague in general. On the other hand the reasons stated for a 
person's agreement with a United Europe gain considerably in significance. 
One speaks of assurance of peace, closer relations among peoples, solidarity 
and aid to developing countries next to arguments of a purely economic or 
political nature. It is quite feasible and probable that with a large number of 
advocates of a United Europe, this attitude emanates from a horror of 
agression and war, from real interest and consideration for one's fellow-man, 
from an idealistic attitude and desire for progress, and that this attitude as such 
has little to do with the question of whether one has a knowledge of Europe 
or political interest. Although knowledge and interest will sometimes be 
attended with all this. 
Another question is whether in general Advocates of a United Europe would 
be willing indeed to contribute to this purpose. An attitude for a United 
Europe implies in our enquiry feeling involved in the integration, being pre-
pared to cooperate, having confidence in its set-up and being in favour of 
political integration in the frame-work of Europe. Over 60% of the students 
have an attitude score of 44 or higher, i.e. these test persons have given 
a positive answer to all or nearly all items of the Europe Scale. More than 
30% of all the students obtained an attitude score of 49 or more, and 
belong, in our opinion, to the fervent advocates of a United Europe. 
Their average score per Europe item is 4.5 or more, i.e. more strongly for 
than for. It may be doubtbd that all advocates are in fact willing to convert 
their opinions into deeds. However, it is quite believable that one third or more 
of all students will be prepared to do so if an adequate opportunity presents 
itself. (In our introduction we referred to a 'test de réalité' of the U.S.I.A. in 
1952, which showed that max. 20% of the advocates of Europe would change 
their minds if a United Europe would entail disadvantages for their own 
country.) 
It is practically sure that with these students it is not a matter of temporary 
or passing admiration for e.g. a European adventure, but that there is question 
of an opinion of a more lasting nature, i.e. of an 'attitude'. 
122 
2.2 Y a-t-il des Européens? (Salvador de Madariaga) 
In our enquiry a remarkable fact came to the fore. In addition to a great amount 
of political interest and knowledge of matters there appeared to be a 
unanimity in the image and expectations of a future Europe. The majority of 
the students is outspokenly for a Europe of all Western European countries, 
except Spain and Portugal (± 85%). One prefers a democratic and federal 
Europe, powerful and independent of other powers, economically but also 
politically integrated. One chooses for direct elections of members of a 
European parliament. One is for acceleration of the integration and is con-
vinced that a United Europe will be realized. Development aid inside and out-
side Europe is listed high. 
Rabier (1966) quotes Salvador de Madariaga (1960), who asks himself: 
Y a-t-il des Européens? Are there Europeans? By this Madariaga means e.g. a 
consciousness in space and culture of belonging to each other (to a family with 
its own features). Particularly, he means, a Euro-political consciousness, an 
aggregate of relatively closely related and lasting attitudes, pictures, images 
and appreciations of values, of members of a community (with regard to 
political power which is manifested in and by this community). We are inclined 
to answer this question as regards the student group questioned with a clear 
'Oui'. 
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CHAPTER IX. 
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS 
1. THEOREM AND RESULTS 
As a result of enquiries held about the integration of Europe there appeared 
to be a need of more accurate research with more reliable measuring instru-
ments. In order to trace the relation between a pro-Europe attitude and the 
variables connected with it, and to avoid disturbing incidental effects, it proved 
advisable to involve homogeneous groups in the enquiry; groups comparable 
in intelligence and education level with a critical mind, capable of formulating 
an opinion, being well up in the matter and interested in the subject. 
For this reason the enquiry was concentrated on students at universities in 
the E.E.C, countries and England. It was a written test by means of a pre-
coded questionnaire which had been carefully drawn up and translated in the 
various vernacular languages. The purpose was to obtain answers to the 
following questions: 
1. What is the attitude of the students in respect of a United Europe and is 
this attitude based on facts? 
2. What image has one portrayed for oneself and what is the picture of a 
United Europe? 
3. What is the distinction between Pro's and Non-Pro's and can a difference 
in personality be shown? 
4. What factors prove in general to play a part in an attitude of being pro 
or not pro unification? 
In order to determine a Europe attitude a measuring scale was constructed, 
which proved to be strongly unidimensional and was reliable and possessed a 
due amount of validity. In the Knowledge Test designed, a high degree of 
reliability and validity could be supposed to be present on the ground of the 
nature of the test and the careful pre-selection of the items. 
There appeared to be a high amount of (mutual) correlation among the three 
parts of the test, to wit: knowledge of European organisations, the tenor of the 
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mutual agreements, and the results obtained in the European frame-work. In 
order to get to know something of the personality of the test persons we made 
use of the 'Social Attitude Inventory' of Melvin. Factor analysis brought to 
the fore two, and not more, factors identifiable as the conservative radical 
dimension and the tough-minded tender-minded dimension, which corres-
ponded very well with the findings of Eysenck and Melvin in England. 
The efforts to measure with a 'Motivational Distortion Scale' the degree of 
being motivated in the enquiry, and to derive from this a yard-stick for the 
degree of truth of the answers given did not prove successful. There is little 
reason for us to suppose that distortion of facts on a large scale has taken 
place. This may be asserted on the ground of the unidimensionality of the 
Europe Scale found, the answers to the Knowledge Test and the logical con-
formity in the results of the various measuring instruments, (Europe Scale, 
Knowledge Test, social attitude and image questions). Nor are there arguments 
to be brought forward for an unconscious, incorrect representation of reality. 
Although a certain degree of 'social desirability' (conforming oneself to a 
certain opinion of a group) was shown, it appeared that this factor had only 
a weak influence. Also the conformity of the results found by us with those of 
other enquirers confirms that there is no reason for suspicion of dodging the 
truth, wittingly or unwittingly, on a large scale. 
On the other hand it may be assumed that the very large number of accurately 
completed questionnaires, the quality of the answers and the knowledge of 
Europe have strengthened our presumption that the student test group mainly 
consisted of strongly motivated test persons, with a critical mind, with in-
terest in the subject, capable of distinguishing the relative importance of 
scientific research and willing to cooperate. It may further be supposed that 
this willingness was all the more manifest because of the strict anonymity of the 
enquiry. Altogether we may speak of an attitude that indicates sincerity in 
answering the questions rather than try ing to distort reality. 
On account of the scores on the Europe scale it may be assumed that the 
student group as a whole votes with conviction for the Unification of Europe. 
Although an attitude scale does not actually allow of a discrimination be-
tween advocates and opponents it is reasonable to suppose that about 15% 
of the test persons must be reckoned to belong to the Non-Pro's. Fifty percent 
of these at most may be considered to be opponents. An analysis of the 
statements with direct reference to an attitude pro or contra a United Europe, 
shows that the Pro's feel personally involved in the integration, that they have 
confidence in its set-up and that they want to continue the integration in a 
political respect. 
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With a classification of the student group by age, sex, nationality etc., 
it appeared that certain variables played a part, and others little or not at all, 
in a Europe attitude. Considerable differences in Europe score occur among 
test persons of a different political conviction or nationality, in degree of politi-
cal interest and between test persons having travelled abroad or not, as well 
as between the students who have a great or small amount of knowledge of 
languages. By environment, age or sex, faculty or duration of academic edu-
cation there appeared to be no distinction of significance in Europe score. 
The student group proved to be well informed on Europe affairs. Of 75 % 
of the test persons it may be assumed that they are factually knowledgeable. 
Twenty-five percent of them may be categorised as having a good know-
ledge of Europe matters. Although there proves to be some difference on the 
ground of sex and duration of academic study, the differences by political 
party, political interest and nationality are most remarkable, as well as the 
difference between the well and little travelled test persons, and students with 
a larger or smaller amount of knowledge of languages. The test persons have 
proved to be interested in political matters. Over 40% state to be highly in-
terested; 45% state that they have a moderate amount of interest, and 15% 
have little or no interest in political affairs. 
The picture they have portrayed for themselves of a United Europe appears 
to show a great similarity. The majority of all test persons is in favour of a 
United Europe of all Western European countries, except Spain and Portugal. 
Half of all the students are also in favour of including these two countries 
together with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Turkey. A minority is in favour 
of admission of the other Eastern European countries, with the exception of 
Albania and Russia. Only a very small minority (22%) votes for these two 
countries to be included in a United Europe. 
The majority of all students, i.e. between 60 and 80%, is for a democratic 
Europe on a federal basis, independent of other world powers, economically 
but also politically integrated. In this Europe one is for combined scientific 
research and joint economic projects. One is for development aid and does 
not want to do away with the army. If a common language should be adopted, 
one is for the English language, although the need of a uniform language is 
not great. Nor is a need felt for changes in the boundaries of member states. 
Hopes are focused on the future and one is convinced that a United Europe 
will materialize, though not within 15 years. 
The rate of integration should be speeded up and one is for a European 
Parliament. That Europe, as it is now, has nothing to fear is endorsed by 
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only a few of the test persons (17%). There is no fear for domestic political 
difficulties, problems with other world powers or economic crises, but one is 
afraid of dominance by one of the member states and mutual tensions, as a 
result of difference in size, of leadership, economy or mentality. The Unification 
of Europe is regarded as an important matter but not considered to be of a 
primordial nature. Freedom from hunger campaigns and stopping the Vietnam 
war are seen as the most important problems that demand a solution. 
The Attitude Inventory of Melvin is meant to measure a particular 'social' 
attitude and in connection with it certain personality factors. The answers on 
this scale demonstrate that the attitude structure of the student group shows 
great similarity with the distribution of attitudes found by Eysenck, Melvin 
and others in a representative sample of the populations of England and 
several Western European countries. The students in our enquiry as a group 
appear to be somewhat more radical than the average citizen, but for the rest 
they deviate little or not at all in social attitude. There is thus no reason to 
suppose that the positive attitude of the students for a United Europe would 
be due to a deviation in social attitude or personality from the test group. 
There proves to be a distinct relationship between a Europe attitude and 
other 'social' attitudes. A pro Europe attitude appears to be closely related 
to attitudes expressing equality of and consideration for one's fellow-man and 
a tendency against agression and violence. An attitude not-pro Europe ap-
pears to be related to attitudes expressing a 'hard line', as well as strong 
nationalism and a certain amount of conservatism as regards the church and 
sexuality. Being for or not for Europe refers to a distinction between radicalism 
and tender-mindedness on the one hand and conservatism and tough-
mindedness on the other. The answers on the Social Inventory show some 
difference between villagers and the inhabitants of towns, though also here the 
most important differences are shown on the ground of political party, na-
tionality, political interest (and knowledge) and to a lesser extent on the ground 
of being travelled or knowledge of languages. Also among religious and non-
religious people differences occur, contrary to other categories such as environ-
ment, age, duration of academic study etc. 
Among the student group as a whole there proves to be a tendency towards 
defending oneself against (in their eyes) exaggerated nationalism, militarism, 
paternalism, as well as a desire for more freedom in the domains of religion 
and sexuality. However, it is only a small percentage of the students that take 
an extreme position. 
In order to gain an impression of the difference between Non-Pro's and 
Real Pro's of Europe, 100 test persons on the one end of the scale were com-
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pared with 100 students on the other end. The 100 test persons who obtamed 
a score of half or less than half of the maximum number of points on the 
Europe Scale were called Non-Pro's; the 100 test persons with the highest 
scores were called Real Pro's. The average of the total test group on a scale 
from 11 to 56 points appeared to be 43.7, of the Non Pro's 28.6 and the Real 
Pro's 53. Non-Pro's feel hardly or not to be engaged in a United Europe, have 
little or no confidence in the set-up, are not in favour of political integration and 
are thus not prepared to take an active part to this purpose. 
Taking into account the degree of difficulty in the knowledge test Non-
Pro's generally appear to be duly informed of European matters. About 20% 
of them belong to the category with a very limited amount of knowledge. The 
Non-Pro's are by a majority also politically interested, 25% of them having 
a good deal of interest, 20% little and 6% no interest. Real Pro's of the in-
tegration appear to have a good amount of knowledge and by a majority to 
show a great amount of political interest. People with a very limited amount of 
knowledge or having no political interest are not found in this group. 
There is little difference between the two groups in their opinions as to what 
countries should be included, or not, in a United Europe. Real Advocates prove 
to be less in favour of autocratic governments and the outspokenly Com-
munist countries; there is less general unanimity among Non-Pro's with regard 
to the admission of Great Britain and other Western European countries. Both 
Pro's and Non-Pro's have broadly the same future Europe in mind as the test 
group as a whole, although among the Non-Pro's there are more people who 
are in favour of a large Europe than among the other groups. 
Differences between Pro's and Non-Pro's can thus be hardly attributed to 
contrasts between 'knowers' and 'not knowers', between people with political 
interest and without political interest or to a difference in the opinions of a 
large or small Europe. On the other hand there appear to be differences in the 
opinions about form of government, objectives and degree of integration. Real 
Pro's feel strongly engaged in the integration and are willing to cooperate in 
an active manner. They are unambiguously in favour of a democratic Europe, 
as a close federation, economically as well as politically integrated. They want 
a strong and independent Europe, without direct ties with other world powers. 
They are for aid to developing countries and poor areas in Europe. European 
integration is felt to be an important issue of world interest, almost as impor-
tant as stopping the war in Vietnam. They are convinced that a United Europe 
will materialize, perhaps within 15 years, and would like to accelerate the 
integration. There is a conviction that a United Europe will bring real draw-
backs with it, but one is prepared to make sacrifices. 
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Non-Pro's expect little advantage of a United Europe and do not see in-
tegration as a realistic proposition, nor as an important problem. They do ex-
pect that in the long run a European Union will be brought about. They prefer 
a democratic (or people's democratic) Europe, but as a less closely-knit feder-
ation or as a convention of countries with long-term agreements, not politically 
integrated, but with ties with other world powers. Interest is focused most on 
economic integration, in which personal welfare does play a considerable part. 
Aid to developing countries is not regarded to be essential. 
Remarkable differences between the two groups are shown in social attitude. 
Non-Pro's generally prove to be conservative and tough and to distinguish 
themselves from the other group by less objections to certain forms of agression 
and violence and less consideration for one's fellow-man. They are rather for 
'my country right or wrong' and against intervention of governments. 
Real Advocates appear to be radical and tender or (moderately) tough. 
There are also a number of Pro's with a conservative tender-minded attitude. 
However, conservative tough-minded people do not occur in the latter group 
or hardly at all. A relatively large number of Non-Advocates of integration is 
found among the conservative and right political groupings, among the small 
group of students having no political interest and among English students. 
Real Advocates are of frequent occurrence among all nationalities except Italy 
and England. They are also often found among students with an excellent 
knowledge of Europe, among Socialists and Liberals, and among students with 
a great amount of political interest. 
Europe attitude, Europe knowledge and social attitude appear to show a 
mutual relationship, a certain correlation. A further analysis of the data col-
lected shows that the degree of knowledge of European matters does corre-
late pretty well with the degree to which one is pro or strongly pro integration, 
but has relatively little to do with an attitude pro or not pro Europe. On the 
other hand Non-Pro's appear to distinguish themselves in social attitude from 
the Real Pro's by a conservative tough-minded attitude. It shows that the above-
mentioned three scales or tests correlate mutually and that it is always the same 
sub-groups that show the largest differences per category both in Europe atti-
tude, in knowledge of Europe and social attitude. On the ground of this we have 
supposed that Europe knowledge and social attitude form an essential part of 
an attitude with respect to the unification and are as such more fundamental 
than the other differences found in the sub-groups. 
That a good knowledge of European matters goes along with a positive 
European attitude may be accounted for because a greater amount of know-
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ledge will just be a consequence of greater interest in the subject. With respect 
to a Europe attitude political interest appears to play a part which is com-
parable with the knowledge factor. However, it is less plausible that political 
interest should play a more important role in such an attitude than Europe 
knowledge, c.q. Europe interest. Political conviction or party proves to show 
a clear relationship with social attitude as was also shown by Eysenck. In 
every political party we found a clear difference between Pro's and Non-Pro's 
in the respect expected. Also on this ground we supposed that differences in 
social attitude or personahty play a more fundamental part in a Europe atti-
tude than a difference on the ground of political colour although in certain 
cases the stamp of the party may turn the scale (Communists). 
On the ground of nationality there appears to be little difference in Europe 
attitude among students of the E.E.C, countries, but there is a considerable 
difference in knowledge, as was also shown by Gallup (1962). This might 
indicate that difference in Europe attitude on the ground of nationality may 
be largely accounted for by a difference in knowledge of Europe. That a certain 
nationalistic attitude can play a distinct part also appeared from the English 
student group. It seems that the relation between being travelled as well as 
having a knowledge of languages and a Europe attitude can be accounted for 
by a difference in personality, a difference between radicals and conservatives 
(travelling), and by a difference between people with a tender-minded or 
tough-minded-attitude (languages). Also knowledge of and interest in Europe 
prove to exercise a certain influence in this respect. That visiting foreign 
countries as well as reading foreign languages as such does cause the mind 
to ripen towards the unification of the European peoples may for the rest be 
deemed quite likely. 
If the fundamental difference between Pro's and Non-Pro's is rooted in a 
difference in personality, the insight into the relationship between Europe 
attitude and a number of other variables will certainly increase: e.g. the fact that 
Non-Pro's with their conservative-tough-minded attitude are mainly found 
among conservative and (tough) right groupings; but also that they have a 
smaller amount of political interest and at the same time that they are less in-
clined to become aquainted with foreign countries and languages. That know-
ledge of European matters, though related to the radical-conservative dimen-
sion, plays its own considerable part, particularly in an attitude for or strongly 
for unification (also as a feature of positive interest in the matter), gives little 
grounds for doubt. The differences in knowledge of the subject may very likely 
be one of the reasons for differences in Europe attitude among the inhabitants of 
the countries of the present European Community, rather than the differences in 
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personality. More research will be required to confirm or to deny the justness of 
the above assumptions. 
A very recent research at the instigation of the European Communities in 
Brussels into the attitude of young people toward the integration of Europe 
seems to confirm our supposition. In a provisional report on this research it 
appears that education or training, political interest and social attitude are the 
cause of the most important differences in the scores on a Europe measuring 
scale. Young people with a conservative tough-minded opinion on 'le bon 
citoyen' get the lowest of all scores measured. Better schooling together with 
a greater amount of political interest appear to be attended with a 'stronger* 
pro-Europe attitude. 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The determination of an attitude by means of a measuring scale is to be 
preferred to registration of opinions, in spite of the fact that converting an 
attitude scale into a foreign language brings drawbacks with it. A literal trans-
lation is almost impossible and certain words may sometimes have different 
meanings. The technique of Osgood, the semantic differential, meant to accu-
rately define the real meaning of a word (1964), seems promising in this respect, 
although this method also has its drawbacks. For the study of the relation 
between variables it is desirable not to work with too small groups of test 
persons. This is necessary to preclude secondary effects. (In this way it is con-
ceivable that the notions a certain professor had about Europe exercised a 
direct influence on his students.) For the determination of the Europe attitude 
of e.g. Communists the number of test persons in our enquiry was decidedly 
small. 
We deem it doubtful whether in general international research e.g. among 
students should be done with separately calibrated scales per country. Doise 
(1969) also underHnes the great amount of homogeneity in attitude and thought 
among students of the E.E.C, countries. Even of a contrast between French 
and German students in mutual appreciation, as is supposed, little or nothing 
is to be discerned. Yet he found some differences in the capacity of empathising 
with the mentaUty of other peoples. The Dutch students obtained the highest 
score in this respect, followed by the Belgians, Germans, French and Italians, 
which appears to be practically in conformity with our own findings on the 
Social Attitude Inventory. 
A measuring scale registers an attitude, but does not supply certainty about 
the behaviour or activities that are attendant on it. As to this matter, research 
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and particularly observation, are requirements of prime order. By this is meant 
observation of behaviour and attitude with respect to a United Europe, as may 
appear from the reading of articles on the subject, in discussions from groups' 
activities, from the formulation of thought etc. More research is also desired 
as to what is meant by unification, integration and cooperation. In this respect 
the result of the previously mentioned enquiry by Gallup INRA will be quite 
interesting. 
What is the significance of nationalistic thinking in a Europe attitude? As 
has appeared from our enquiry a conservative mind need not prevent one 
from having a positive Europe attitude. It is the combination of a conservative 
attitude and tough-mindedness that does not seem to go together with a posi-
tive attitude. Yet in our enquiry, not all conservative tough-minded students 
take a negative position with regard to unification. It would be interesting to 
continue the research in this group. A radical attitude proves to contribute 
towards a positive Europe attitude, although extreme radicalism does not seem 
to contribute particularly. Is the desire for change as such most important and 
e.g. the aim of the Unification of Europe a by-product of it for them? That the 
new epoch will bring about changes for young people is certain. Possibilities of 
looking across the borders have greatly improved. T.V. and travelling, books 
and films, music and fashion will no doubt contribute or are an expression of 
a more international orientation. Also in a political respect changes are being 
brought about, which points to changed views and other social attitudes. An 
empirical description of what is changing in this respect is very desirable. In 
our enquiry the comparison of the political convictions of a father with the 
political aspirations of his son is interesting. The table below will give some 
indication on this point. 
TABLE 37 
Comparison of political conviction between father and son. 
Political conviction father son 
Right 4 2 
Conservative 22 12 
Christian Democrat 27 23 
Liberal 26 30 
Socialist 19 29 
Communist 2 4 
From this table a distinct shift to the left clearly comes to the fore. That this 
is a temporary shift and that most of the sons will in course of time revert to the 
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old state may be possible but is in our opinion not very sure. Since radicalism in 
general goes together with a desire for Unification of Europe, the time seems 
to be ripe to proceed to action, at least for young people. 
The proportions in party-political respect are quite interesting. The survey 
in Enclosure 11 gives an impression of this. In the enclosure we have also shown 
the 'second' preference by political orientation, which gives an indication as 
to how these shifts have been brought about. However, as party political shifts 
are beyond the scope of this enquiry we shall not go further into this matter. 
We ourselves found evidence for the supposition that a Europe attitude 
shows a direct relationship with social attitude or personality together with 
knowledge of facts. A representative investigation among the various popu-
lation groups would in this connection be clarifying. 
3. ON TO A UNITED EUROPE 
Social psychological research ought to measure and to register, and as such 
be free from personal likes and dislikes. However, in this last paragraph we 
shall intentionally deviate from this rule and add to the conclusions of this 
enquiry some thoughts in the frame-work of the strivings for a United Europe. 
In the enquiry some striking points came to light. It appeared that among 
the students there is a great amount of goodwill in respect of the Unification 
of Europe, based on a knowledge of facts. A greater or lesser amount of know-
ledge appeared to be a yard-stick for an attitude for or strongly for a United 
Europe. From this it may be concluded that information plays a very important 
part in rousing more enthusiasm for the European cause. On the ground of 
a wish for a 'greater Europe', which came to the fore in our enquiry and 
others, a greater supply of information on the Western European countries 
inside and outside the E.E.C, is desired. 
In our opinion more thought should also be given to the supply of infor-
mation on the Eastern European countries, preferably on a basis of reci-
procity. We found that there is difference in the amount of knowledge among 
Pro's and Non-Pro's. It is quite likely that information as such has little in-
fluence on Non-Pro's, i.e. more information does not seem to be the appropriate 
means to tum a negative or neutral attitude into a positive one. 
Pro's and Non-Pro's distinguish themselves particularly in social attitude. 
The latter group appeared to be conservative and tough, in contrast with the 
former. In 1960 Salvador de Madariaga concluded that in a given situation 
and at a certain moment there are two ways to create Europeans: by educating 
the new generation and re-educating the old one. As education presupposes 
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social cultivation, rather than the bringing of knowledge, we would gladly 
confirm this statement. In this light education must be regarded as the dif-
ficult task of cultivating more frankness and an understanding of another 
person's situation, in order to open the window to the outside world and 
allow others to enter one's own environments. In brief: an orientation or 
re-orientation in social attitude. 
Actions that appeal to the public may also contribute to broader views and 
minds in this respect. This will be all the more the case as the results are felt. 
(Success does make an appeal.) For the near future we think of a smooth start 
in the negotiations with England about joining the European Community, of 
breaking down the reviled barriers, of direct elections for the European Par-
liament. 
Besides the goodwill among the students we found a clear willingness to make 
one's own contribution for the purpose of unification. The small amount of 
action in this respect may well be due to the lack of opportunities to undertake 
something. This is all the more surprising since the tools are available at every 
university. Practically every faculty is in a position to make its own contribution. 
For the faculties of social sciences an immense field lies fallow in the frame-
work of project research, as was shown in the previous section. The majority of 
the research can be done on a national level. The European Communities at 
Brussels have at their disposal the facilities for the coordination of and the 
assistance to the various countries. European research among various classes 
of the population (e.g. by means of project research at the universities) might 
provide for some form of 'say' in the national policy in respect of integration. 
Although various institutions of higher education have their 'Europe centre' 
it seems that the time is ripe for a Europe College at university level, a truly 
European University for research and brain work from the aggregate with a 
specialisation in studies orientated on the individual countries, managed by 
the European Commission, financed by the governments and populated by 
young people eligible from the participating countries. Such an institution 
could supply selected Europe specialists and considerably speed up the inte-
gration of scientific education in Western Europe. More fundamental thought 
and attention could then be given to the standardization of qualifications and 
diplomas. There would also be an opportunity for a permanent braintrust to 
do research and to solve specific problems. 
First priority should be given to a direct influence e.g. in direct elections of 
national delegates in the European Parliament. Such a step would considerably 
promote the interest of the Euro-citizen, urge political parties to a clear state-
ment of their points of view and stimulate news media to particular activities. 
134 
Inter-European consultation would receive a positive impetus, increased oppor-
tunities would be created for negotiations among political parties, trade unions 
and industries in the various countries. International cooperation of press, radio 
and T.V. would be promoted and induce regular Europe columns in press and 
radio, T.V. broadcasts on European matters, and eventually to a more Euro-
pean oriented Eurovision. Still more important is that direct elections would 
prove the confidence of the governments in the Europe cause. 
A true European Parliament only gains concrete significance if the Euro-
pean Commission is entrusted with concrete powers. There is a clear 
demarcation of matters that have to be solved on a national or a European 
level. Only when the first steps have been taken to a political Union will it be 
possible for a European Parliament to successfully execute its controlling and 
stimulating task and will there be question of a real 'say'. 
The differences in the native languages of the European peoples deserve 
particular attention. Teaching in one or two foreign languages in all sections 
of education may in the long run be a means of filling the language gap. Under-
standing a foreign language will in this respect be more important than 
speaking it. It is interesting to witness a discussion between French and EngUsh 
students, when each group speaks its own language which is mutually under-
stood, so that neither of the two is obliged to speak the foreign language. Is 
it perhaps possible that the difference in language is the reason of the persis-
tent conviction that the Western European peoples show such large differences 
in many respects? 
One may wonder if we have not stuck too long to a perhaps imaginary con-
trast between the French and the Germans, the Dutch and the Belgians etc. 
We have found that the national differences in the Europe attitude of the stu-
dents (which may be accounted for by differences in knowledge and personality) 
show little distinction in Europe-consciousness and image. Also Paul Valéry 
(1924) and Madariaga (1960), Lutte (1968), Doise (1970) and other enquirers 
underline the uniformity of thought in Western Europe. In this respect it is 
interesting to know the opinions of non-Europeans, the opinions of people 
from the 'rich' as well as the 'developing' countries. The uniformity in 
opinion which can be noted in discussions with them is remarkable. Europe, 
and still more Western Europe is regarded as one aggregate and is a population 
clearly distinguished from other population groups in the world. Some-
times there is irritation about the 'blindness" of the Europeans them-
selves, a blindness which would prevent them from undertaking jointly and 
unswervingly a special task in the world, a task of a cultural and spiritual 
nature rather than of an ideological or economic character. A task not based 
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on an ideology or prosperity (as an export item), but emanating from the 
capacity to identify oneself with the other party, from a willingness to partake in 
consultation or mutual assimilation. In this sense an independent Europe 
should be regarded as a necessity for a resting point (and a centre of gravity?) in 
the play of world powers. 
It will depend on the Europeans themselves, but especially on the visions of 
the leaders of the governments and the national parliamentarians if this chal-
lenge is to be accepted. The next decennium seems to hold certain promises. 
The tiresome building on in the sixties could be closed with the conference in 
The Hague on December 1 and 2 1969. Leaders of States and Governments of 
the E.E.C, countries decided to jointly enter the final stage of the Common 
Market, from which there is no point of return. 
It was stated that the realisation of an economic and monetary union would 
be achieved soon. General agreement was reached at the start of negotiations 
between the Community and candidates wishing to join, although no exact 
date was fixed. No progress was made as to strengthening the powers of the 
European institutions; nor was any encouragement given for the promotion 
of effective efforts for the realisation of a political union. Yet there are hopes 
that the next ten years will usher in a new European era perhaps with an elan 
that may be compared with that of the fifties. According to Jean Rey 
(1969), the president of the European Commission, there is no doubt that the 
Community will enter upon a new stage of construction and development and 
that it is regaining the creative powers which have in the past years been lack-
ing. At the Conference the leaders of the governments betrayed a broader 
view on the European issue and it was particularly the strong and convincing 
standpoint of the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany that 
drew general attention. However, hopes are set on the increase of a real sense 
of Europe among the new generation which is reaching maturity. 
It looks as though in the coming years advantages may be expected of this 
vital force and that this collective process deserves as much attention as the 
formulation and ratification of agreements. The search for new ways is re-
quired to enable youth to make an effective contribution in the process of 
integration. A purposeful effort of the post-war generation in the construction 
of the common home seems a paramount condition to ensure the birth of The 
United States of Europe. 
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ENCLOSURE 1 
SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS ON PREFERENCES, LIKES AND 
DISLIKES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
The purpose of this interview is to make a comparison among the following Western 
European countries: Belgium, England, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands. 
You are kindly requested to give your opinion in reply to the following questions: 
1. Of which of the above-mentioned countries would you prefer an inhabitant as chief 
in a European Army? 
Which foreigner would you not like to accept? 
2. Which foreigner would you like to share a room with? 
Which nationality would you not like as a room-mate? 
3. With which country would you like most to do business if you carried on a foreign 
trade? 
Which country would you not like to deal with? 
4. Which Western European language do you consider most important for a United 
Europe? 
Which country is in your opinion least important? 
5. Which country would you like most to settle in, except your own country? 
In which country would you never like to settle? 
6. If foreigners come to live in our country, which nationality would you prefer? 
To which nationality would you object? 
7. Which nationality is in your opinion kindest as a population? 
Which foreigners are not kind in your opinion? 
8. Which country is most important for you in a United Europe, except your own 
country? 
Which country is in your opinion not very important in this respect? 
9. Which of the six countries mentioned above, except your own, is in your opinion: 
economically strong 
military strong 
democratically strong 
strong in education 
politically strong 
socially strong (working for the people) 
strong in culture. 
strong in science 
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10. Which of these countries is in your opinion: 
economically weak 
military weak 
democratically weak 
weak in education 
politically weak 
socially weak 
weak in culture 
weak in science 
11. On which country would you rely most in the event of an economic or political crisis 
in your country? 
On which country would you not rely? 
12. Which country, except your own, could in your opinion exercise the greatest influence 
in a United Europe? 
To which country would you have objections in this respect? 
13. Which of these countries have you ever visited? 
14. What is your nationality, age, profession and what education do you have? 
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ENCLOSURE 2 
40 STATEMENTS ON THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
The following 40 statements about the unification of Europe have been collected from 
speeches, books, newspapers, and other sources. They have been chosen in such a way 
that most people are inclined to agree with a number of these statements and to disagree 
with others. You are asked to give your opinion for each statement. Please do so by using 
the following symbols only: 
+ + if you strongly agree 
+ if you are in general agreement 
О if you cannot decide whether you are for or against, or if you find that the question 
is such that you cannot give an answer 
- if you are in general disagreement 
if you strongly disagree 
This is not a 'test'; there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. It is a matter of your personal 
opinion. 
Would you answer frankly and not leave out any of the questions? 
1. If I knew that this really would contribute to the political unification of Europe, 
I would be prepared to give my spare time, money or efforts to it. 
2. The failure of European unification would be a highly regrettable thing. 
3. Viewed over a long period of time the political structure of a United Europe would 
have to be as uniform as possible. 
4. The countries that might be at an economic disadvantage from a unification of 
Europe cannot be expected to do their utmost for such a unification. 
5. Every national political party ought to bring in line his program with the political 
unification of Europe. 
6. If the unification of Europe should demand substantial sacrifices, I would be willing 
to make them. 
7. Within a United Europe I would not object to settle outside my present country. 
8. I would be willing to give up my own nationality and to accept the European 
nationality instead. 
9. The disadvantages of a political unification of Europe outweigh its advantages. 
10. Nobody can foresee the consequences of a political unification of Europe. 
11. The differences between various national civilisations will be caused to disappear 
by a United Europe. 
12. The unification of Europe will increase economic prosperity. 
13. In spite of national differences there exists already one European civilization. 
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14. The unification of Europe is indispensable to realize large scale help to the developing 
countries. 
15. To me, the unification of Europe is an important problem. 
16. The attitude taken up by some countries, makes the unification of Europe impossible 
to realize. 
17. In present day Europe the national frontiers are determined by the natural com-
munities. 
18. I frequently think of a United Europe, or speak with others about it. 
19. The unification of Europe will increase the nervous strain of everyday-life. 
20. The economic unification of Europe should be seen as a step towards its political 
unification. 
21. In the Europe of the future the national states of the moment should retain their own 
ways of living. 
22. In the process of unification of Europe the smaller countries should remain vigilant 
with regard to the ambitions of the larger ones. 
23. Europe as it is now, has nothing to fear. 
24. The unification of Europe will be an asset to those regions that are now being 
neglected by their national governments. 
25. For the unification of Europe I shall have to do my little bit, whatever that may be. 
26. It would be dangerous to carry out the integration of Europe to such an extend that 
doctors, workers and shopkeepers from other countries could settle in our country. 
27. I for one, I don't care much for a United Europe. 
28. Voting for a future European parliament should be done directly that is, without the 
intermediary of the governments of the member states. 
29. The political unification of Europe is something that is indeed important to me; 
I feel not, however, personally involved in it. 
30. To believe in the unification of Europe is a matter of realism. 
31. There is too much talk about a United Europe and too little is done about it. 
32. The ideal United Europe also embraces the European countries behind the Iron 
curtain. 
33. Presumably, a politically United Europe will not be viable. 
34. A United Europe will offer better opportunities for an exchange in the field of arts 
and letters, than we have at this moment. 
35. One of the great advantages of a United Europe is the realisation of a new world-
power, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union. 
36. In a United Europe the individual is likely to get lost. 
37. The United Europe needs a common language. 
38. The differences between the countries of Europe are smaller, than the differences 
between these countries and countries of other continents. 
39. Those who oppose to the political unification of Europe are politically blind. 
40. A politically United Europe will be beneficial to peace inside and outside Europe. 
Nationality: 
male/female: 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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ENCLOSURE 3 
THE FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
University of Nijmegen 
The Netherlands 
This study is concerned with your opinion and your wishes as regards a United Europe 
and the way you visualize it. 
The object of the study is your personal view. Your opinion on the subject matter to 
follow is of importance irrespective of whether you would be in support of a unification 
of Europe or not. The information you provide will be sent direct to the Mathematics 
Centre of the above University. 
In order to interpret the results with greater precision, we would like to have more 
information concerning you personally and your opinion with regard to certain social 
questions and aspects of society. We would appreciate your answering these questions 
too according to your private opinion. 
On completion of the questionnaire, please enclose it in the envelope, seal this, and hand 
it to the invigilator. Do not mention your name on any of the papers. If you wish to make 
any comments please do so in Section G on the last page of the questionnaire. 
The results of this study will be published in book form in about a year's time. A copy 
will be sent to the library of your University. The book will be published in English with 
the title 'Europeans about Europe' under the authorship of Petrus-Arsene Comelis. 
The study is conducted as a piece of pure research. 
We kindly ask you to do the following: 
1. Read the instructions carefully. 
2. Answer all the questions. 
3. If you are in doubt, choose the answer that fits best with your opinion. 
4. Work at a steady pace without discussion while filling in the questionnaire. 
A. The following are a number of statements that have been made by Europeans about 
a United Europe. You are asked to indicate whether you are in agreement or not with 
each statement by marking the appropriate box with one of the following symbols. 
+ + if you are in complete agreement 
+ if you more or less agree 
- if you are inclined to disagree 
if you absolutely disagree 
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1. One of the great advantages of a United Europe is the establishment of a new world 
power alongside the United States and the Soviet Union. 
2. Failure of European unification would be a highly regrettable thing. 
3. The attitude taken up by some countries precludes the unification of Europe. 
4. The unification of Europe is necessary for the realization of large-scale help to the 
developing countries. 
5. Every national political party should bring its programme in line with the political 
unification of Europe. 
6. If the unification of Europe should be demand substantial sacrifices, I would be 
willing to make them. 
7. Nobody can foresee the consequences of a political unification of Europe. 
8. The unification of Europe will be an asset to those regions that are now being 
neglected by their national governments. 
9. I would be willing to give up my own nationality and to accept the European 
nationality instead. 
10. The economic unification of Europe should be seen as a step towards its political 
unification. 
11. Towards the unification of Europe I shall have to add my little bit, whatever that may 
be. 
12. To believe in the unification of Europe is a matter of realism. 
13. The disadvantages of a political unification of Europe outweigh its advantages. 
14. Personally I do not care much for a United Europe. 
15. In a United Europe there will be a need for a common language alongside the 
existing national languages. 
16. In a United Europe the habits and customs of my country will be favourably 
influenced through contact with people of other countries. 
17. In a United Europe it is desirable to make certain alterations in the boundaries of 
member states in order to achieve more homogeneous (closely integrated) popula-
tions. 
18. In a United Europe it will not be possible to give an adequate place to the royal 
families. 
19. The unification of Europe gives rise to a number of real objections. 
20. Members of a parliament for a United Europe should be elected direct by the voters, 
i.e. without intervention by governments and parliaments of member states. 
21. I am convinced that there will be complete religious freedom in a United Europe. 
22. Europe as it is now has nothing to fear. 
B. The following deals with questions concerning a possible United Europe. Irrespective 
of whether you are in favour of a United Europe or not, you are asked to indicate your 
choice of its composition, you think most acceptable. 
1. Which of the following countries ought, in your opinion, to have a place in a United 
Europe, and which not? Please mark each country with one of the following symbols: 
+ if you feel the country ought to have a place in a United Europe 
- if you feel the country ought not or not yet to have a place in a United Europe 
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a Ireland 
b Great Britain 
с France 
d Spain 
e Portugal 
f Norway 
g Sweden 
h Finland 
i Denmark 
j Netherlands 
к Belgium 
1 Luxemburg 
m Germany-West 
η Germany-East 
о Switserland 
ρ Austria 
q Italy 
г Poland 
s Czechoslovakia 
t Hungary 
a Rumania 
ν Bulgaria 
w Albania 
χ Jugoslavia 
y Greece 
ζ Turkey 
zz U.S.S.R. (Russia) 
2. Please name below the 5 countries which you would most preferably incorporate 
into a United Europe. Do nol name your own country. 
My first choice is : 
secondly : 
thirdly : 
fourthly : 
fifthly : 
C. In the following, various issues related to a United Europe will be raised. For each issue 
three possible statements are given. You are asked to rank these three possibilities by 
placing numbers in the appropriate boxes: 
1 for the statement that agrees most closely with your opinion or preference 
2 for your second choice 
3 for the remaining statement 
In brief, for each question please provide all the boxes with a number. 
1. If a United Europe is achieved, then I am in favour of: 
a Π agreements between a large number of countries 
b Π close-knit integration of a small number of countries 
с D less close-knit integration of a medium-sized number of countries 
2. The present rate of European integration should, in my opinion: 
а Π be speeded up, even if this entails change and discomfort 
b Π be brought to a halt until certainty has been reached that no country or occupa­
tional group will be harmed 
с Π be continued at the same rate as at present 
3. I expect that a United Europe: 
а Π will be achieved within 15 years 
b G will be achieved, but not within 15 years 
с Π will not or probably not be achieved 
4. My opinion about a United Europe is based on: 
а Π my expectations of the future 
b Π discontent with the present state in my country 
с Π avoiding a repetition of what has happened in the past 
Note: Please rank your order of preference from 1 to 4 for the following questions, thus 
giving each of four possibilities a number. 
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5. I should most like to see United Europe as: 
a Π a large nation with a central government 
b Π a federation of countries, each with a limited independence 
с Π a federation of countries, each with a large degree of independence 
d Π a group of countries with common long-term agreements 
6. In a United Europe I regard the best form of government as being a: 
a Π people's democracy such as e.g. Poland 
b Π autocracy such as e.g. Spain 
с D democracy such as e.g. England 
d Π democracy with full powers in the hands of one person such as e.g. France 
7. I believe that the most important contribution towards the unification of Europe is at 
present made by: 
а Π the governments of the countries concerned 
b D national and international political parties 
с Π the industrial world 
d Π groups such as the 'European Movement' 
8. As regards the allegiance of a United Europe, I am in favour of: 
a • an independent Europe separate from other world powers 
b Π an orientation towards the U.S.S.R. (Russia) 
с Π an orientation towards the U.S.A. 
d Π an orientation towards the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
9. If a United Europe is going to give economic aid for development, then I am in favour 
of this aid going to: 
a Π areas in the world where the need is greatest 
b D retarded areas within United Europe 
с • the countries in development where economic advantages may be expected 
d Π only those countries where the expenditure of aid can be controlled effectively 
10. In a United Europe I am in favour of: 
a D the complete abolishment of the army 
b Π an army of regulars (volunteers) only 
с Π an army of young men under compulsory military service 
d Π the establishment of a strong army 
Note: Please rank your order of preference from 1 to 5 for the following questions, thus 
giving each of the five possibilities a number. 
11. In a United Europe I am in favour of integration in the following spheres: 
а Π economic: common market 
b Π political: common foreign policy 
с Π military: common defence 
d D social: equivalent social legislation, labour and social assistance laws 
e D educational: equivalent educational and training courses and diplomas 
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12. The most important aim of United Europe is, in my opinion: 
а Π the development of the economy in Europe 
b D the establishment of an independent European power in the world 
с Π the aid to underdeveloped areas 
d Π the enhancement of personal well-being 
e Π the protection and propagation of European art and culture 
13. I am in favour of the following internal measures in a United Europe: 
а Π an equivalent system of taxation in all member states 
b • co-ordination of diplomas and requirements for trades and professions 
с Π equivalent social benefits (holiday, sickness, pensions) 
d D equal price-levels in the member states 
e D equal pay for the same occupational groups 
14. If one common language is desirable in addition to the various national languages, I 
would choose this to be: 
а Π French 
b Π German 
с • English 
d Π Italian 
e D Spanish 
15. The unification of Europe can lead to a number of common achievements, of which 
I would most appreciate: 
a D a European space programme 
b Π motorways all through Europe 
с Π an independent and well-equipped army 
d D combined projects such as aircraft design, land reclamation, power stations 
e • combined large-scale scientific research 
16. I believe that the actualization of a United Europe is best promoted by: 
а Π international tourism 
b G information by press, radio and television 
с D international exchange of visiting labourers and of students doing practical 
courses 
d Π teaching programmes on Europe and subsidized language instruction 
e Π cultural and scientific exchanges 
17. If difficulties arise in a United Europe, I expect them to be: 
a • tensions between the member states, partly as a result of mental or cultural 
attitudes 
b D difficulties with one of the world powers, e.g. America 
с D dominance of one of the member states as a result of difference in economy, 
size of leadership 
d D economic upheavals (crisis) in certain sectors of industry 
e D domestic political difficulties 
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18. Which of the following international campaigns do you consider most important ? 
a Π freedom from hunger campaign 
b D unification of Europe 
с Π stopping the Vietnam war 
d Π campaign for nuclear disarmament 
e D campaigns for road safety and accident prevention 
19. Listed below are 8 political currents in Europe. You are asked to rank from 1 to 5 
the five currents in your order of preference: i.e. leave 3 boxes empty. 
a Π conservatives 12 % e Π communists and left-wing groups 3,5% 
b Π socialists 24,5% f Π pacifists 7 % 
с Π Christian democrats 19 % g Π independents 5 % 
d Π liberals 27 % h Π right-wing and extreme right-wing groups 2 % 
D. The following 30 statements on general aspects of society have been collected from 
speeches, books, newspapers and other sources. They have been chosen in such a way that 
most people are inclined to agree with a number of these statements and to disagree with 
others. You are asked to give your opinion for each statement. Please do so by using the 
following symbols only: 
+ + 'f you strongly agree 
+ if you are in general agreement 
О if you cannot decide whether you are for or against, or if you find that the question 
is such that you cannot give an answer 
- if you are in general disagreement 
if you strongly disagree 
This is not a 'test'; there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. It is a matter of your personal 
opinion. 
Would you answer frankly and not leave out any of the questions? 
1. Production and trade should be free from government interference. 
2. The so-called underdog deserves little sympathy or help from successful people. 
3. Men and women have to right to find out whether they are sexually suited before 
marriage (e.g. trial marriage). 
4. I have sometimes, even if briefly, had hateful feelings towards my parents. 
5. 'My country right or wrong' is a saying which expresses a fundamentally desirable 
attitude. 
6. The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished. 
7. The dropping of the first atom bomb on a Japanese city, killing thousand of innocent 
women and children, was morally wrong and incompatible with our kind of 
civilization. 
8. I find it hard to admit when I am wrong. 
9. When I know I'am doing the right thing, I find my task easy. 
10. Capitalism is immoral because it exploits the worker by failing to give him full value 
for his productive labour. 
11. A person should be free to take his own life, if he wishes to do so, without any 
interference from society. 
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12. Free love between men and women should be encouraged as a means towards mental 
and physical health. 
13. Compulsory military training in peace-time is essential for the survival of this country. 
14. Sex crimes such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprison­
ment; such criminals ought to be flogged or worse. 
15. A white He is often a good thing. 
16. My mind does not work as clearly at some times as at others. 
17. The idea of God is an invention of the human mind. 
18. The Church should attempt to increase its influence on the life of the nation. 
19. Most religious people are hypocrites. 
20. Sex relations except in marriage are always wrong. 
21. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters which do not concern them. 
22. Jews are as valuable citizens as any other group. 
23. Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure them, not punish them. 
24. There is no harm in travelling occasionally without a ticket, if you can get away 
with it. 
25. I may be less considerate of other people than they are of me. 
26. An occupation by a foreign power is better than war. 
27. Christ was divine, wholly or partly in a sense different from other men. 
28. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
29. The maintenance of internal order within the nation is more important than ensuring 
that there is complete freedom for all. 
30. I think my memory is better than it ever was. 
E. In this section we ask you to answer a number of questions about yourself by placing a 
cross in the appropriate box. Would you place one cross only (x) for each question and not 
leave out any questions? 
The collected material is anonymous and will be used for research purposes only. 
1. In which faculty are you studying? 
а Π law 54% 
b Π economics 46% 
3. Date of birth: 
а Π before 1944 15% 
b Π 1944 11% 
с Π 1945 11% 
d D 1946 21% 
e Π1947 25% 
f Π 1948 13% 
g Π 1949 4% 
h Π after 1949 0% 
2. Sex: 
a Π male 79% 
b Π female 21% 
4. Please mark the nationality of your­
self in the 1st column, your father's 
in the 2nd column, and your mother's 
in the 3rd column. 
«Ы tri Ь4 
2 'S ·3 
S. s 
a French 
b German 
с British 
d Italian 
e Dutch 
f Belgian 
g other 
( 8,5%) 
(16,5%) 
(17 %) 1 
(19 %) 1 
(17 %) 1 
(20 %) 1 
( 2 %) 1 
I 2 
I 2 
1 2 
I 2 
2 
I 2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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5. How many inhabitants has the place 
where you lived most part of your 
life? 
a Π less than 10,000 15% 
b D 10,000- 50,000 17% 
с Π 50,000 - 100,000 10% 
d D 100,000 -500,000 17% 
e Π more than 500.000 41% 
7. To which religion do you consider 
yourself to belong? 
а Π Christian, 
not Roman Catholic 23% 
b Π Roman Catholic 42% 
с Π other religion 5% 
d Π no religion 30% 
9. To which of the following categories 
does, in your opinion, your father's 
occupation belong? (Please fill in 
even if your father is no longer em­
ployed or has died) 
a G higher administrative posts and 
higher academic professions 
(professors, medical specialists, 
etc.) 13% 
b Π directorate and management and 
academic degrees 28% 
с Π supervisory, executive and cler­
ical professions at a higher level 
28% 
d Π supervisory, executive and cler­
ical professions at a lower level 
15% 
e D skilled manual labour and lower 
clerical jobs 12% 
f Π semi-skilled labour 2% 
g Π unskilled labour 2% 
11. Are you interested in politics? 
а Π very interested 42% 
b Π moderately interested 45% 
с Π little interested 11% 
d Π not interested 2% 
6. To which category does the environ­
ment belong in which you have been 
brought up? 
a D upper class 11 % 
b Π upper middle class 33% 
с Π middle class 37% 
d G lower middle class 14% 
e Q working class 5% 
8. Are you a member of any special 
movement for a United Europe? 
а Π yes 8% 
b Π no, but have been 9% 
с Π no, and never have been 83% 
10. Which of the following political 
currents would you say approached 
your father's political convictions 
most closely? Would you use the 
numbers 1 and 2 to rank two choices; 
thus not giving more than Iwo boxes 
a number? 
a • conservatives 22% 
b Π socialists 19% 
с Π Christian democrats 26% 
d Π liberals 26% 
e G communists and left-wing 
groups 3 % 
f Π right-wing and extreme-wing 
groups 4% 
12. Are you member of a political party? 
а Π yes 13% 
b Π no, but have been 8% 
с D no, and never have been 79% 
13. Suppose that tomorrow General Elections were to be held and that you could vote 
for any political party in your country: to which party would your vote go? 
(Please write clearly) 
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14. Which of the following countries 
have you ever visited? 
a Π Belgium 
b Π Netherlands 
с Π Italy 
d Π Britain 
e Π Germany 
f Π France 
15. Which of the following languages can 
you read or speak? 
a • Spanish 
b Π Italian 
с Π English 
d • German 
e Π French 
f Π Dutch 
16. How many years of university education have you attended as per 1 July 1968? 
Encircle the appropriate answer: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
17. Town of University: 18. Date: 1968 
F. The following questions, finally, are intended to investigate which European organi­
zations and activities are known, and which are not. Would you try to answer every 
question, even if you have to guess the answer. Please do not think over the question too 
long. 
1. Below is a list of some countries in Europe. To the right of this list are a number of 
columns headed with the names of several European organizations. Please indicate 
which of the listed countries belong to the EEC by placing an X in the first column 
behind the countries concerned. Do the same for the EFTA countries in the 2nd 
column, the COMECON countries in the 3rd column, etc. 
a 
Η 
a Great Britain 
b Sweden 
с West Germany 
d Belgium 
e France 
f Spain 
g Switzerland 
h Italy 
i Poland 
j Hungary 
к Jugoslavia 
1 Turkey 
< 
Ё 
ω 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Ζ 
О 
υ 
ш 
о 
ü 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
J о-
Π Q 
«δ 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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2. What was founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957? Note: place one X ony 
a Π European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
b Π Common Market (EEC) 
с Π Council of Europe 
d Π COMECON 
3. What is the aim of the Kennedy Round? 
а Π strengthening the economy of the NATO countries 
b Π development aid trough bi-lateral agreements 
с • improved relations between East and West 
d D tariff reductions on an intercontinental scale 
4. In which part of the world are most of the countries that are associated with the 
Common Market (EEC) situated? 
а Π Europe 
b Π South America 
с Π Asia 
d G Africa 
5. To which field do the activities of Euratom belong? 
а Π defence problems of the EEC 
b Π peaceful uses of atomic energy 
с D atomic development for NATO 
d D scientific research in the EEC countries 
6. The Warsaw Pact is: 
а Π an East European defence community 
b Π a non-agression treaty between the EFTA and a number of countries in Eastern 
Europe 
с • mutual economic aid between East European countries 
d Π an economic agreement between countries of Eastern and Western Europe 
7. Have the following measures been carried out in the countries of the EEC (Common 
Market)? Please indicate your opinion by placing an X in the appropriate column. 
yes no don't 
know 
a abolishment of import and export duties 
(customs tariffs) 
b free settlement and exchange of labour and industry 
с equal social care in the countries concerned 
d common agricultural policy 
e common foreign policy 
f co-ordination of diplomas 
g use of national taxes for aid to African countries 
h use of national taxes for aid to the poorest 
regions in Europe 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
i combination of Euratom, EEC and ECSC into one 
community 1 2 3 
j European defence community 1 2 3 
к investment fund for industrial development in the 
countries concerned 1 2 3 
G. We have now come to the end of the questionnaire. If there are any comments that you 
would like to make, please use the space below. 
Please hand the questionnaire in sealed envelope to the invigilator. Your co-operation in 
this research project is greatly appreciated. 
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ENCLOSURE 4 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE 22 ITEMS OF PART A OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
No. Quest ι 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Part A 
No. 
1. (14) 1.00 
2. (2) -.54 1.00 
3. (13) 0.52 -.47 1.00 
4. (11) -.44 0.44 -.33 1.00 
5. (6) -.42 0.43 -.35 0.45 1.00 
6. (10) -.37 0.40 -.41 0.34 0.31 1.00 
7. (5) -.37 0.39 -.35 0.34 0.37 0.35 1.00 
8. (9) -.32 0.33 -.32 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.33 1.00 
9. (12) -.34 0.33 -.28 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.19 1.00 
10. (21) -.29 0.32 -.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.21 1.00 
11. (16) -.24 0.23 -.29 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.13 1.00 
12. (4) -.16 0.23 -.17 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.11 1.00 
13. (22) 0.24 -.25 0.15 -.15 -.15 -.11 -.13 -.13 -.05 -.12 -.13 -.00 1.00 
14. (1) -.13 0.11 -.09 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.07 0.03 -.06 1.00 
15. (7) 0.15 -.18 0.14 -.10 -.14 -.10 -.15 -.10 -.11 -.03 -.07 -.04 0.11 -.03 1.00 
16. (8) -.02 0.11 -.06 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.00 1.00 
17. (20) -.14 0.12 -.08 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.07 -.01 0.04 1.00 
18. (18) 0.00 0.07 -.10 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.22 -.04 -.01 0.02 -.00 -.07 0.07 -.01 0.01 0.16 1.00 
19. (17) 0.07 0.02 -.01 -.06 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.11 1.00 
20. (15) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 -.01 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.07 -.06 0.12 0.07 -.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 1.00 
21. (19) 0.13 0.01 0.11 -.06 0.02 -.06 -.00 -.05 -.04 0.10 -.05 0.01 -.01 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.03 -.00 -.09 0.07 1.00 
22. (3) 0.02 -.03 0.06 0.05 -.01 0.00 0.03 -.04 -.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.00 -.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 1.00 
ENCLOSURE 5 
FACTOR MATRIX OF THE 11 ITEMS OF THE EUROPE SCALE 
No. Questionnaire Statements Factor loading 
Part A, No 
1. (2) Failure of European unification would be a highly 
regrettable thing. 0.7320 
2. (14) Personally I do not care much for a United Europe. —0.7262 
3. (13) The disadvantages of a political unification of Europe 
outweigh its advantages. —0.6815 
4. (11) Towards the unification of Europe I shall have to add my 
little bit, whatever that may be. 0.6692 
5. (6) If the unification of Europe should demand substantial 
sacrifices, I would be willing to make them. 0.6667 
6. (10) The economic unification of Europe should be seen as a 
step towards its political unification. 0.6440 
7. (5) Every national political party should bring its programme 
in line with the political unification of Europe. 0.6306 
8. (9) I would be willing to give up my own nationality and to 
accept the European nationality instead. 0.5756 
9. (12) To believe in the unification of Europe is a matter of 
realism. 0.5420 
10. (21) I am convinced that there will be complete religious 
freedom in a United Europe. 0.5134 
11. (16) In a United Europe the habits and customs of my country 
will be favourably influenced through contact with people 
of other countries. 0.4554 
Total percentage extracted variance 0.3935 
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ENCLOSURE б 
THE NUMBER OF REAL PRO'S AND NON-PRO'S BY POLITICAL CONVICTION AND NATIONALITY 
(T is the total number of Students) 
Comm. Soc. Pasc. Lib. Indep. Chr. dem. Cons. Right Country 
RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP RP Τ NP 
Germans 
French 
Belgians 
Dutchmen 
Italians 
British 
Unknown 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
3 
2 
4 
3 
6 
4 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
8 
8 
5 
10 
6 
2 
40 
21 
19 
34 
25 
21 
5 
1 
1 
1 
4 
6 
7 
4 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
7 
2 
13 
6 
14 
4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
4 
1 
7 
3 
13 
4 
2 
3 
41 
11 
40 
30 
27 
29 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
8 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 
8 
8 
8 
5 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
1 
2 
6 
3 
2 
0 
13 
8 
43 
27 
25 
9 
2 
0 
0 
3 
2 
6 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
3 
5 
20 
42 
3 
0 
0 
1 
1 
13 
20 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
5 
0 
5 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
21 110 
19 57 
27 135 
17 113 
11 131 
5 114 
— 12 
3 
2 
10 
12 
35 
38 
0 
Political party 2 23 5 39 165 14 5 47 6 32180 15 3 35 6 14 127 14 2 81 35 1 14 4 100 672 100 
Note: Two French (RP) and one Italian (NP) student did not mention their political conviction. 
ENCLOSURE 7 
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
This table shows the degree of likelyhood in which the difference between Real Pro's and 
Non-Pro's must be attributed to chance (Interaction). 
Qu. 
No 
1. 
5. 
6. 
12. 
11. 
8. 
13. 
14. 
10. 
9. 
2. 
3. 
16. 
7. 
4. 
17. 
18. 
С Description of 
the question 
Size of Europe 
Form of control 
Form of government 
Purpose 
Integration 
Ties 
Standardisation 
Language 
Army 
Development aid 
Rate 
Period of realisation 
Promotion 
Contribution 
Opinion of 'why' 
Difficulties 
Relative position 
Factor I 
!i,b,c(d),(t) 
0.631 # 10-s 
0.737 # 10-w 
0.312 Ж 10» 
0.349 Ж 10-" 
0.796 Ж 10-" 
0.143 Ж 1 0 " 
0.738 Ж 10« 
0.371 Ж 1 0 " 
0.264 Ж 10-· 
0.676 Ж 10» 
0.490 #- 10» 
0.381 Ж 10» 
0.180 Ж Ю-7 
0.147 Ж 10-· 
0.954 Ж 10» 
0.143 « Ю» 
0.170 Ж 1 0 " 
Factor Π 
RP/NP 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.871 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
0.996 
Factors I and II 
Interaction 
0.186 Ж 
0.551 ^ 
0.993 Ж 
0.188 Ж 
0.148 Ж 
0.246 ^ 
0.111 
0.577 Ж 
0.187 Ж 
0.173 Ж 
0.388 Ж 
0.454 Ж 
0.232 Ж 
0.198 
0.265 Ж 
0.769 
0.244 Ж 
Ю-
5 
Ю-
12 
Ю-
7 
IO' 
Ю-
9 
10« 
10» 
Ю-
8 
10« 
10» 
10» 
10» 
10-г 
10-» 
From the above figures it appears that the differences occurring in the image of Europe 
between pro's and non-pro's cannot be accounted for by chance, except for the questions 
No. 7, 13 and 17. 
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ENCLOSURE 8 
FACTOR MATRIX OF THE 23 ITEMS OF THE 
SOCIAL ATTITUDE INVENTORY 
No Questionnaire Statements R + T-f 
Part D, No 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(10) 
(Π) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(26) 
(27) 
(29) 
Production and trade free 
Underdog deserves little help 
Right of trial marriage 
My country right or wrong 
Death penalty is barbaric 
Atom bomb morally wrong 
Capitalism is immoral 
Free to take one's own life 
Free love to be encouraged 
Compulsary military training 
Sex criminals to be flogged 
White lie often good 
God is an invention 
Church should get influence 
Religious people hypocrites 
Sex relations only in marriage 
People are prying into matters 
Jews are equally valuable 
Treatment of criminals too harsh 
Travelling without a ticket 
Occupation better than war 
Christ was divine 
Internal order more important 
Percentage extracted variance 
Total percentage extracted variance 
—0.1421 
—0.1611 
0.5632 
—0.3275 
0.4190 
0.3126 
0.3045 
0.2728 
0.4672 
—0.3364 
—0.3245 
—0.0195 
0.5803 
—0.4654 
0.1983 
—0.4391 
—0.1061 
0.2376 
0.4309 
0.1221 
0.1912 
—0.3974 
—0.3174 
0.1173 
0.4206 
0.4271 
0.3760 
0.3318 
—0.3040 
—0.1866 
—0.0647 
0.3518 
0.3403 
0.2847 
0.3525 
0.1913 
0.3209 
—0.1351 
0.3871 
—0.0409 
0.2767 
—0.1879 
—0.2516 
0.1716 
—0.0527 
—0.2140 
0.2128 
0.0780 
0.1953 
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ENCLOSURE 9 
THE SOCIAL ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS (in percentages) 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
Questionnaire 
Part D, No 
(1) 
(6) 
(7) 
(23) 
(14) 
(2) 
(29) 
(13) 
(5) 
(1) 
(26) 
(27) 
(18) 
(11) 
(17) 
(19) 
(3) 
(12) 
(20) 
(15) 
(21) 
(24) 
(10) 
Statements 
Fellow-men: 
Jews are equally valuable 
The death penalty is barbaric 
The atom bomb is morally wrong 
Our treatment of criminals is too harsh 
Sex criminals ought to be flogged 
The underdog deserves little help 
Native country: 
Internal order more important 
Compulsary military training 
My country right or wrong 
Production and trade should be free 
Occupation is better than war 
Religion: 
Christ was divine 
Church should get more influence 
Free to take one's own life 
God is an invention 
Religious people are hypocrites 
Sexuality: 
The right of trial marriage 
Free love should be encouraged 
Sex relations except in marriage wrong 
Remaining: 
A white lie is often a good thing 
People are prying into matters 
Travelling without a ticket 
Capitalism is immoral 
Agree 
90 
68 
65 
61 
31 
16 
41 
29 
21 
39 
30 
43 
25 
41 
41 
34 
64 
29 
15 
60 
49 
38 
31 
No 
answer 
5 
5 
10 
8 
8 
11 
9 
7 
10 
4 
21 
26 
7 
10 
14 
16 
8 
11 
5 
16 
22 
10 
7 
Disagree 
5 
27 
25 
31 
61 
73 
50 
64 
69 
57 
49 
31 
68 
49 
45 
50 
28 
60 
80 
24 
29 
52 
62 
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ENCLOSURE 10 
NP's Knowledge 
THE NUMBER OF NON-PRO'S IN PERCENTAGES IN THE MOST 
IMPORTANT SUBGROUPS (AVERAGE 15%) 
Personality Political Party Nationality Polit, interest Travelling Languages % NP's 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Germans 
French 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Good 
Rad./Tender 
Rad./Tough Belgians 5 or б countries 
Socialists 
Liberals Great 
6. 
7. 
4, 5 or 6 languages 8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Cons./Tender 
Chr. Dem. 
Pascifists 
Dutchmen 
3 or 4 countries 
11. 
3 languages 12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Average Indépendants Moderate 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 21. 
22. 22. 
23. Communists 23. 
24. Little or no 24. 
25. 25. 
26^  26? 
27. Italians 27. 
28. 28. 
29. Little 1 or 2 languages 29. 
30. 1 or 2 countries 30. 
31. 31. 
32. 32. 
33. British 33. 
34. Cons./Tough 34. 
35. 35. 
36. Right 36. 
37. 37. 
38. 38. 
39. 39. 
40. 40. 
41. 41. 
42. 42. 
43. Conservatives 43. 
44. 44. 
2 45. (no interest) 45. 
ENCLOSURE 11 
POLITICAL CONVICTION IN SECOND ORDER OF PREFERENCE 
Comm. 
Soc. 
Pasc. 
Lib. 
Indep. 
Chr. Dem. 
Cons. 
Right 
1st choice 
S 
! 
X 
16 
6 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
23 
t 
21 
X 
25 
47 
14 
49 
8 
1 
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fU 
4 
13 
X 
5 
15 
9 
1 
0 
47 
á 
1 
47 
21 
X 
23 
52 
34 
2 
180 
CL î 
1 
7 
7 
8 
Χ 
10 
1 
1 
35 
S 
υ Q 
б 
2 
37 
5 
41 
15 
Χ 
21 
6 
127 
. en 
δ 
1 
9 
5 
25 
6 
24 
Χ 
11 
81 
« j 
•a 
0 
3 
2 
2 
3 
0 
4 
Χ 
14 
.§ 
о 
I 
30 
132 
71 
128 
76 
144 
70 
21 
672 
Note: Of the 23 Communists, by first choice, 16 give their second choice to the Socialists, 
6 to the Pascif ists and 1 to the Conservatives. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Naar aanleiding van gehouden opinie-onderzoeken over de eenwording van 
Europa bleek de behoefte aan meer nauwkeurig onderzoek met een betrouw-
baar meetinstrument. Om de samenhang tussen een houding vóór Verenigd 
Europa en andere variabelen op te sporen was het gewenst homogene groepen 
in het onderzoek te betrekken. Mede om die reden werd het onderzoek ge-
richt tot studenten. Ongeveer 700 juridische en economische studenten van 12 
Universiteiten in België, Duitsland, England, Frankrijk, Italië en Nederland 
verleenden hun medewerking aan het onderzoek. Om de Europahouding zo 
nauwkeurig mogelijk te bepalen werd, op basis van een aantal vooronderzoe-
ken, een attitudeschaal geconstrueerd. Deze attitudeschaal bleek in vrij hoge 
mate unidimensioneel, betrouwbaar en valide. In de vragenlijst werd tevens een 
Europakennistest opgenomen en uitvoerig, middels gepraecodeerde vragen, ge-
ïnformeerd naar beeld en voorstelling van het Verenigd Europa van de toe-
komst. Om meer te weten te komen van de persoonlijkheid van de betrokkenen 
werd gebruik gemaakt van een 'social attitude'-schaal, waarin vragen werden 
gesteld t.a.v. het vaderland, de medemens, godsdienst en sexualiteit. Uitvoerig 
werd geïnformeerd naar de maatschappelijke situatie van de proefpersonen. 
De studenten blijken overwegend voor of sterk voor een Verenigd Europa. 
Men is bereid actief aan de eenwording mee te werken, men heeft vertrouwen in 
de opzet en men hoopt op een politieke integratie van de deelnemende 
landen. Slechts ± 15% van de proefpersonen kan als niet voor c.q. tegen 
worden beschouwd. De jonge intellectuelen blijken merendeels goed of uit-
stekend op de hoogte van Europese organisaties, onderlinge verdragen en 
bereikte resultaten in E.E.G.-verband. Ook de niet-voorstanders beschikken 
over een behoorlijke kennis. 
Het beeld dat men zich voorstelt van een toekomstig Europa blijkt onder-
ling grote overeenkomst te vertonen. Men kiest voor een Europese Gemeen-
schap van de West-Europese landen met uitzondering van Spanje en Por-
tugal. Men wil een democratisch Europa, in federatief verband, onafhankelijk 
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van andere wereldmachten en economisch en politiek geïntegreerd. Men is voor 
gezamenlijke prestaties op wetenschappelijk en economisch gebied en in meer-
derheid voor een gemeenschappelijk leger (van beroepsmilitairen). Men ver-
wacht een Verenigd Europa en zou de eenwording willen versnellen, ondanks 
reële bezwaren die dit mee zou brengen. Niet-voorstanders zien de eenwor-
ding van Europa noch als een belangrijk, noch als een werkelijk probleem. 
Toch menen ook zij dat de eenwording op den duur tot stand zal komen. 
Hun beeld van het Europa van de toekomst is aanmerkelijk minder gelijk-
vormig dan dit beeld bij sterke voorstanders en voorstanders. 
De houding vóór Europa blijkt in verband te staan met bepaalde attitudes 
in het maatschappelijke vlak. Met een houding vóór gelijkheid en consideratie 
met de evenmens en een houding tégen agressie en geweld. Een houding niet 
voor c.q. tegen Europa gaat samen met het voorstaan van een harde aanpak 
van misdadigers en minoriteitsgroepen, gecombineerd met een conservatieve 
houding t.a.v. vaderland, religie en sexualiteit. 
Politieke belangstelling, politieke richting en nationaliteit blijken een be-
paalde rol te spelen in een houding t.a.v. Europa. Dit in tegenstelling tot 
milieu, geslacht, godsdienst, en jaren academische studie. Onder studenten zon-
der politieke belangstelling, onder 'conservatieve' en 'rechtse' proefpersonen, 
zowel als onder Engelse studenten blijkt het aantal niet-voorstanders aan-
zienlijk (van 45 tot 34%). Ook onder studenten met weinig of geen buitenland-
se ervaring of kennis van Sreemde' talen komen niet-voorstanders vrij veel 
voor (30%). 
Er is aanleiding voor de veronderstelling dat het meest wezenlijke onder-
scheid tussen voor- en niet-voorstanders van een Verenigd Europa verankerd 
ligt in een verschil van houding t.a.v. de mens en maatschappij en als zodanig 
gebaseerd is op verschil in persoonlijkheid. Niet-voorstanders onderscheiden 
zich van voorstanders door een meer conservatieve en harde (tough-minded) 
instelling. 
Meer kennis van Europese zaken blijkt onder voorstanders samen te gaan 
met een 'sterkere' houding voor Verenigd Europa. Dit is wellicht te verklaren 
door een persoonlijke toegankelijkheid voor die informatie en een positieve 
belangstelling in deze. Meer of minder kennis discrimineert echter niet sterk 
tussen voor- en niet-voorstanders. 
Meer onderzoek in dit opzicht is gewenst, waartoe een aantal suggesties 
werden gedaan. Gezien de bereidheid van studenten en de aanwezige 'tools' 
is de mogelijkheid aanwezig tot meer onderzoek aan universiteiten in West-
Europa. Meer research t.a.v. de eenwording en de 'verandering' die zich heden 
voordoet bij jonge mensen. Een verandering die een belofte inhoudt voor de 
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wording van een Verenigd Europa. Aandacht werd besteed aan de geconsta-
teerde wens tot rechtstreekse verkiezingen voor een Europees Parlement en de 
positieve stimulans die hiervan verwacht kan worden. De behoefte aan inspi-
rerende acties in Europees verband werd beklemtoond. Tenslotte werd de 
noodzaak vermeld om nieuwe wegen te zoeken om de naoorlogse generatie in 
staat te stellen hun bijdrage te leveren in de wording van een Verenigd Europa. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Les enquêtes faites sur l'unification de l'Europe avaient démontré la nécessité 
d'une recherche plus précise à l'aide d'un instrument de mesure fidèle. Afin 
de découvrir la corrélation entre une attitude favorable à l'égard de l'Europe-
Unie et d'autres variables, il était souhaitable de prendre pour objectif de 
notre enquête des groupes homogènes. C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles 
nous nous sommes adressé à des étudiants. Il s'agit d'étudiants de douze uni-
versités des pays de la C.E.E. et de la Grande-Bretagne. 
Pour déterminer l'attitude à l'égard de l'Europe nous avons construit une 
échelle sous forme de questionnaire. Cette échelle d'attitude s'est avérée dans 
une large mesure unidimensionelle, fidèle et valable. Le questionnaire com-
prenait un test de la connaissance de l'Europe et s'informait aussi de l'idée 
qu'on se fait sur l'Europe future. Nous avons posé en même temps des 
questions se rapportant à la personnalité des sujets et à leur position sociale. 
Il se trouve que la majorité des étudiants sont partisans - et un certain nombre 
d'entre eux partisants fervents - d'une Europe-Unie, personnellement engagés 
dans l'unification, disposés à y travailler activement, confiants dans le projet 
adopté et désireux de poursuivre l'unification dans le sens politique. Environ 
15 pour cent seulement des sujets ne peuvent être considérés ni comme par-
tisans ni comme adversaires. Dans la plupart des cas les jeunes intellectuels 
sont bien ou parfaitement au courant des organisations européennes, des 
traités mutuels et des résultats! déjà atteints dans le cadre de la C.E.E. Les 
non-partisans aussi en possèdent une connaissance assez estimable. Les idées 
qu'on se fait d'une Europe future présentent de nombreux traits communs. 
On opte pour une Communauté Européenne des pays de l'Europe occi-
dentale, à l'exception de l'Espagne et du Portugal. On désire une Europe 
démocratique conçue comme une fédération de pays, indépendante des autres 
puissances mondiales et intégrée au point de vue économique et politique. 
On s'attend à une Europe-Unie et on voudrait accélérer l'unification en dépit 
des inconvénients réels entraînés par cette accélération. Les non-partisans 
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considèrent une Europe-Unie comme non réaliste, comme un problème de peu 
d'importance. Eux aussi pourtant estiment que finalement l'unification se 
produira. 
L'attitude favorable à l'égard de l'Europe est en relation avec certaines 
attitudes sur le plan social: avec des attitudes favorables à l'égard de l'égalité 
et du respect des hommes et avec des attitudes négatives vis-à-vis de l'agres-
sion et de la violence. Se montrent ni pour ni contre les étudiants partisans 
d'une attitude plus dure (à l'égard des criminels et des groupes minoritaires) 
combinée avec une attitude plus conservatrice à l'égard de la patrie, de la 
religion, de la sexualité. 
L'intérêt politique, l'orientation politique et la nationalité jouent un certain 
rôle dans l'attitude à l'égard de l'Europe, contrairement au milieu, au sexe, 
à la religion, etc. Il est permis de supposer que la connaissance de l'Europe, 
conséquence d'un intérêt positif, ainsi que la personnalité, constituent les 
facteurs les plus importants de l'attitude à l'égard de l'Europe. Plus la con-
naissance de l'Europe est grande plus l'attitude à l'égard de l'unification est 
favorable. Il n'y a guère de rapport entre la connaissance de l'Europe et l'at-
titude favorable ou proprement négative. Les non-partisans se distinguent 
des partisans par une mentalité plus conservatrice et dure (tough-minded). 
Nous avons signalé que dans ce domaine il faudra plus de recherches pour 
lesquelles nous avons fait quelques suggestions. Etant donné la bonne volonté 
des étudiants et les outils ('tools') disponibles, nous avons relevé la pos-
sibilité de recherches plus nombreuses aux universités de l'Europe occidentale 
au sujet de l'unification et du 'changement' qui s'opère actuellement chez les 
jeunes. Finalement nous avons insisté sur la nécessité de chercher des voies 
nouvelles pour permettre à la génération d'après-guerre de contribuer à la 
naissance d'une Europe-Unie. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Frühere Meinungsumfragen über die Einigung Europas zeigen die Notwen-
digkeit einer genaueren Untersuchung mittels zuverlässiger Prüfmittel. Um 
den Zusammenhang zwischen einer positiven Einstellung zum Vereinigten 
Europa und anderen Variabelen zu erforschen, war es erforderlich, homogene 
Gruppen in die Untersuchung einzubeziehen. U.a. auch aus diesem Grunde 
richtete sich diese Untersuchung an Studenten, und zwar an Studenten von 
zwölf Universitäten in den E.W.G.-Ländern und in England. Zur Bestim-
mung der Europa-Attitude wurde ein Meßinstrument in Form eines Frage-
bogens ausgearbeitet. Es stellte sich heraus, daß dieses Meßinstrument zur 
Bestimmung der Attituden in hohem Maße unidimensional, zuverlässig und 
valide war. In den Fragebogen wurde ein Test über die Europakenntnisse 
aufgenommen und nach den Vorstellungen über das zukünftige Europa ge-
fragt. Auch wurden Fragen zur Person der Beteiligten und ihrer gesellschaft-
lichen Position gestellt. 
Es zeigte sich, daß die Studenten überwiegend für oder sogar sehr für 
ein Vereinigtes Europa sind, sich persönlich an der Einswerdung beteüigt 
fühlen, bereit sind, aktiv daran mitzuarbeiten, dem Vorhaben Vertrauen 
entgegen bringen und die Einigung in politischer Hinsicht weiterführen wol-
len. Nur ca. 15 Prozent der Testpersonen entscheiden sich weder für noch 
gegen. Es stellt sich heraus, daß die jungen Intellektuellen sich großenteils gut 
oder ausgezeichnet in den europäischen Organisationen, gegenseitigen Ver-
trägen und bereits erzielten Ergebnissen innerhalb der E.W.G. auskennen. 
Auch diejenigen, die sich nicht dafür aussprechen, verfügen über durchaus 
ausreichende Kenntnisse. 
Die Vorstellung, die man sich von dem zukünftigen Europa macht, zeigt 
eine große Übereinstimmung. Man entscheidet sich für eine europäische Ge-
meinschaft der westeuropäischen Länder mit Ausnahme von Spanien und 
Portugal. Man will ein demokratisches Europa, einen föderativen Zusammen-
schluß unabhängig von anderen Weltmächten, wirtschaftlich und politisch 
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integriert. Man erwartet ein Vereinigtes Europa und möchte die Einigung trotz 
reeller Schwierigkeiten, die sich daraus ergeben, beschleunigen. Die Nicht-
Befürworter betrachten ein Vereinigtes Europa weder als realistisch noch als 
ein wichtiges Problem. Dennoch glauben auch sie, daß die Einigung auf die 
Dauer zustande kommen wird. 
Es ergibt sich weiter, daß eine positive Einstellung zum Vereinigten Europa 
im Zusammenhang mit bestimmten Attituden auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene 
steht: mit Attituden gegenüber Gleichheit und Rücksichtnahme auf die Mit-
menschen und Attituden gegenüber Agression und Gewalt. Eine Einstellung 
von weder für noch gegen weist eine Verwandschaft mit Attituden auf, die ein 
kräftiges Durchgreifen befürworten (im Hinblick auf Verbrecher und Minori-
täten) und geht zusammen mit einer konservativeren Haltung gegenüber Vater-
land, Religion und Sexualität. 
Politisches Interesse, politische Ausrichtung und Nationalität spielen offen-
sichtlich in der Einstellung zu Europa eine gewisse Rolle; dies im Gegensatz 
zu Milieu, Geschlecht, Religion usw. Es gibt Grund zu der Annahme, daß 
Kentnisse über Europa als Folge eines positiven Interesses, wie auch die 
Persönlichkeit die wichtigsten Faktoren in einer Einstellung zu Europa bilden. 
Es stellt sich heraus, daß mehr oder weniger Kenntnisse einen Maßstab für 
eine Einstellung 'für' oder 'sehr für' die Einigung abgeben, aber nicht scharf 
zwischen Nicht-Befürwortern oder Befürwortern trennen. Nicht-Befürworter 
unterscheiden sich von den Befürwortern durch eine konservativere und 
härtere (tough-minded) Einstellung. 
Es wurde dargelegt, daß weitere Untersuchungen in dieser Hinsicht erfor-
derlich sind; eine Anzahl Vorschläge wurden dazu eingebracht. In Anbetracht 
der Bereitwilligkeit der Studenten und der vorhandenen 'tools' wurde auf die 
Möglichkeit hingewiesen, weitere Untersuchungen an den westeuropäischen 
Universitäten im Hinblick auf die Einigung und den Wandel, der sich heute 
bei den jungen Leuten vollzieht, durchzuführen. Schließlich wurde mit Nach-
druck auf die Notwendigkeit hingewiesen, neue Wege zu suchen, um es der 
Nachkriegsgeneration zu ermöglichen, ihren Beitrag zum Entstehen eines Ver-
einigten Europas zu leisten. 
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RIASSUNTO 
In seguito al sondaggio dell'opinione pubblica sul problema dell'unificazione 
dell'Europa è risulato il bisogno di una ricerca più accurata con un sicuro 
mezzo di misura. Per fissare le cause delle variazioni di atteggiamento riguardo 
al problema dell'Europa Unita era preferibile coinvolgere nella ricerca gruppi 
omogeni. Anche per questa ragione il sondaggio è stato indirizzato agli stu-
denti. Studenti di 12 università nei paesi del Mercato Comune e nell'Inghil-
terra. A questo scopo è stata preparata una scala metrica in forma di domande, 
la quale è risultata estremamente unidimensionale, sicura e valida. L'elenco 
delle domande contiene oltre a dei quesiti per rilevare la conoscienza 
dell'Europa attituale e l'immagine di un-Europa nel futuro, delle domande in 
relazione alla personalità e alla posizione sociale degli interessati. 
Gli studenti risultano essere prevalentemente, о molto favorevoli ad 
un'Europa Unita, interessati personalmente all'unificazione, disposti a colla­
borarci attivamente, aver fiducia nell'ordinamento e voler continuare l'uni­
ficazione in direzione politica. Soltanto il 15% circa degli interrogati possono 
esser ritenuti come non fautorio avversari all'unificazione. Risulta poi che la 
maggior parte dei giovani intellettuali sono bene, о particolarmente bene al 
corrente delle organizzazioni europee, degli accordi mutui e dei risultati 
ottenuti nel M.E.C. Anche i non-fautori ne hanno una conoscienza notevole. 
Le immagini che ci si fanno della futura Europa appaiono molto simili 
l'una all'altra. È preferita una comunità Europea dei paesi dell'Europa occi-
dentale ad eccezione della Spagna e del Portogallo. È desiderata anche 
un'Europa democratica, in unione federativa, indipendente da altre potenze 
mondiali ed integrata economicamente e politicamente. Ci si aspetta un'Europa 
Unita e si vorrebbe accelerare il ritmo dell'unificazione dell'Europa nonostante 
le inconvenienze che questo porterà con sé. I non-fautori vedono un'Europa 
Unita non come realizzabile né come un problema importante. Credona però 
anche essi che quest'unificazione si realizzerà col tempo. 
L'opinione favorevole ad un'Europa Unita pare esser in rapporto con certi 
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atteggiamenti sul piano sociale: con atteggiamenti favorevoli ad uguaglianza e 
considerazione del prossimo e con atteggiamenti contro l'aggressione e la 
violenza; l'opinione non favorevole о avversaria all'unità dell'Europa sembra 
avere una certa affinità con gli atteggiamenti di coloro che sostengono una 
severità di giudizio (nei riguardi di malfattori e di gruppi di minorità) com-
binati con atteggamenti più conservativi riguardo alla patria, alla religione e 
alla sessualità. 
Al contrario deli-ambiente, del sesso, della religione ecc. gli interessi politici, 
la direzione politica e la nazionalità risultano avere una certa importanza 
per un contegno riguardo all'Europa Unita. C'è ragione di supporre che sia 
la conoscienza dell'Europa - come risultante di un interesse politico - sia la 
personalità costituiscano i fattori più importanti dell'atteggiamento umano 
riguardo al problema dell'Europa Unita. Più о meno conoscienza appare una 
norma per un contegno pro-unificazione non facendo discriminazione fra i 
fautori e i non-fautori. I non-fautori si distinguono dai fautori per una con­
cezione più conservativa e rigida (tough-minded). 
Si è notato poi che sarebbero augurabili delle ricerche più approfondite 
sotto questo riguardo, per cui sono stati fatti alcuni suggerimenti. Avendo 
avuto la condiscenza degli studenti e la disponibilità dei 'tools' (mezzi) è stata 
indicata la possibilità di sondaggi più approfonditi alle università nell'Europa 
occidentale riguardo al problema dell'unificazione e al 'cambiamento' che 
avviene oggigiomo nei giovani. In fine si è sottolineato il bisogno di cercare 
nuove strade per dare alla generazione del dopo-guerra l'occasione di con-
tribuire alle formazione di un'Europa Unita. 
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EPILOGUE 
An enquiry on a European scale cannot be held without the cooperation of 
many individuals. We are happy to say that we have indeed come into contact 
with many such individuals. In the first place we would like to mention Dean 
H. Brugmans of the College of Europe at Bruges who succeeded in rousing 
enthusiasm for the enquiry and Mr. J. R. Rabier, Director of the Information 
Service of the European Communities at Brussels. He made the preliminary 
arrangements for the desired contacts with a great number of Universities. His 
arrangements in the E.E.C, countries and England greatly contributed towards 
the success of the consultations. We owe much thanks to the many professors 
who lent their help personally of through their assistants in the briefing and the 
organisation of the enquiry, as well as to the students in the six countries for 
their outspoken interest and their accuracy in completing the questionnaires. 
We received expert help for the mathematic compilation of the data col-
lected, in particular we mention Prof. Th. Bezembinder and Dr. A. van der 
Ven of the Mathematical Department of the Psychological Laboratory at 
Nimeguen. Mr. J. Kuypers of the same Department did an excellent job in 
preparing the data for the computer. We owe our improved knowledge on the 
use of scale techniques to Dr. J. Hettema of the University Bureau for Educa-
tional Research. We are grateful to Prof. H. Eysenck of the London Univer-
sity, Mr. J. R. Rabier of the European Communities and Mr. R. Gijs of 
International Research Associates at Brussels for their consent to make use of 
their own research or research under their instruction. Mr. Th. Berings 
licensed translator, deserves our appreciation for his interpretation and the 
interest shown in the subject. 
The enquiry could never have been achieved without financial support. 
We owe much to the organisations who rendered their assistance for their 
considerable contribution as well as the way in which it was given. Needless 
to say, no influence was exercised as to the method of enquiry, the reporting 
or the contents. Finally we are grateful to the many people who contributed 
through their help and friendship. In this respect we would like to mention 
Prof. R. Lapierre of the University of Nice, Dr. A. Tatti of the Bureau of the 
European Economic Community at Rome, and Mr. J. Moreau of the Infor-
mation Service at Brussels. 
Our physical and spiritual rambles through Western Europe and the conse-
quent completion of this work would never have been possible but for the con-
tinuous help of my wife. To her I owe the greatest debt of gratitude. 
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STELLINGEN 
1. Studenten in de E.E.G.-landen zijn overwegend voor of sterk voor de een-
wording van Europa en bereid om actief bieraan mee te werken. 
2. Studenten zijn voor de uitbreiding van de huidige Europese Gemeenschap, 
bij voorkeur met Engeland en de Scandinavische landen. 
3. Studenten zijn in meerderheid voor een federatief verenigd (West-) Europa, 
economisch èn politiek geïntegreerd, onafhankelijk van andere wereldr 
machten. 
4. Het ontbreken van een 'Universiteit van Europa' wijst op gebrek aan durf 
en visie bij de verantwoordelijke autoriteiten. 
5. De stelling van H. J. Eysenck in 'The Psychology of Politics' (Londen 
1963) dat attitudes een component van de persoonlijkheid vormen wordt 
door ons bevestigd. 
6. Er is duidelijk verband tussen een niet-positieve houding t.a.v. de een-
wording van Europa en conservatieve attitudes gecombineerd met 'tough 
mindedness' - de geneigdheid tot 'krachtig' optreden. 
7. Rechtstreekse verkiezingen voor het Europees Parlement zijn als vorm van 
inspraak dringend gewenst, vooral als teken van vertrouwen van de natio-
nale regeringen in een Verenigd Europa. 
8. Verschillen in aard en karakter tussen de inwoners van de West-Europese 
landen worden overschat; de na-oorlogse generatie in deze landen ver-
toont grote gelijkenis. 

9. In een welvaartsstaat is de hoogte van het inkomen minder belangrijk dan 
de wijze waarop dit inkomen wordt besteed. 
10. Democratiseren van het middelbaar onderwijs is dit onderwijs afstemmen 
op taaibegrip en woordenschat van het 'gewone' kind. 
11. Voor het advies inzake huwelijksmoeilijkheden behoort meer studie te 
worden gemaakt van homosexuele c.q. lesbische gedragingen. 
12. Het opheffen van Uzendijke als zelfstandige gemeente is een schending 
van rechten, in de Middeleeuwen aan deze Hanzestad verleend en is een 
ontluistering van de historie van deze, tijdens de 80-jarige oorlog zo be-
langrijke frontierstad. 



